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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
EXPONENTIAL CAPACITY OF POWER AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MILITARY
ALLIANCE DYNAMICS
by
Nikoloz Gabriel Esitashvili
Florida International University, 2016
Miami, Florida
Professor Félix. E. Martín, Major Professor
The Cold War ended in 1991, yet the North Atlantic Treaty Organization still
persists. This outcome defies paradoxically two exceedingly important facts: First,
NATO’s central and greatest geostrategic rival—the Soviet Union—disappeared a
quarter of a century ago. Second, China and Russia are insufficiently capable to
individually challenge and counterbalance NATO’s military supremacy and conventional
military might. From a theoretical perspective, in the absence of an immediate threat
and/or the need to counterbalance relative power, International Relations alliance theory
would posit the dissolution of military alliances. Nonetheless, NATO continues to
endure. This study seeks to elucidate the strategic factors generating this puzzling
historical and theoretical development.
This study demonstrated that the political economy of the defense industry has
become an important variable that can affect the power of states and the endurance of
alliances. The study analyzed three equivalent cases of military alliance dynamics—the
aftermath of the Great World War, the Second World War, and the post-Cold-War phase
of NATO. The analysis of these three cases served to probe and demonstrate the
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necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence and endurance of military alliances.
According to International Relations alliance theory such conditions should be, first, the
presence of external threats and, second, the compatibility of national interests.
This study employed the comparative case study method in order to shed light on
the nature of threats faced by great powers during different time periods. Further, the
study used the focused comparison method in conjunction with the intensive case study
approach to explore in depth the states’ strategic military and economic interests and
alliance decisions. Having analyzed the external threats and compatibility of great power
interests in different time periods, the study concluded that neither of the two
abovementioned conditions is sufficient to explain the endurance and deepening of the
level of cooperation among the great powers participating in NATO. This study
demonstrated that technological features of military production—the size and extent of
scale economies, economies of scope, and learning-by-doing—and escalating military
costs have been crucial and complementary factors affecting the motivations and intraalliance politics of NATO member-states after the Cold War.
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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The unraveling of the Soviet Bloc began in Poland in June 1989. This was
accelerated by protests throughout Eastern Europe and the crack on the Berlin Wall on
November 9th, 1989. These events, together with other domestic-level conditions
operating in the Soviet Union, ultimately caused its collapse and ended the Cold War in
1991. Nonetheless, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) perversely still
endures despite the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union—the
principal rival that prompted the military alliance’s formation and purportedly warranted
its military and geostrategic operation for over four decades. Nonetheless, over the course
of a quarter of a century, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact
Treaty Organization in 1991, NATO intriguingly expanded its membership, kept its
internal structure and organization virtually intact, and engaged in a variety of military
missions, causing the redefinition of its original geostrategic function and purpose.

The enduring capacity of NATO is, indeed, a puzzling political event and a
counterintuitive development regarding the internal logic of military alliance theory in
International Relations. Undeniably, this is a crucial case worth exploring further and
comprehensively in terms of its historical, geopolitical, strategic, and theoretical
ramifications. Accordingly, this study aims to examine and explain, first, the underlying
reasons and conditions causing NATO’s endurance in the absence of its original purpose:
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counterbalancing the Soviet Union’s threat. Second, and perhaps even more importantly,
this study attempts to elucidate why NATO’s most powerful members, (i.e., France,
Germany, Great Britain, and the United States) continue (and deepen) their military
cooperation when their main rival is a bygone historical fact. Third, on a broader scale,
this study aims to advance a theoretical contribution to the literature on military alliance
dynamics, particularly, the paradoxical and perverse alliance endurance beyond the
defeat, capitulation, or disappearance of the alliance’s central enemy. From this vantage
point, this study will show that the political economy of military materiel production, an
aspect generally omitted when explaining military alliance strategies and dynamics,
might be a crucial causal factor in determining the alliance choices of states and the
counterintuitive endurance of military coalitions such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s since 1991.

After a general historical introduction and functional description of NATO, I will
review the extant literature on military alliance dynamics. Since I investigate the role of
military power in the alliance strategies of states, my work closely examines realist
assumptions and norms in the unfolding dynamics of world politics. Despite significant
differences among various variants or branches within Realism, military power and the
use of force are vital considerations among realists, driving alliance formation, operation,
and state strategies. I will review three major realist theories that relate power and the
threat of force directly to alliance politics among states: Balance-of-power; balance-ofthreat; and balance-of-interests theories. These theories should clarify the motivations
driving the behavior of states and the role of social power in their political and strategic
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motivations and calculations. Once these theories are clarified in relation to the
international behavior of states, I will explain specific alliance strategies that states
employ towards each other. I will briefly analyze four strategies discussed in the realist
literature: Balancing, bandwagoning, chainganging, and buckpassing, with its two
attendant variants referred to as bloodletting and/or bait, and bleed strategy.

In the process of introducing realist theories, I will show that they fall short of
explaining NATO’s endurance since the end of the Cold War. Specifically, they fail to
explain why Western European states chose the strategy of bandwagoning with the U.S.
rather than choosing other possible and available alliance strategies, including simply
opting for neutrality, as has been historically the case for Switzerland. In the next chapter,
I provide my own theoretical contribution based on the political economy of military or
defense materiel production. I will argue that traditional explanations of material
capabilities should be expanded to incorporate political economic insights in order to
complement (not to debunk) existing political and strategic propositions, and, thus,
explain better and more comprehensively particular alliance policy choices–for example,
bandwagoning.

3

Why Does NATO Persist?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an intergovernmental military alliance
that came into existence on April 4, 1949. The organization was built on the principle of
collective defense, wherein member-states have agreed to defend each other from an
attack by an external party to the alliance. NATO's base is located in Brussels, Belgium.
It is comprised of twenty-eight members across North America and Europe whose
military spending exceeds 70% of the world's defense spending. Two U.S. supreme
commanders direct NATO. During the Cold War NATO’s main rivals were the memberstates of the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization, which the Soviet Union formed in 1955
to counterbalance NATO.

Social uprisings against Communism and Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe in
1989, and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Treaty
Organization in 1991 removed NATO’s geostrategic enemy. Even after the main enemy’s
disappearance, the military bloc has, nevertheless, continued to exist and operate.
Moreover, NATO gradually expanded to include some Eastern European nations and
former Warsaw Pact Treaty alliance members, and it started to engage in military,
political and humanitarian activities in Europe and in the rest of the world. In sum,
NATO is still a central fact of world politics despite the disappearance of the original
geostrategic and political purpose for its formation, evolution, operation, and strategic
justification for over four decades.
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What factors make NATO’s endurance possible? Importantly, why do NATO’s
great powers continue their military cooperation instead of engaging in competition and
rivalry among themselves or opting for neutrality? As mentioned above, this study does
not aim to discredit and challenge existing political and strategic alternative explanations
for NATO’s endurance beyond the end of the Cold War. Rather, this dissertation aims to
show that important developments in the political economy of the military and defense
industry may have played (and still play) an important role in the decision by key NATO
members to remain active in the coalition. In the past two decades specific developments
in the political economy of defense created important incentives for some NATO
members to continue their organizational membership and military cooperation. This
study argues that, in addition to political and ideological factors, political-economic
calculations may have played a larger role than originally understood in extending the
institutional and operational life of NATO into the twenty-first century. This will be the
central focus and contribution of this dissertation.

Literature Review: Neorealist Theories and Alliance Dynamics

In the field of International Relations, different versions of Realism—ranging
from Classical to Neo-classical—have focused on military power and the use of force as
the most significant determinants of military alliance dynamics among great powers. It is,
thus, necessary to begin our exploration by reviewing the most germane propositions
generated by realist approaches to military alliance formation, operation, and endurance.
The focus here is to show how these alternative explanations may have overlooked
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important political economic determinants accounting for the perplexing endurance of
NATO beyond 1991.

Neorealist theories have been largely silent on how the political economy of
security may condition and influence the alliance endurance among member-states. In his
Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz argues that alliances are formed by states
to balance each other’s military power. Waltz suggests that "balance-of-power politics
prevail wherever two, and only two requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and
that it be populated by units wishing to survive" (Waltz 1979, 75). Following the end of
the Cold War, however, the Western European members of NATO, France, Germany,
and Great Britain, the most powerful members of the alliance trailing the U.S., did not
attempt to counterbalance the U.S. as we would have expected based on traditional realist
alliance theories. Rather than realigning with other world powers, such as, for example,
China and Russia, the European powers continued their alliance with the U.S. The
continuation of military cooperation among Western European and North American
NATO members may be acceptable, reasonable and even commonsensical from the
perspective of political, cultural, and ideological affinity among these countries.
However, from the normative perspective and fundamental assumptions underpinning all
variants of Political Realism, it is rather anomalous and even counterintuitive.

In this vein, it is theoretically, historically, and politically intriguing how and
why NATO continues to exist despite the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the
superpower it aimed to counterbalance and deter during the Cold War. The study will
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show that existing neorealist explanations are incomplete and should be complemented
with insights that take into account the political economy of military materiel production.
Below, I distinguish among various alliance strategies that nation-states usually pursue in
world politics, namely, balancing, bandwagoning, chain-ganging, and buck-passing.
Then, I will demonstrate that NATO’s Western European members follow a
bandwagoning strategy. Importantly, though, the study will show that bandwagoning, as
it is currently presented in the theory of alliances, is insufficient to shed light on the
causes leading to NATO’s endurance and military cooperation among Western European
powers in the midst of the U.S. military unipolar moment since 1989. It is imperative,
though, to incorporate the political economic dimension of defense development and
production into a more comprehensive explanation of these puzzling outcomes. This
dissertation will show how the notion of social power entails a political economic
dimension that still remains unincorporated into alliance dynamics theories by realist
scholars and is poorly understood by international security theorists. The central
argument of this study is that political economic developments in the defense industry
partly influenced NATO’s endurance by affecting the policies and calculations of the key
alliance partners.

Relationship of Power, Balancing Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics:

According to some neorealist scholars, states care about their power relative to
that of other states. Gains in power by one state will adversely affect the interests of other
states. In order to safeguard their national interests, whether it is because of survival or
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expansion, states engage in unilateral or multilateral balancing. Unilateral balancing
implies increasing economic growth and/or increasing military spending as states
augment their own capabilities. Multilateral balancing occurs when states enter into
military alliances. Since the principal objective of this dissertation is to explain why
NATO, a military alliance, survived and outlived the end of the Cold War, I will
concentrate on explaining the interests of states that may motivate their decisions with
respect to military alliance. Below, I will review the extant literature on the motivations
of states for engaging in multilateral balancing in international politics and the role of
power, based on specific objectives. I will subsequently explore what social power
motivations imply for states’ alliance strategies.

As discussed above, neorealist scholars have offered three distinct theories
expounding the motivations of states to engage in multilateral balancing–balance of
power, balance-of-threat, and balance of interest theories. According to the balance of
power theory, proposed by Kenneth Waltz, states attempt to balance each other’s
perceived power or capabilities in the international system. As stipulated by Waltz and
other realists, states’ uncertainty about each other’s intentions in a decentralized and
anarchic order causes them to remain perpetually fearful and distrustful about the
potential that other states may use force against them at some point. There is no guarantee
to the contrary. It is a world where there are no permanent friends or allies but, rather,
only permanent interests. For Waltz and others, power is a means for survival and the
primary concern of states is maintaining their power relative to other states (Waltz 1978,
82).
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John Mearsheimer, an offensive realist, on the other hand, starts with the same
assumptions as Waltz. That is, the international system is anarchic, states are mistrustful
of each other’s intentions, and they care about their power capabilities, which are crucial
for their survival. Unlike defensive realism, promoted by Waltz and others, which
assumes states to be status quo powers striving to maintain the existing balance of power,
offensive realism views states as power-maximizing entities. For offensive realists, the
anarchic international system pushes states to be more offensive in their quest to assure
security and survival by expanding and protecting their assets, gains, and power
(Mearsheimer 2001, 36).

In contrast to defensive realists, Mearsheimer argues that in the absence of a
central authority, uncertainty of a state’s intention, and the presence of offensive military
capabilities, states fear and distrust each other, and are compelled to take measures to
guarantee their survival. Given the fear of aggression, states strive to maximize their
power defined in terms of material capabilities. As Mearsheimer puts it: “They look for
opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at
the expense of potential rivals” (Mearsheimer 2001, 39). The states’ goal is to increase
their military strength at the expense of other states within the system, with global
hegemony being their ultimate aim. Thus, the main motivation of states is survival, but
they will not pass an opportunity to increase their power and even attempt to become
global hegemons. However, since global hegemony is almost impossible “due to the
constraints of power projection across oceans and retaliation forces,” states end up
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balancing each other and becoming status quo actors after they achieve local hegemony
(Mearsheimer 2001, 45).

In line with the defensive versus offensive realist argument, Stephen M. Walt
suggests that the main motive for state behavior is survival, but their concern is not only
the power differential of other states, but, more importantly, the threats they face in the
system. In his book Origins of Alliances, Walt offers the balance-of–threat theory to
explain the motivations promoting state behavior in the international arena. In contrast to
defensive and offensive balance of power theorists, the book argues that states ally to
balance against threats rather than against power calculations alone (Walt 1987, 66).

In their quest for survival, states carefully consider factors affecting threat level:
aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intention (Walt
1987, 68). Aggressive intentions matter because states viewed as aggressive are likely to
provoke others to balance against them, even if this state is weaker than other powers.
This is the reason why, according to Walt, “in a balancing world, policies that convey
restraint and benevolence are best, and appearing aggressive is costly” (Walt 1987, 70).
Thus, like defensive and offensive realism, Walt in his balance-of-threat theory suggests
that states strive for their survival. Similar to defensive realists, he argues that states’ best
option is to appear less aggressive to other states in their quest for survival. However, an
important distinction from defensive realists is Walt’s observation that states implement
their defensive policies with regard to threats posed by other states, among which,
aggressive intentions occupy a central position (Walt 1987, 82).
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In his “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” Randall
Schweller critiques Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat theory (Schweller 1994, 76).
According to Schweller, the status quo bias of some neorealists cannot explain the
competitive behavior of states observed so regularly. He argues that Walt’s analysis
ignores cases in which threat is not the main motivation for balancing. Rather, Schweller
contends that competitive behavior in international relations frequently stems from the
fact that certain states harbor intentions of territorial aggrandizement. Conflict, according
to Schweller, is driven by the existence of state’s unhappiness or dissatisfaction with their
territorial holdings (Schweller 1994, 77).

Schweller offers the balance-of-interests theory to explain the motivations of
states in the international system. His theory suggests that state interests depend on how
states value status quo situations as compared to possible changes they can potentially
affect—states that can gain considerably from changes will be more likely to take
measures to attain them and vice versa. In contrast, status quo states are relatively
satisfied with their share in the international system and attempt to hold on to it by
maintaining relative power. Revisionist states, on the other hand, might prefer increasing
their absolute power to maintaining security. In such cases states might opt to choose
power over security. Schweller adds: “when the goal of one or more states is something
other than mutual security [...] conflict arises not because they misperceive the security
efforts of benign states but because aggressive states truly wish to harm them” (Schweller
1994, 79).

11

Thus, states, according to these neorealist scholars, have various motivations in
relation to the use of military power and force. Above, I presented three balancing
theories offered by different neorealist scholars: Balance-of-power, balance-of-threat, and
balance-of interest theories. According to Waltz and Walt, proponents of the balance-ofpower and balance-of-threat theories respectively, states care about their security and
engage in the use of power primarily for defensive purposes. Differently, Mearsheimer
theorizes that increasing security often entails offensive use of power for defensive
purposes. Finally, Schweller, the proponent of balance-of-interest theory, focuses on
situations in which states are primarily motivated by territorial aggrandizement and, thus,
would willingly jeopardize their security in order to increase their power in the system.
He refers to such states as revisionist states.

Nonetheless, independent of their particular motivations and objectives, states
often have to align with other powers—that is, balance externally—to protect their
national interests. In the following section I will review the International Relations
literature, which discusses how states choose alliances based on their underlying strategic
motivations and goals. Accordingly, I turn now to examine the extant literature on
alliance dynamics and how it fails to explain the case of NATO. Once this is
accomplished, I will offer my political economic theoretical contribution with respect to
NATO’s endurance capacity beyond the end of the Cold War in1991.
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Motivations of States and Their Alliance Strategies

Depending on which version of neorealist theory is reviewed, the main motivation
of states can range from surviving to increasing their power and status, or all these
motivations in between the extreme objectives along a continuum. Independent of
whether the motivation of the state is survival, predation, or gain in power and status, the
array of alliance strategy options is the following: Balancing, bandwagoning, buckpassing, and chain-ganging. Below, I will review each alliance strategy and discuss
whether they explain convincingly or shed some light on NATO’s resilience and
endurance after the demise of the Soviet Union.

Balancing is one of the alliance strategies that has been extensively discussed by
neorealist scholars. Balancing implies offsetting or counterbalancing a potential external
threat by either pursuing increased unilateral capabilities in a self-help system or entering
into a multilateral arrangement or military alliance with others against the perceived or
actual threat. Balance of power theory posits that the formation of hegemony is highly
unlikely because states threatened by a potential hegemon will ally with others to balance
against it. Another important reason for balancing with other weaker powers against a
potential hegemon is because the membership of such an alliance increases the influence
of the state in the alliance. In contrast, an alliance with a rising hegemon could mean
domination or overwhelming influence by their stronger ally (Waltz 1979, 95).
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In the case of NATO, British, Canadians, French and Germans, contrary to what
Waltzian defensive neorealism would predict, are not trying to balance relatively larger
military capabilities of the U.S. within the coalition. Clearly, the U.S. is overwhelmingly
more powerful than any other state on its own. Nonetheless, Europeans in alliance with
Russians, Chinese, or these two combined could actually achieve enough military power
to counterbalance the U.S. The Europeans, however, opted against this option. Instead,
they chose to ally, or in other terms, bandwagon with a much stronger partner. This
decision has been explained according to multilateral cultural, political, and ideological
affinities among members of the North-Atlantic military coalition. Others have
emphasized the United States’ geopolitical and global leadership objectives and the
proximity of a potentially threatening Russia. This does not, however, provide a strong
explanation as to why the Europeans resolved to bandwagon with the U.S., consequently
remaining in the NATO alliance. In addition to Russia, China was an alliance partner
option for the Europeans in pure power politics context, yet these states resolved to
bandwagon with the U.S. and remain linked to the U.S. in NATO. Below, I will review
the extant theoretical military alliance literature discussing the reasons why states opt to
bandwagon rather than to balance the superior power of other intra-alliance actors.

There are two main versions on bandwagoning offered in neorealist literature:
One advanced by Stephen Walt and the other by Randall Schweller. According to Walt,
some states bandwagon because they lose hope of balancing the aggressor and, instead,
ally with a foe to gain, at least, something from wars. Walt suggests that bandwagoning is
a dangerous strategy, though, and states will bandwagon if and only if they cannot
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balance a threatening enemy. Therefore, weak states are more likely to bandwagon with
the threatening state. Strong states have a better chance of affecting the final outcome of
conflict and are more likely to balance (Walt 1987, 54).

Unfortunately, Walt’s bandwagoning argument in its current form does not
explain why states would continue in an alliance when there is a clear absence of any
enemies posing either a diffuse or immediate threat. While it is true that Russia and China
can, at some point, rise to threaten the Europeans, until very recently, perhaps as late as
the Eastern Ukraine crisis and Russia’s absorption and re-annexation of the Crimean
peninsula, they have not been displaying such aggressive intentions towards either the
Europeans or the U.S. In this vein, it is all the more fascinating and perplexing that the
NATO alliance continued to exist beyond the end of the Cold War; and that the
Europeans powers bandwagoned with the largest power within NATO rather than
dissolve the alliance as were the cases subsequent to the end of the First and Second
World Wars’ Triple Entente and Allied Powers alliances, respectively.

Schweller may be able to provide a clue as to why powers could remain allied to
one another even if the threat to their security is nonexistent. He introduces some
modification to the bandwagoning alliance strategy proposed by Walt. He suggests that
Walt mistakes bandwagoning with capitulation, and falsely attributes this strategy to
coercion of the weaker side by the strong one. In his “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing
the Revisionist State Back In,” Schweller maintains that states sometimes join an alliance
hoping to “gain something” rather than “to defend from a real threat.” According to
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Schweller, Walt’s bandwagoning falsely assumes that states only look for power to
achieve security. This is because Walt bases his argument on the assumption that "states
value more what they have than what they covet” (Schweller 1994, 80). Schweller
counters that some states—the so-called revisionist states—are not satisfied with their
position and care to increase their power rather than just maintain security (Schweller
1994, 81).

But like other theories, Schweller’s balance-of-interests theory cannot explain
why the U.S. and the Western European states continue to have military cooperation
despite the fact that the original geostrategic threat disappeared in 1991. Schweller’s
theory explains why the U.S. and the Europeans would align with each other against an
external threat: They have common interests in preserving the existing status quo.
However, it does not explain why the alliance members would cooperate, and, critically
important, even deepen their military cooperation such as, for instance, in military
production, in the absence of a clear and evident external threat. This suggests that some
other causes for military cooperation remain unaccounted for and are worth pursuing in
this study.

Chainganging is yet another military alliance strategy discussed by neorealist
scholars. In chainganging, attacks on allies are considered as a direct threat to the state
security. Chainganging occurs when states drag their allies into conflicts they would
rather avoid. Thus, states "may chain themselves unconditionally to reckless allies whose
survival is seen to be indispensable to the maintenance of the balance” (Christensen and
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Snyder 1990, 138). If one member state is attacked by another power, allies retaliate
together against the offender. However, chainganging is an alliance choice that explains
why states may go into war because they are already members of an alliance and are
dragged against their own will. It does not explain, however, why alliances endure but,
rather, why alliances may prove to be catastrophic as was the case of the tight alliance
system that prevailed prior to the 1914 debacle. As such, it is not useful in explaining the
continuing military cooperation among NATO’s great powers. In a similar fashion buckpassing strategy in alliance politics is not helpful to explain the endurance of alliances. In
buck-passing, instead of balancing against an aggressor, some states choose to pass the
responsibility of defending from an aggressor to another state. Thus, rather than
remaining together in facing the alliance’s responsibility, as was the case of the
Europeans behavior during the mid-1990s Balkan wars, states engage in buck-passing by
deciding to stay out of the conflict and letting other states sort out their differences.

In conclusion, none of the abovementioned theories provides a convincing
explanation as to why great powers such as the U.S., Great Britain, France and Germany
remained NATO members and continued their military cooperation after the Cold War.
Among those discussed above, Schweller’s alliance theory of bandwagoning seems to be
the most compelling, convincing, and promising for our task at hand. That is,
compatibility of national interests makes Europeans and Americans ally with each other.
However, as this theory stands now, it appears to be only useful in explaining the alliance
strategies during open hostilities and war. It does not explain, however, why Europeans
continued to ally with the US during peacetime and in the absence of a direct and evident

17

threat from other powers, and, equally important, why the allies deepened their military
cooperation in the absence of a real or perceived extra-alliance threat. The latter was
particularly and more prominently the case from 1991 up until 2008 during the RussoGeorgian War.

Beyond political and, possibly, cultural and ideological factors, this study will
show that there may be a political-economic rationale stimulating the decisions by the
U.S. and the Western European states to continue and deepen their multilateral military
cooperation. None of the theories discussed above explain the alliance strategies adopted
by NATO members since the end of the Cold War. I argue that the political economy of
defense production can turn out to be the decisive missing link and a complementary
explanation of NATO’s paradoxical outcome in terms of realist perspectives on alliance
behavior. I will argue that, at the moment, Europeans and Americans gain from
remaining involved in the alliance and cooperating with each other. Such cooperation
needs not be only political, cultural, ideological, and geostrategic, but, also, pecuniary in
nature. I argue that there are political-economic considerations motivating their
individual decisions. That is, the dynamics of economies of scale, economies of scope,
and other economic factors are centrally at play in this complex relationship. The logic of
the proposed argument is expounded subsequently.
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CHAPTER II

MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND SECURITY: NEOREALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES

Military alliance dynamics literature can be divided into two general categories:
neorealist and neoclassical realist. In the first category, we find neorealist scholars, who
understand a military alliance to be a collective response to external power differential or
threat conditions. The second category, represented by neoclassical realists, interprets
alliances as a coalition among states that have compatible national interests. What unites
these two positions is their common assumption that the endurance of alliances is
conditioned by the achievement of their objective, external goals. These theories,
however, take minimal effort to analyze how internal or intra-alliance dynamics affect the
alliance endurance. Before expounding my theoretical contribution, it is necessary to
discuss notions of intra-alliance dynamics in order to point out more directly an important
dimension motivating the purpose for my theoretical contribution to alliance dynamics
and politics—that is, intra-alliance balance-of-power. My goal is to analyze alternative
explanations of intra-alliance dynamics that may obviate my own explanation for the
endurance of military cooperation among NATO’s great powers.

Generally, neorealists understand alliances as an attempt to aggregate power in
order to balance other states’ power, to balance their threat, or to achieve certain
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geopolitical goals. But there is a competing view on alliances, which classifies them,
using Paul Schroeder’s terminology, as “power management tools” used by states to
control the strategies of their alliance partners (Schroder 1976, 255). However, alliances
require a credible commitment to constrain other states. Absence of such commitment
would make an alliance unstable and untenable. Following the same line of reasoning,
Glenn H. Snyder in his Alliance Politics suggests that states make commitments that can
actually entrap them in alliances. Hence, they will be wary of making any deep
commitments. Snyder called this phenomenon the “dilemma of abandonment and
entrapment” (Snyder 1997, 49). The benefits of an alliance are security and stability;
however, it comes at the cost of losing degrees of autonomy, and that involves the
possibility of being dragged into unwanted wars. But Snyder, just like Schroeder, makes
his argument for alliances as power management tools in the conditions of external
threats. He does not explain, however, why alliances hold in the absence of such threats,
and why states make deep commitments or uphold them when there is no apparent rival.

Nonetheless, Snyder makes an important contribution to understanding the
endurance of alliances. He coins the term “situational context of behavior,” to help
understand the bargaining process–the division of costs and benefits—within the alliance
(Snyder 1997, 62). According to him, the type of alignment, goals of the participants, and
the relative power of the allies will influence intra-alliance bargaining. In turn, the
outcome of the bargaining process will influence the endurance of the alliance.
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James D. Morrow, in his article “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the
Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” continues Snyder’s line of reasoning. He
suggests that symmetric alliances –that is, alliances of states with roughly equal strength–
will not last long because there is an inherent problem of distributing the costs and
benefits (Morrow 1991, 908). In a symmetric alliance, a change in either ally's
capabilities forces a reallocation of the benefits of the alliance, making the alliance less
likely to persist. Conversely, asymmetric alliances are easier to negotiate and last longer.
In such alliances the small state gains the support of the strong state but loses autonomy
and the strong state provides this support and gains the compliance of the weaker one.

To summarize, internal or intra-alliance balancing dynamics are very important
for the endurance of military alliances. The internal security depends on the bargaining
between states and on the benefits they gain from bargaining. In an alliance among equal
powers, bargaining might destabilize its endurance. However, in asymmetric alliances,
endurance is much more readily available. Thus, the enduring success of NATO could be
attributed partially to the fact that it is an alliance between a major power and weaker
members. The problem with this explanation is that it also assumes the existence of an
external threat simultaneous to the intra-alliance balancing dynamics as a crucial reason
for the endurance of asymmetric alliances. In the case of NATO, however, there was no
such catalyst immediately after the Cold War to warrant its existence. Despite the
absence of the external threat, the military organization continued to exist for its
members. Subsequently, I present and expound my contribution, which, I hope, will
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explain this perversely puzzling phenomenon by incorporating an overlooked and
understudied political-economic dimension to the question of alliance strategies.

I previously introduced the notion of intra-alliance dynamics as an important
influence on the endurance of alliances. Among the various important factors
conditioning internal dynamics, state’s interests stand out as one of the most prominent.
Similar to Schweller’s argument about the compatibility of interests among states, my
explanation takes the level of analysis explaining the endurance of alliances from the
systemic to the state level. According to this perspective, alliances are not solely
influenced by systemic factors and forces but, also, and perhaps primarily, by how
nation-states view their national interests within the system.

As mentioned above, Schweller coined the balance-of-interests notion in order to
explain what promotes states’ alliance decisions and preferences. Schweller labels as
“lions” those states that are strongly in favor of keeping the status quo. In turn, he defines
as “wolves” states that are hungry for change and for revising the status quo. Jackals,
which are smaller than wolves,’ have an interest in changing the system, and they
bandwagon with wolves. There are other categories such as “pilers” and “lambs,” but
their behavioral effect on the balance of interests is minimal, if at all, and unrelated to the
question at hand (Schweller 1994, 74).

However, Schweller explains only why states dissatisfied with the status quo,
such as wolves and jackals, would ally to change the odds. And “lions,” that are content

22

with the status quo, create alliances to oppose change. Schweller does not explain,
nevertheless, why lions would continue their alliance after the threat to their status
disappeared as is in the case of NATO. Even more importantly, he does not explain why
states would deepen their military cooperation in the absence of external or extra-alliance
challenges. Lions agree on their systemic interests and would not change the established
order. In the absence of external challengers it is, thus, intriguing to observe and
extremely challenging to explain why they chose to continue and deepen military
cooperation. I explain next what could explain such development on the basis of the
political-economic rationale of the defense industry and how it may influence alliance
dynamics.

This section introduces several centrally important economic concepts that can
potentially explain the states’ decision to stay in a military alliance and continue
cooperation beyond the disappearance of the original strategic objective fueling the
formation of the coalition. Economies of scale, economies of scope, and research and
development costs provide the political economic rationale for such outcome. Neorealists
allude to political-economic considerations mainly under the rubric of intra-alliance
balancing. According to them, states balance internally when they augment their own
capabilities by increasing economic growth and increasing military spending.
Consequently, natural resource endowment, and demographic, economic, military and
technological capacity determine the economic potential of a country. Logically, the
military power of a state is shaped by the state’s own economic potential in military
production. However, with economies of scale, economies of scope, and shared
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research/development costs, a different logic applies. In cooperation with each other,
nation-states may be able to achieve the same level of power, but using fewer resources
and economizing by sharing costs.

This dissertation attempts to demonstrate that economies of scale, economies of
scope, and research/development costs in military production can significantly cut down
the military expenditure of the allies, without jeopardizing their individual capabilities,
political and economic autonomy, and relative power. Consequently, on the basis of
rational cost-and-benefit considerations, it makes sense for states to cooperate with each
in order to cut down such costs, provided, of course, their individual national interests are
compatible. Below, I discuss in more details the logic of economies of scale, and other
market mechanisms, and how these ultimately may play a fundamental role in intraalliance balance and its endurance in the absence of an extra-alliance threat.

Market Imperfections:

Certain methods of production exhibit increasing returns to scale. In his
Principles of Political Economy, John Stuart Mill notes, “the larger the scale on which
manufacturing operations are carried on, more cheaply they can in general be performed”
(Mill & Robson 1996, 47). Adam Smith’s pin factory illustration in his The Wealth of
Nations demonstrates how large-scale production can achieve lower costs per unit than an
establishment with specialized labor tasks but short production runs. Scale and scope
economies reflect indivisibilities - fixed costs that are indivisible with respect to output.
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At the factory level, indivisible costs include capital requirements for plant and
equipment, which can be amortized more rapidly when spread over large volumes to
minimize costs per unit. Research and development costs will figure out as one of the
most prominent ones, if not the most prominent outlay.

The returns to scale are important because producers gain more from increased
scale, the steeper the cost curve in production (see the Graph No. 1 below): each marginal
increase in plant size for producers decreases the average cost of the production. The
difference in unit costs between producers of different sizes (for example between A and
B in the Graph 1 below) denotes the penalty, or the cost in terms of reduced efficiency,
when scale economies are not fully exploited. The steeper the curve, the larger are the
economies of scale. That is, the lower the average cost of production is when goods are
produced in large quantities.

For a producer, indivisibilities (costs incurred independent of the quantity of
goods produced) arise from expenditures for research and development, product design
and overhead costs. The minimum efficient scale is (MES) the level of output, which
minimizes average costs, or the point at which potential economies of scale have been
exhausted. The graph below shows how certain production costs fall until minimum
efficiency scale is achieved. For producers that remain on the downward-sloping portion
of the cost curve, some scale economies remain unexploited and, thus, savings in
additional production do not accrue to these producers.
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Graph 1 – Cost-quantity relationship in the process of production
with economies of scale
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Economies of Scale in Military Production:

Several authors have written about scale economies, economies of scope, learning
by doing, and other economic topics related to military and/or defense material
production. Harold Asher, in his paper, “Cost-Quantity Relationships in the Airframe
Industry,” notes that the "learning curve" tended to apply to airframe production … with
unit costs declining in a fairly predictable pattern as production expanded (Asher 1956,
78). Malcolm W. Hoag, in his “Increasing Returns in Military Production Functions,”
alludes to this reasoning when he suggests that prominent production economies of scale
do apply with special frequency in military applications (Hoag 1967, 44). He argues that
this is the reason why “concentrated sources of supply tend still to predominate,”
meaning that instead of there being many factories and producers, there are just a few that
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produce in large quantities (Hoag 1967, 46). He illustrates the point with the example of
the F-iii (TFX), which was designed to be an advanced tactical fighter-bomber for both
the United States Navy and the Air Force. Hoag concludes that the same logic applies to
space programs.

According to Stefan Markowski, scale, scope and learning economies do appear
to influence defense industry cost conditions, thereby helping prompt restructuring of the
industry nationally and globally (Markowski et al. 2010, 38). Todd Sandler and Keith
Hartley suggest that scale economies per se may have had only a modest influence on
defense industry structure in the past, while the evidence for learning economies and their
impact was more convincing. However, since the 1990s, scale economies have had large
impact as well (Sandler and Hartley 2001, 891). James Dunne suggests that governments
now appear more sensitive to the extra cost incurred by small national production runs
(and the high technology nature of some manufacture) and more receptive to the
argument that “economies of scale need to be met through international collaboration and
industrial restructuring” (Markowski, Hall & Wiley 2010, 88).

Markusen argues that a huge wave of US mergers and acquisitions in the 1990s
has been partly attributed to a search for scale and scope economies at a time of shrinking
demand (Markusen 1997, 115). Markowski adds that the degree of cross-sector
diversification among the largest defense firms suggests that they perceive and value such
economies (Markowski, Hall & Wiley 2010, 95). According to Dunne, a major driver of
economic restructuring is the growing trans-Atlantic nature of the industry, in terms of
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both the European companies’ aspirations to become major players in the US market and
the US’s acceptance that “interoperability requirements, the benefits of cooperative
defense programs, and an increasingly global industrial infrastructure require that the [US
Department of Defense] be prepared to accept the benefits offered by access to the most
innovative, efficient, and competitive suppliers worldwide” (Dunne & Surry 2006, 395).

The various views summarized above point to one key development: There are
clear indications that, after the end of the Cold War, cutting military costs became one of
the major concerns for NATO members. The conclusion of the Cold War meant, NATO
members no longer faced significant external threats and, therefore did not require high
scale military production. Some firms could not keep up with the reduced demand and
exited the market. Others, in order to stay in business, consolidated their operations and
expanded their markets internationally and beyond the confines of the NATO system.
Importantly, though, NATO members collaborated with each other and produced
common orders, which, I will argue, allowed them to use scale, scope and reduce
production and overhead costs significantly. All this has taken place while maintaining a
vibrant military research, development, and production processes in case of a sudden
increased need and to replenish normal tear and wear of the national armed forces.
Further, I argue that by cooperating beyond an immediate need, these countries gained by
saving from specialization in research, development, and production costs of defense.

Returning to Schweller’s terminology, lions may want to continue their military
cooperation beyond the end of the conflict in order to keep their power and international
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status, but at a considerably lower cost. If significant economies of scale, scope and
learning-by-doing exist in the production of military technology, countries can achieve
higher gains from shared research, development, and production as compared to similar
amounts invested unilaterally and independently. This argument is founded principally on
the assumption that significant scale/scope and other economies exist in the production of
certain military technology. Translating the logic of my argument to the case of NATO’s
endurance, I maintain that, although the strategic need for NATO may have disappeared
for some time after the Cold War, countries like the U.S., France, Germany, Great Britain
opted to stay in it and promote NATO beyond the end of the Cold War, in part, to access
affordable and still important military technology.

Methodologically speaking, part of my goal in this dissertation is to demonstrate
how important economies of scale, scope, and other economic factors may be in military
production and ultimately in the persistence of NATO beyond the end of its chief
geostrategic purpose. In addition, I will attempt to provide available historical and
quantitative data to establish what impact, if any; economies and market imperfections
may have on intra-alliance politics, specifically on NATO’s endurance beyond 1991.

Methodology and Central Research Question:

The key purpose of this study is to develop and articulate a sound answer to the
following central research question: Why did NATO endure through 1991-2014 in the
absence of an external or extra-alliance strategic threat? My preliminary answer hinges

29

on pecuniary considerations leading to significant savings in the research, development,
and production functions of military materiel and operations. In the absence of an
external threat, NATO members did not need to spend as much on expensive and
sophisticated weapon systems, and on keeping large operational infrastructures and
specialized personnel. Regarding research, development, and production, NATO
countries let military industries to consolidate, engage in trans-border mergers or
economic cooperation, use economies of scale, economies of scope, and learning by
doing in order to save scarce financial resources, and shared research and development
expenditure. This dissertation uses a combination of qualitative and descriptive
quantitative data in a process-tracing method in order to investigate and establish a sound
analysis addressing the central research question of this work.

The study focuses on the most important members of NATO, namely the U.S.,
France, Great Britain and Germany. With the exception of Germany, these countries were
lions, using Schweller’s terminology, after WWI and WWII, yet in yesteryears, they did
not continue the intra-alliance cooperation, as has been the case since the end of the Cold
War. To reiterate, this study attempts to explicate why states decide to continue and
deepen military cooperation in the aftermath of a major rivalry like the Cold War,
especially, when the main rival collapsed, capitulated, and opted out of the competitive
systemic game of international politics. I will attempt to explain, concomitantly, why
similar military cooperation did not take place at the end of WWI and WWII, when both
the Triple Entente and the Allied Powers alliances ceased to exist shortly after the end of
both major wars, respectively. The methodological objective of this comparative three-
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case study approach is to demonstrate the anomalous situation that has prevailed in the
world since the end of the Cold War in 1991. Below, I will present, first, the outline of
my research approach with the research questions, hypotheses, methodology, and brief
chapter content. With my explanatory contribution, these are the central components of
the study on NATO’s puzzling endurance for over two decades after the Cold War.

Ancillary Research Questions and Hypotheses:

1) Did the U.S., France, and Great Britain cooperate in military and weapons production
in the post-First World War and post-Second World War periods?
2) If not, what structural, geopolitical, ideological, or economic conditions precluded
such military cooperation in the absence of an extra-alliance threat?
3) Did the military and weapons production cooperation between the US, Great Britain,
France, and Germany increase during the Cold War?
4) If yes, what were the structural, geopolitical, ideological, or economic conditions that
energized the military cooperation process in the absence of a clear extra-alliance threat?
5) Has the military and weapons production cooperation among the U.S., Great Britain,
France, and Germany increased since the end of the Cold War?
6) If yes, what has been the primary motivation, given prevalent structural, geopolitical,
ideological, or economic conditions for such military cooperation?
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Answers to these questions will be used to guide the test of the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis No. 1: If there is no external threat and no compatibility of interests among
great powers, cooperation is weak or non-existent.
I will analyze the post WWI developments to confirm or falsify the validity of the above
hypothesis.

Hypothesis No. 2: If there is incompatibility of national ideational interests in the
presence of major external threat, then military cooperation among great powers will
ensue.
I will analyze the post WWII developments to corroborate or disconfirm the validity of
the above hypothesis.

Hypothesis No. 3: Given compatibility of national material and ideational interests,
cooperation in national military production will be positively related to economies of
scale, economies of scope, and learning by doing indistinctively in either the absence or
presence of a serious external threat.
I will analyze the post-Cold War developments to confirm or falsify the validity of the
above hypothesis.

Hypothesis No. 4: Provided there are favorable market conditions and compatible
national material and ideational interests, cooperation in national military production is
positively related to escalating costs in military production in either the absence or
presence of a serious external threat.
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I will analyze the post-Cold War developments to confirm or disconfirm the validity of
the above hypothesis.

Answer No. 1: From the preliminary research conducted, the answer to the first question
above is negative. Important structural, geopolitical and economic interests did not lead
to a cooperative outcome.

By answering the questions above, I should find that economies of scale,
economies of scope, and learning-by-doing in military production either were not present
or were too insignificant to effect intra-alliance military cooperation among states after
World War I and immediately after the end of World War II. Thus, my primary goal is to
analyze such compatibility. And, should such compatibility exist, I will examine if
market factors and forces influenced state cooperation in defense matters. Case studies, as
well as historical and international relations literature on great power politics of the era
will be used to corroborate or falsify the hypotheses expounded above. Concomitantly,
though, I will look at the type of weaponry produced and examine if the logic of
economies of scale, economies of scope, and learning-by-doing were at work in these
cases.

Answer No. 2: From the preliminary research conducted thus far, I expect answers to
questions 3 and 5 to be on the affirmative. Economies of scale, economies of scope, and
learning-by-doing have progressively become significant due to the nature of modern
military equipment—its sophistication and high research costs. During the Cold War, the
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cooperation among states became more pronounced because the production of weapon
systems was increasingly characterized with significant economies of scale, economies of
scope, learning-by-doing, and high research costs.

After the Cold War, external, geostrategic threats have significantly decreased,
which has made great powers even more likely to cooperate to save costs. I will show
through the analysis of the weapon-producing industry that economies of scale,
economies of scope, and learning-by-doing can now bring real benefits to these states.
Here, I will show how much states would spend if they produced the same military
equipment on their own and how much they actually spend through multilateral
cooperation.

The comparative case study method is used in order to highlight the presence or
absence of external threats. More specifically, I will use focused method of comparison
since I have a small sample of countries to study. I will combine my method with
intensive case study approach to explore in-depth about threat conditions that nationstates faced and alliance decisions they made under these conditions. I will approach each
case by analyzing the various economic and military tactics each state takes to deal with
actual or potential external threats. This will allow for finding similarities and reaching
specific generalizations and conclusions. These generalizations will allow us to
understand why states chose the alliance strategy they did given the political economy of
defense, compatibility of national interests, and threat conditions they faced at different
intervals since 1919.
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I will supplement my own analysis with historical records, writings of political
scientists as well as government records on the subject. I will analyze the US, France, the
UK, and add Germany to the post-Cold War analysis. These countries have been allies
for decades and actively cooperate inside and outside the framework of NATO. After
analyzing and comparing the threat levels during Cold War and post-Cold War, I will try
to explain why states chose differing strategies with regard to military cooperation after
the Cold War. I will base my explanation on the technological features of military
production. That is, the size and extent of scale economies, economies of scope, learningby-doing, and research and development costs.

When there is the potential for scale economies, unit costs differ across plants and
firms manufacturing the same product in different volumes. It’s impossible to observe
long-run average cost curves, but I attempt to draw from the unit costs data, which is
publicly available; significant decrease of costs as the quantity of production increases
would be indicative of significant economies of scale. This will allow me to observe if
there were any economies of scale in the period during and after the Cold War.
Importantly, though, I will be able to calculate how much states have gained by
cooperating in weapons production since the end of the Cold War. I will be able to find
how much states save on weaponry because of transnational production compared to how
much they would spend if they produced the same quantity on their own. Discovering
that market conditions have been bringing considerable benefits to states since the Cold
War, compared to other periods, might be an important explanation as to why the above-
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mentioned states continued to cooperate militarily within and outside the framework of
NATO.

The U.S. and its allies are cooperating in over 20 military programs. I will try to
investigate how much states save by cooperating with each other. Should savings be
considerable, this would be a robust indicator as to why military cooperation between
states still continues and, thus, solid proof that Schweller’s logic of the balance-ofinterest works even during time of peace, and is a primary motivation for the military
cooperation among NATO’s great powers.
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CHAPTER III

POST-WWI ALLIANCE DYNAMICS AMONG GREAT POWERS

The first hypothesis of this study posits that the absence of an external threat and
compatibility of interests among great powers do not lead to cooperation. This chapter
analyzes the post-World War One developments to confirm and/or falsify the validity of
this hypothesis. More specifically, I will investigate why the Triple Entente members did
not continue military cooperation after the end of the Great War and the signing of
multiple peace treaties in 1919, prominently among these, the Treaty of Versailles.
Identical to the end of the Cold War, the main rival or geostrategic threat that fueled the
inception, evolution, and functioning of the military coalition since 1907 disappeared as
the result of the military defeat. Yet, unlike the collapse and capitulation of the Soviet
Union 1991 that led to the end of the Cold War, member-states of the Triple Entente did
not continue, nor extended their military cooperation within their alliance and/or engage
in common military projects beyond 1918. I will try to show that the explanation lies in
the fact that the national interests of the great powers in 1919—namely, the U.S.A., Great
Britain, and France—were incompatible. They viewed post-world war global political
order differently. Subsequent to explaining the background and alliance politics of WWI,
the chapter will discuss in detail the individual national interests of these great powers on
the winning side of the Great War and how the incompatibility of their national interests
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precluded the extension of the Triple Entente alliance and further military cooperation
beyond the end of the First World War in 1918.

Background of WWI:

World War I, also called the Great War, started on 28 July 1914 and lasted for
four years until November 11, 1918. Up to the time, it was the biggest, most costly, and
most bloody war in the history of humankind, mobilizing more than 70 million soldiers,
the large majority of whom were Europeans (Keegan 1998, 12). The total death toll
exceeds 16 million, over 9 million soldiers and the rest civilians. Genocides, trench
warfare and technological developments significantly increased the death toll. It was one
of the bloodiest wars ever, and entailed important political developments, revolutions,
and economic changes around the globe (Willmott 2003, 23).

The world’s greatest powers at the time formed the Triple Entente alliance that
originally included the United Kingdom, France, and the Russian Empire. This military
coalition was meant to counterbalance the Triple Alliance—a secret military alignment
functioning since 1882 that morphed in the early 1900s into the Central Powers military
coalition. It has been argued repeatedly that the military commitment to the European
alliance system just prior to 1914 was one of the central factors that dragged Triple
Entente members into war against the Central Powers alliance that included Germany and
Austria-Hungary (Willmott 2003, 24). Italy did not join the Central Powers in the war,
although it was a member of the alliance, as Austria-Hungary and Germany were inciters
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of the conflict, in violation of one of the central stipulations of the alliance (Willmott
2003, 32). Both military alliances increased in size, as Italy, Japan and the United States
joined eventually the Triple Entente, while the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria allied with
the Central Powers.

Political and Military Alliances

The history of Great Powers relationships in the 19th century can be characterized
as one of trying to secure the balance of power among each other. By the end of the
century the powers had formed multiple political and military alliances (Clark 2014, 18).
Creation of such alliances began in 1815 as Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary signed a
treaty. The bloodshed of the Napoleonic wars that culminated in 1815 made European
powers averse to war. Diplomats at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 negotiated the socalled classical balance of power system or the Concert of Europe system among the
great powers of the continent. This diplomatic arrangement was supposed to resolve
conflicts of interest and differences among great European powers via peaceful means.
The mechanism worked rather well and except for minor wars among great powers, such
as the Crimean war among the Russians and the British in 1853-56 and the war among
the French and the Prussians in 1870-71, Europeans enjoyed international peace up until
1914.

However, with the rise of Germany in the second half of the 19th century, the
balance was bound to change. Before 1871 there was no centralized Germany. But it was
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known as the Holy Roman Empire and consisted of independent kingdoms. One such
kingdom was Prussia, which desired to increase its influence and even unite other
kingdoms under the leadership of the Prussian king. Otto von Bismarck, who was a chief
minister of the Prussian king, was the primary force behind the German unification.
Before 1870, Germany comprised of a few kingdoms, and territories rather than a country
under a central authority. It was in 1860s, when Prussians, with King Wilhelm I and
prime minister, Otto von Bismarck, incited a conflict with a goal to unite the German
states. Bismarck celebrated a significant victory over the Danes in the 1864 Second
Schleswig War, soon after which he turned his full attention to southern German states.
In 1866, Prussian military celebrated another important victory. After the final victory
German confederation was formed. Bismarck’s ambitions did not stop there. In 1870,
German confederation had warfare with France, when French opposed Bismarck’s
attempts to place a German prince on the Spanish throne (Hickman 2015, 1).

Prussians devastated French forces, captured French Emperor and occupied their
capital. In 1871, they proclaimed the German Empire at Versailles and ended the
unification process. The Treaty of Frankfurt ended the war and left German Empire with
French Alsace and Lorraine. The loss of this territory badly stung the French and was one
of the motivating factors in 1914 war (Hickman 2015, 2). At this point Germany was a
well-developed and industrialized nation with its army power growing speedily. The
strong Germany was a problem for the traditional balance of power system in Europe.
The agreement in 1815 among great powers had not envisioned another great power
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arriving in Europe and the traditional balance of power system was upset by the
empowerment of the Germans.

After the war of Germans with the French both states tried to make sure their
rivals did not pose threat to them. Bismarck’s Prussia aimed to keep France week and
without allies. French were especially worried at the cooperation among Germany,
Austria-Hungary and Russia in what came to be known as the Three Emperor’s league.
After German unification Prussia became a part of a German state. In 1873, with
Bismarck’s initiative the League of Three Emperors was founded between Russians,
Germans and Austrians. Despite the fact that Russians and Austrians had frequent broils,
with German intervention they were easily settled down, and the alliance remained the
most potent force. Disagreements between Austrians and Russians arose because both
were keen to increase their influence in the Balkans, among others in Serbia and Bosnia.

The League of Three Emperors functioned smoothly until Kaiser Wilhelm II, in
what later proved to be a huge political mistake, released Bismarck from his service and
assumed the conduct of foreign affairs himself. Wilhem II unraveled Bismarck’s
carefully designed system of alliances. One of his biggest blunders, if not the biggest,
was not to renew the relationship with Russia. By not renewing the Reinsurance Treaty
with Russia, the Austrians and Germans allowed the French to form a military alliance
with Russia, with the parties promising to come to each other’s aid if assailed by outside
forces. In 1892, Russians and French officially allied to defend themselves from possible
aggression by Germans and Austrians. Germans and Austrians formed a dual alliance to
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oppose Russians in the Balkans, as the weakening Ottoman Empire was no longer
capable to (Willmott 2003, 43). The alliance was expanded in 1882 to include Italians
(Keegan 1998, 35).

The German Kaiser, Wilhelm II (1888-1918), the son of Wilhelm I, was rather
belligerent towards his neighbors. He, nonetheless, forged an alliance with Emperor
Franz Joseph (Austria- Hungary-1848-1916). They shared language and culture. Their
ambitions of territorial aggrandizement were quite comparable. They had often been at
war with their neighbors and their countries had even fought against each other in the 19 th
century. They had special gusto for wars of conquest. In 1879, they formed a coalition to
thwart potential Russian challenges to Austrian foreign policy goals in the Balkans. Italy
was itself no stranger to ambitions of territorial aggrandizement and held a grudge against
France over Tunisia. An alliance comprising of three such aggressive countries was
eventually bound to involve in some major conflict (Wilmott 2003, 56). During WWI,
Great Britain, France, and the USA forged a military alliance to thwart Germany and
Austria-Hungary’s aggressiveness. Since the 1815 Napoleonic wars France and Great
Britain had abstained from forming common alliances. At this historical juncture,
however, they concurred that it was in their common interests to guarantee the neutrality
of Belgium. The document was signed in 1839 and its main goal was to protect Belgium
from outside aggression. Interestingly, though, some of the signatories were countries
that initiated the First World War. Later, the document was incorporated into the FrancoRussian agreement and formed the basis of the Triple Entente. (Wilmott 2003, 57).
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In 1914, Germany informed Britain of its intentions to attack France via Belgium.
Prussian General Alfred von Schlieffen wanted to avoid attacking France directly
because the French were well prepared. Rapid attack from the north (Belgium) would
leave France exposed. England, citing the 1839 agreement with France, advised Germany
to abstain or expect a war. The German Chancellor was infuriated and could not
comprehend why countries would go to war because of a "scrap of paper" (Wilmott 2003,
84). For the British, Belgium was the red line and not just the protection of French
sovereignty. Moreover, the British and French had significantly improved their relations.
They had signed the Entente Cordiale recognizing British influence in Egypt and the
French sphere in Morocco (Wilmott 2003, 84).

The French and British signed the Entente Cordiale in 1904 and in three years
Russia and Britain signed a convention. Although, the British agreements were not
military in nature, they, nevertheless, increased the chance of their involvement in the
French and Russian conflicts. The agreements among Russia, France and Britain have
come to be known as the Triple Entente (Wilmott 2003, 84). After the British joined the
Franco-Russian alliance, Turkey and Italy allied with the Germans. This would complete
the formation of opposing alliances. Both alliances increased the cost of war for rival
factions and were supposed to make the entry into the war unfathomable for the involved
parties. It is noteworthy to note that the major powers had their own, individual military
alliances with several smaller states. For instance, Russians allied with Slavs in Serbia.
These alliances were not considered a threat to the overall security and stability of the
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European geostrategic system. Ironically, though, such alliances turned out to be the fuse
that sparked the Great War in 1914.

While the French and British were improving their relationship, the United States
was gaining influence in the Pacific. Americans had a policy of avoiding international
entanglements—a foreign policy style dating back to the US first President, George
Washington. However, in 1889 they nearly avoided a navy battle with Germany over
trade routes in the Pacific archipelago. The conflict was peacefully resolved and the
United States signed an agreement with Germany and Britain dividing zones in the
Pacific. This was the first agreement of the U.S. with Germany (Keegan 1998, 46).

During WWI, the American freighter, Housatonic, was sunk in January 1917. No
American lives were lost this time, but soon after another ship was sunk, with 28
American lives lost. At the same time, the German Ambassador to Mexico, Arthur
Zimmerman, attempted to push Mexico into war with the U.S. by promising Mexico
material support and territories the U.S. had conquered from them. Zimmerman sent a
telegram, which was intercepted and decoded by the British. British intelligence shared
the message with the Americans. Although there is a historical debate about the “real”
purpose of Zimmerman’s telegram, some even claiming that it was in fact a British ploy
to push the U.S. into war on its side, the fact remains that after publishing the note in the
U.S.A., the administration declared war against Germany (Wilde 2015, 2).
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American soldiers boarded the first ships to Europe in the spring of 1917 to join
the British and French with whom they had no prior military alliance, but merely a
friendly sympathy with their plight against a common enemy. Germany had overplayed
its hand and encouraged Americans to act in concert with the original Triple Entente
members (Wilde 2015, 2).

Colonial Politics and Naval Power Before World War I:

Before the First World War, Great Britain was the global hegemon. It was a
superpower that possessed the biggest and most powerful fleet in the world and ruled
over a fifth of the world’s territories, including Australia, Canada, India, and other minor
territories. The rise of Germany threatened Britain’s global dominance. Germans had
their own intention of colonial aggrandizement and global domination. By the beginning
of the Great War, Germany had the second largest fleet and their army was the most
potent in Europe. German unification and the creation of the German Empire after the
war with France in 1871 catalyzed its economic growth. Starting from the mid-1890s,
Kaiser Wilhelm II devoted considerable resources to strengthening the German fleet.
Admiral Tirpitz had to make sure that Germans challenged the British on the seas
(Willmott 2003, 94). Both nations aimed to build more ships than their rival. In 1906
Britain released its Dreadnaught and capitalized on its advantage over Germany.
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Wilhelm II was a grandson of England’s Queen Victoria. He was an ambitious
leader and wanted to see Germany gain the status of other great powers. Therefore,
Germany was set on the track of becoming an imperial power and consistent with the
approach of other great powers at the time, it got involved too in the colonization of
foreign lands. It was, thus, inevitable and a matter of time that Germany would be
competing and in conflict with other great powers. Despite this, Germany still managed
to conquer parts of Africa and Pacific islands. Wilhelm spent enormous resources to build
his fleet. He was particularly humiliated by the German fleet’s demonstration on
Victoria’s special occasion. He devoted significant resources to build a formidable fleet
(Willmott 2003, 94).

Great Britain did not view Germany’s decision to expand its fleet with a
benevolent eye. The British forged an alliance with the Japanese to counteract German
goals of territorial expansion in the Asian Pacific. Shortly thereafter, Britain and France
formalized their relationship under Entente Cordiale in 1904. This helped the powers to
settle some outstanding disputes over their colonial possessions. As Germans completed
Dreadnought in 1906, British and German competition accelerated exponentially and
each nation strived to build more naval forces. Germany saw a formidable fleet as an
instrument to make the British recognize Germany’s ambitions and make political
concessions. Instead, the British signed an agreement with the Russians in 1907. This
agreement was signed on the basis of the Triple Entente of France, Russia and Britain.
The Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy and the Triple Entente were
now ready for further developments. The abovementioned political and military
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arrangements laid the foundation for WWI’s process of international polarization, which
would not take long to happen in 1913 (Willmott 2003, 98).

The naval race, nonetheless, did not end with the development of opposing
counterbalancing political and military coalitions. Soon enough the rest of Europe was
devoting its resources to increasing their military power (Prior 1999, 28). Right before
the global conflict, then European great powers had increased their military spending by
half as compared to 1907 (Fromkin 2004, 67). At the turn of the 20th century France had
started to grow into an industrial nation. Concomitantly, its military power rose
exponentially and keeping pace with its economic and industrial prowess. France had a
decent navy by the beginning of the Great War, counting submarines along with regular
battleships. Italy and Russia were taking measures to increase and modernize their armies
with Russians establishing their air force in 1907. In sum, before the outbreak of the
Great War, great imperial powers were engaged already in an intense arms race. This was
ignited by Germany’s rise, its relative growth in economic and military power, its global
ambitions, and its ability to reach and expand globally. This development was a clear
manifestation of the classical security dilemma problem, running and spiraling
uncontrollably towards a major conflagration among rival powers 1.

For the introduction and further elaboration of the security dilemma notion, see John H. Herz, “Idealist
Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, (January 1950), pp. 157-180;
and Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Jan., 1978),
pp. 167-214.
1
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The War Trigger: Conflicts in the Balkans

The Austria-Hungarian Empire was the main culprit of what came to be known as
the Bosnian Crisis (1908-1909). Austrians annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which
Ottomans had under their control since 1878. The annexation irritated Serbians and their
allies, particularly the Russian Empire. Further, Russian involvement in the region proved
to be highly provocative. It was notoriously known as the “powder keg of Europe”
(Keegan 1998, 124). The Ottoman Empire had to fight a war, the so-called First Balkan
War, against the Balkan League in 1912-1913. The war ended with Ottoman defeat and
they had to give up some of their Balkan possessions. As the result of this war, an
independent Albanian state was formed, while Greeks, Serbians, Bulgarians and others
saw their territories increase in size. The Second Balkan War was fought in 1913, when
Bulgarians attacked Greeks and Serbians. Bulgarians came out as a defeated party and
lost much of their territory to their rivals. In this vein, one can argue that both wars laid
the foundations and context for future violent conflicts, and prepared the grounds for the
outbreak of WWI in 1914 (Willmott 2003, 89).

In 1914 Archduke Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was
visiting Bosnia-Herzegovina. These were turbulent times in Bosnia, which was home to
an angered Serbian minority dreaming about unification with Serbia. Ferdinand was
taking a ride in his car on June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo, when Serbian militants attacked
him. The murder served as the trigger for the great conflict. Serb nationalist, Gavrilo
Princip, and his five accomplices from the group Mlada Bosna had gathered on the street
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where Ferdinand and his entourage were supposed to pass. The grenade, which was
thrown at Ferdinand, missed the target. Ironically, though, on the way back from a nearby
hospital, Ferdinand’s car ran into Princip and he did not hesitate to fire and kill both
Ferdinand and his wife Sophie.

The initial response of the Austrian authorities was to provoke aggression against
Serbs in Sarajevo. The violence resulted in the death of a few Serbs and damage of
Serbian residences. Acts of violence against Serbs were encouraged in many other cities
in the Balkans (Mitrovic 2007, 24). Many others were either deported or imprisoned. In
Bosnia, a Muslim militia was founded, which organized atrocities against Serbs. For
about a month, in July, the Great powers were engaged in diplomatic talks. The Austrians
correctly believed that the Serbian government had something to do with the
assassination. In addition, the continuous movements in Bosnia towards Serbian
independence irritated the Austrians (Stevenson 1996, 59). On July 23, 1914 they
presented 10 commandments to Serbians, which Serbian government could not accept
without revealing their involvement in the assassination case (Wilmott 2003, 76).

Austria-Hungary delivered an ultimatum to the Kingdom of Serbia (Taylor 1998,
44). Just a few weeks later the Great War broke out. Looking to avenge the murder of
Ferdinand, the Austrians sent their army to Belgrade. At this stage Serbs sought Russian
help and Russia started preparing for an offensive. Russian Tsar mobilized most of its
Western European districts and the fleets of the Baltic and Black Seas. Other regions
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would be in a state of alert ready for general mobilization. Serbians also declared general
mobilization and on July 28, 1914 Austria-Hungary officially declared a war on Serbia.

Two days after the Russians declared the military mobilization against AustriaHungary, they ordered general mobilization against the Germans. Austrians responded
with a general mobilization as well. Wilhelm demanded that Russia refrain from
supporting Serbians in case Austria-Hungary attacked them. An ultimatum not to support
Russia was sent to France as well. Russia declined the German ultimatum and declared
war against them on August 1, 1914 (Wilmott 2003, 79). This was the beginning of the
Great War or the First World War.

Germans needed the French to stay out of the war because they had to choose
between two alternative deployment plans, which were difficult to switch if launched.
According to the first plan, Eighty percent of the German army would go west, while the
second plan envisioned the deployment of sixty percent in the same area. Forty percent
was the maximum capacity the railway infrastructure would allow to deploy to the East.
The French left unaddressed the German request to avoid interference. They withdrew
their army 10kms away from the borders but simultaneously ordered the full mobilization
of the troops. As a result, the Germans chose to act according to the second plan. On the
second, third and fourth days of August 1914 Germany declared war on Luxembourg,
France and Belgium (Crowe 2001, 127). Britain demanded that Germans abstain from
invading Belgium. Having received no satisfactory answer they declared war on
Germans.
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Shortly after Russia’s mobilization, Germans warned Russians about an imminent
war should they not stop the military preparations. The military on all sides did not
hesitate to use military power to pursue their goals. Consequently, WWI began as
Austria-Hungary started the war against the Serbs, Russia responded by mobilizing
against Austria, Germany countered with a war declaration on Russia, France, and
Britain, and both Russian allies, declared war on Germany. Soon enough German’s were
stopped from advancing to Paris and the conflict grew into a war of attrition. The trench
line lasted until 1917. On the Eastern flank, Russians claimed a few victories over the
Austro-Hungarian army, but Germans stopped them. In 1914, the Ottoman Empire joined
the Central Powers and made their advancement on the eastern front much easier. In 1915
Bulgarians joined the Central Powers, while Romania joined the Triple Entente a year
later. In 1917, the United States entered the war on the side of the Allies.

In 1917, Russians withdrew from the war and signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk
with the Central Powers. Germans celebrated a huge victory and could now concentrate
their forces on the Western flank. Germans organized a huge offensive, however, they
were repelled by the Allies powers, which forced the German army to retreat. In
November 1918 both Austria-Hungary and Germany signed the peace treaty ending the
war with the victory of Allies. The end of the war brought with it the dismantlement of
Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. Borders of these countries
were redrawn; a few independent nations were restored or came into existence. The
ensuing Paris Peace Conference solidified the status of the Allied Powers as the global
superpowers. With an American initiative the League of Nations was created to prevent
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war and to promote peace and stability worldwide. Unfortunately, such attempts failed
because of rampant economic problems in the ensuing two decades. These included
economic and political nationalism, beggar-thy-neighbor policies, selfishness, and lack of
political and economic cooperation among the victors. All of these developments
contributed to the rise of totalitarian ideologies, like Nazism and Communism, economic
depression, military rivalry and ultimately the outbreak of the Second World War.

Post-WWI

The end of the Great War brought important changes in Europe and throughout
the world. Four empires collapsed and disappeared, several new states were formed,
border changes took place, international institutions were formed and important political
movements and ideas became widespread. The Treaty of Versailles was signed after the
First World War, on 28 June 1919. The treaty signified an end to the bloody war between
the Triple Alliance among the central powers and the Triple Entente. The armistice,
which was signed in 1918 effectively, ended the war; however, negotiations at the Paris
Conference lasted half a year (Cohrs 2006, 54).

The treaty was harsh obligating "Germany to accept the responsibility of
Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage" during the war (the other
members of the Central Powers signed treaties containing similar articles) (Cohrs 2006,
55). Subsequently, these treaties came to be called the War Guilt clause. Germany was
disarmed, lost much of its territories and had to pay compensation to the Entente powers.
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In 1921, the total cost of these reparations was assessed at 132 billion Marks (then $31.4
billion or £6.6 billion, roughly equivalent to US $442 billion or UK £284 billion in 2015
terms). At the time, economists, notably John Maynard Keynes predicted that the treaty
was too harsh—a "Carthaginian peace", and said the figure was excessive and counterproductive (Cohrs 2006, 92). Moreover, Germans could only have a small army of no
more than 100,000 soldiers without any heavy machinery and equipment.

Peace Treaties and National Boundaries

Importantly, though, the participants in the Great War gathered in Versailles to
plan the postwar global order. The Paris conference determined what measures to take
against Germany, and established the League of Nations, which would run according to
the principles enunciate by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in his “Fourteen Points
Address to Congress” on January 8, 1919 (Magliveras 1999, 52). Germany and its allies
were condemned as the party responsible for the damage to the Allied powers and were
accused of starting the war. Article 231, also known as the War Guilt clause was not well
received in Germany; actually, most Germans felt insulted, on top of that, they sincerely
believed that the blame had to be equally accepted by both sides (Morrow 2005, 44).
Germans called the decision at Versailles a dictate, which imposed on Germany “legal
sanctions, deprived of military power, economically ruined, and politically humiliated”
(Schulze 1998, 68).
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German humiliation would have important consequences for German politics in
the next two decades after the war. Germans denied the war guilt, found reparations
unfair and resented the occupation of German territories by foreign powers. Many started
to believe that Germany was betrayed by some political forces inside the country and
people started to accept the idea that alien forces worked hard to annihilate the German
nation. Widespread sense of German humiliation and resentment prepared the grounds
for the rise of the Nazi party, which searched for scapegoats so as to mobilize the German
people. The Nazis made sure that the disappointments of the Great War would ripen the
society to their political advent.

Many victorious nations viewed the punishment of the Germans as a just
recognition of their wartime wrongdoings. The Conference obligated the defeated side to
pay reparations. Because the Germans had the most functional economy among the
defeated countries they were forced to pay most of the reparations. France, Great Britain,
and the United States, were the most proactive in the Paris Peace settlement. For obvious
political reasons, they were determined to secure the fruits of their victory (Horne 2010,
42). At the same time the victorious parties were far from united in their standings. The
French and British were involved in the bloodshed for about four years; they had
expended too much human and material resource. The French, who had suffered the
most, held the biggest grudge against Germans and worked hard to weaken them
permanently. The British had successfully defended and even expanded their naval and
colonial goals. Britain’s goal now was to safeguard its economic interests, to manage the
European balance of power, and protect its empire.
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American Approach

The United States, which had entered the fighting in the last year, had the most
grandiose design of all, to create a stable world of democratic governments, limited
armaments, and open markets (Horne 2010, 71). When Wilson arrived in Europe in 1918
he happened to be the first American president who had visited Europe, as a president
(MacMillan 2001, 186). Wilson was the author of the Fourteen Points, which were very
popular among civilians in the U.S., Europe and other continents. According to many,
Wilson’s involvement in global politics had contributed to the swift end of the war.
Wilson also believed that he owed to the world to make sure the Paris Peace Conference
would follow his lead. He had promised a bright future after the war and started by being
exceedingly active in global politics despite domestic resistance at home.

President Wilson was actually shocked by the savagery of the war. It was hard for
him to comprehend how advanced civilizations could engage in such barbarism.
Although, his ideas were popular, most Americans desired isolation from Europe. Soon
after Wilson’s health deteriorated, he wanted to make sure Americans did not get
involved in European matters. Although, he developed the idea of the League of Nations,
American contribution to it was kept minimal. Ultimately, the U.S. never joined the
League of Nations. Also, Wilson was a firm believer that Germany was to be punished;
however, the punishment should not have been harsh, to make sure that Germans would
reconcile with the rest of Europe (MacMillan 2001, 186). He had already written on what
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he believed the world should be like in his "Fourteen Points" (MacMillan 2001, 186). The
main points in this document were:

1) No more secret treaties
2) Countries must seek to reduce their weapons and their armed forces
3) National self-determination should allow people of the same nationality to govern
themselves and one nationality should not have the power to govern another
4) All countries should belong to the League of Nations
5) Free trade and commerce among nations.

During the conference, Wilson was disappointed to notice that his wartime allies
shared little enthusiasm for the Fourteen Points (MacMillan 2001, 188). The main
reasons for the lack of understanding among powers were reparations and imperial
competition. Wilson was not able to gain support for his Fourteen Points at home. The
British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, and the French representative, Clemenceau, agreed
to found the League of Nations (Hickman 2015, 1). For two months after the peace talks
were opened, Wilson was actively engaged in the talks about the League of Nations.
Wilson’s initiative led to the draft of a document, which created a Council, Assembly,
and a Secretariat. The document also included clauses on the arbitration of international
disputes and collective security, as well as, colonial mandates, disarmament, and
humanitarian functions (Horne 2010, 145).
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Unfortunately, conflicts of interests among participants led to a treaty, which was
largely ineffective. Moreover, the treaty included very little of what Wilson had
prescribed in his Fourteen Points, and it was very harsh towards Germany and “ultimately
played a key role in setting the stage for World War II” (Horne 2010, 146). He spent
most of his efforts to persuade his allies to change their firm stance towards the Germans,
Ottomans and their allies. The French and Germans would not accept his Fourteen Points
because of irreconcilable differences they held with regard to its fundamental principles.
His Fourteen Points conflicted with the other powers. First of all, the U.S. did not believe
that the War Guilt clause, Article 231, imposed on Germany was just or reasonable.

The French and British compromised with the US and agreed to the establishment
of the League of Nations. But the U.S. Congress did not ratify the treaty because some of
it went against the US constitution, and isolationists in the congress could not accept it.
The U.S. signed separate peace treaties with Germany and their allies in 1921 under
President Warren Harding. The ultimate goal of the U.S. was to promote the world order
based on liberal principles, where diplomacy would substitute for wars. According to the
Fourteen Points the world would be built on the premises of democracy, liberty, selfdetermination and sovereignty. Ironically, the most prominent opponents of the U.S. were
its wartime allies, which possessed the greatest empires and were colonial states.

The Middle East proved to be one of the most polemical topics among the
triumphant powers because of incompatible aims and interests of the participating states.
Zionists and Arabs both were allowed to make statements during the conference and
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defend their position regarding some Ottoman lands. At first, an international
commission, which would study the opinion of local inhabitants, would be created. But
the U.S. allies, although initially sympathetic to the idea, later rejected it, and the US
formed the King-Crane Commission to travel to Syria and Palestine to learn the opinion
of locals. The US Congress passed the decision favoring Zionists in 1922 (Horne 2010,
165).

Although American President Woodrow Wilson was rather discontent with the
outcome of the peace talks for not having achieved his liberal goals, American interests
played an active role in rebuilding Europe and helping Germans with their wartime
reparations. Americans were divided in their opinion on providing help to Germans and
its wartime allies. Some argued that the aid should first go to those who suffered at the
hands of Germans, while others called for distributing aid equally among those who
suffered on both sides. Unfortunately, the economic depression undermined these efforts.

British Approach

The primary British concern during the Paris Peace Conference was to maintain
its empire intact. After the conference, David Lloyd George suggested that the outcome
of the Conference was quite favorable, taking into consideration that he had to deal with
Jesus Christ and Napoleon. The British Prime Minister was referring to how idealistic
Wilsons’s policies were versus the sheer realism of Clemenceau (Harris 1920, 45). Lloyd
George agreed that Germany had to pay for war reparations, but to preserve the British
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Empire he sought to settle territorial disputes, keep France secure, and make sure that the
German fleet never became potent enough to challenge the British Navy. While he
favored the formation of the League of Nations, he discouraged Wilson's call for selfdetermination as it could adversely affect Britain's colonies (Horne 2010, 148).

The British Prime Minister cared about his public image and could not afford
being soft on Germany. He needed public support to keep his party afloat. Being soft was
a sure ticket to losing upcoming elections. The British society demanded blood and the
Prime Minister had to go by their wishes. "Hang the Kaiser" and "Make Germany Pay"
were two very common calls in the era immediately after the end of the war and Lloyd
George, looking for public support, echoed these views (Horne 2010, 149).

But Lloyd George was preoccupied by important foreign developments. He feared
that communism, which came to reign in Russia, could spread to Western Europe. With
the war already over and Germans down, the British feared, that communism posed a
great challenge to Western nations. Lloyd George saw Germany as a natural barrier to
resist the expected spread of communism. He feared that if Germans became dissatisfied
too much with their government they could turn to communism. The British did not want
to be soft towards Germany, but they also realized that Germans would be the only
capable force to stop communism if it started spreading to the West. Germans had to be
punished, but it was vital to leave them capable to deter the spread of communism. It
would have been political suicide for the British Prime Minister to go public with these
views (Horne 2010, 160).
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The Great War had ruinous effects on the British economy. German submarines
sank over a third of British merchant ships during the war. Before the war the UK was the
top foreign investor. The war made it one of the largest debtors, having to devote about
40% of its government revenues to servicing interest on the debt. Inflation had risen and
the value of the pound sterling had fallen by over half. German reparations had a
depressing effect on the economy. It is calculated that the net financial loss in
investments was about 300 million pounds (Taylor 1976, 61).

Indirect harm caused by the war was much more important for the British Empire.
Important wartime achievements of Canada and Australia made them less willing to
follow the dictates of the British Crown. They increasingly demanded more autonomy in
the 1920s. Some of the British dominions were disheartened by the fact that the British
did not care so much about their army. Indians and Nigerians were vociferous in their
demands for independence. They realized that Britain was becoming weaker and it was
their time to act. Moreover, Great Britain had problems on what it considered its
immediate home territory. Irish started the war of independence right after the World
War. The Irish were virtually independent although they formally remained in the British
Empire.

French Approach

The French delegation, led by Prime Minister George Clemenceau, attended the
Paris Peace Conference with the primary goal of trying to make sure Germans never
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posed a threat to France again. He had twice been a witness to how Germans attacked
French lands, and wanted to make sure this would never take place again. Clemenceau
wanted to make sure that France’s wartime allies would become its guarantors of security
as well. Clemenceau was rather unhappy with Wilson’s fourteen points but was very
pleased when the American president signed a defense treaty with him. The treaty never
took effect, though, as republican isolationists decided to distance themselves from
European affairs, when they took over congress (Ambrosius 1972, 56).

The French had tried a different policy with the Germans. In 1919, before the
Paris Conference the French asked the Germans to solve the outstanding issues such as
territorial and economic disputes (Trachtenberg 1979, 71). The French were seeking
closer German collaboration because they feared that Anglo-Saxon powers might have
posed serious future threat to it. According to them, the French had common interest in
trying to resist the domination of the Anglo-Saxon powers. The Germans opted to wait
for the Paris Peace Conference and see what other great powers had in store for it.

As part of the armistice of WWI, Alsace-Lorraine, the region France lost to
Germans during the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, was returned to France. French Prime
Minister Georges Clemenceau wanted to make sure that Germans never attempted to get
the region back or seek any kind of revenge. The destruction brought upon French
territory was to be indemnified by the reparations negotiated at Versailles (Trachtenberg
1979, 73). The French wanted to make sure that Germans paid reparations, and they even
occupied the Ruhr in 1923 in order to force Germany to pay. Germany was unable to pay,
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and they sought United States’ help. Fortunately, the sides were able to agree to common
terms and the Dawes Plan and then the Young Plan were successfully negotiated. The
Dawes Plan and the Young Plan were supposed to mitigate the effect of war reparations
on the German economy and provide certain benefits for its recovery. 2

Georges Clemenceau believed that Germany had to be weakened so that it would
never be able to start another war. It is true that the French public shared the same beliefs,
but Clemenceau was under no public pressure, because he himself held those beliefs
firmly. He had seen the complete destruction of large parts of his country and he wanted
to make sure that this would never repeat. "The Tiger" did not have to adapt his policies
to suit the French public—the French leader and the French public both thought alike
(Trachtenberg 1979, 73).

Due to important disagreements among the allies, the final treaty was an
unsatisfactory compromise for the parties involved. Germany was left infuriated and it
was not weakened as some had hoped for. Soon other treaties followed, such as for
instance, the Locarno treaties, which reset the feelings between Germany and other great
powers to a more positive mode.

2

For detailed account on the plans, see Stephen A. Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe:
The Financial Crisis of 1924; and Douglas Willoughby and Susan Willoughby, The Adoption of the Dawes
Plan (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
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Aftermath, 1920–1924

The Versailles agreement was not able to settle the problems left by the war. It is
true that the League of Nations was created, but the victorious powers had too many
disagreements to make the system work smoothly. The United States decided to isolate
itself from global matters; France felt more insecure as British and Americans distanced
themselves from European matters; Soviet Russia, was already in war with Poland and
was growing into a serious threat for the West; Germans were facing domestic economic
problems, and were extremely unhappy about war reparations; and the former Entente
alliance was fragmented over managing the burdens of victory (Horne 2010, 189).
Germany and Russia had problems in their volatile regions. The military blocs between
France and its East European clients, as well as among the Little Entente, only hid the
nationalist rivalries in the region (Horne 2010, 191).

The revisionism reared its ugly head at Genoa political summit in April–May
1922. David Lloyd George, British prime minister, had an ambition to create a new postwar peace between winners and losers; he hoped to revive political and economic ties
between Western and Eastern Europe. The Conference failed, because Americans
abstained from participation, France obstructed its proceedings, and Germans and Soviets
struck their own treaty at Rapallo. Europe slid into chaos, with a wave of assassinations,
the Fascist seizure of power in Italy, and the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr in
January 1923 to collect unpaid reparations (Horne 2010, 197).
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France’s leader, Raymond Poincare, was too weak to continue being aggressive in
his foreign policy even if he wanted to, which he actually did not. Britain was thinking
globally, and insisted on the restoration of the European balance of power. France,
increasingly desperate in economic straits and rebuffed in its efforts for a British or US
commitment, bowed to the inevitable, even at the cost of sacrificing its East European
clients (Horne 2010, 201).

Conclusion:

This chapter was designed to test hypothesis No. 1, suggesting that the absence of
external threats and incompatibility of interests led to no military cooperation among
former allies. Specifically, the chapter showed that the Great powers, particularly those
former members of the Triple Entente, failed to engage in military cooperation after the
end of WWI. The disappearance of the external threat loosened the bond holding the
Entente powers together. Consumed by their own national interests, the United Kingdom
and France reverted back to traditional balance of power approach to foreign affairs,
while the USA opted for its traditional grand strategy of isolationism.

The United States, which had entered the fighting in the last year, had the most
grandiose design of all, to create a stable world of democratic governments, limited
armaments, and open markets (Horne 2010, 71). The ultimate goal of the U.S. was to
promote the world order based on liberal principles, where diplomacy would substitute
for wars. Wilson was the author of the Fourteen Points Address, which was very popular
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among civilians in the U.S., Europe and other continents. According to the Fourteen
Points the world would be built on the premises of democracy, liberty, self-determination
and sovereignty. Ironically, the most prominent opponents of the US were its wartime
allies, which possessed the greatest empires and were colonial states.

During the conference, Wilson was disappointed to notice that his wartime allies
shared little enthusiasm for the Fourteen Points. The main reasons for the lack of
understanding among powers were reparations and imperial competition (MacMillan
2001, 188). Unfortunately, conflicts of interest among participants led to a treaty, which
was largely ineffective. Moreover, the treaty included very little of what Wilson had
prescribed in his Fourteen Points, and it was very harsh towards Germany and “ultimately
played a key role in setting the stage for World War II” (Horne 2010, 146). The French
and Germans would not accept his Fourteen Points because of irreconcilable differences
they held with regard to its fundamental principles. Wilson spent most of his efforts in
vain to persuade his allies to change their firm stance towards the Germans, Ottomans
and their allies.

As a result, the absence of a credible external threat loosened the bond tying
Entente powers. Consumed by their own national interests they discontinued military
cooperation. This outcome contrasts with the developments after the Cold War, when
NATO Great Powers deepened their cooperation despite the absence of credible external
threat. The compatibility of national interests could explain why these states decided not
to rearrange alliances, but it does a poor job when it comes to explaining the deepening of
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cooperation. The goal of the following chapters is to do exactly this. In the next chapter, I
will explore what role the national interests of great powers and threats to their security
played to affect their cooperation after WWII. I will show that incompatibility of national
interests almost led to the disintegration of the Western Alliance; however, the existence
of immediate external threats, in difference to the post-WWI environment, turned out to
be the glue that held the allies together.
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CHAPTER IV

POST WORLD WAR II ALLIANCE DYNAMICS AMONG GREAT POWERS

This chapter will test hypothesis No. 2, which postulates that the absence of
compatibility of national interests, coupled with external security threats, leads to military
cooperation. I will analyze post WWII developments to confirm or falsify the validity of
this hypothesis. In this chapter I will show and investigate why allied powers—
predominantly, the U.S.A., the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France—did not continue
military cooperation right after WWII. Just like after the Cold War the main geostrategic
rival of the military coalition was no longer a threat, but unlike then states did not
continue cooperation within the alliance and/or engaged in common military projects. I
will try to show that the explanation lies in the fact that the national interests of the allied
great powers were incompatible after the end of the Second World War. Consequently,
they viewed post-world war global political order differently. However, the U.S.A., Great
Britain, and France overlooked their main differences and allied as soon as they started
perceiving the Soviet Union as a strategic threat to their security. After explaining the
background and alliance politics of WWII, the chapter will describe in detail the interests
of great powers on the winning side of the war, their incompatibility of interests and how
common threats forced them to overcome these incompatibilities and cooperate in a new
military alliance.
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Background of the WWII:

World War II known as the Second World War, lasted from 1939 to 1945. The
war encompassed the majority of the nations and all superpowers at the time. Nations
formed two rival military alliances: the Allies and the Axis. The conflict counted more
than 100 million persons and mobilized incredible amount of global resources. The
causes of WWII should had much to do with the outcome of the WWI. States on the
winning side, such as France, Belgium, Italy, etc., gained a lot from the war. Quite a few
new nations were born after the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman and Russian
Empires.

Despite the strong pacifist sentiment after World War I, its aftermath caused
irredentist and revanchist nationalism in several European states (Kritzman, Reilly and
DeBevoise 2006, 78). German’s were irate because of the incurred losses cemented by
the Treaty of Versailles. The treaty deprived Germany of almost one-sixth of its home
territory and colonies. Importantly, they had to pay reparations to other nations for war
damages and limits were placed on the size and capability of the country's armed forces
(Kantowicz 1999, 149).
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Causes of WWII

There were many causes of WWII among which the rise of Nazism in Germany
and Fascism in Italy, and Japanese expansionary politics in the 1930s played a crucial
role. Hitler was extremely aggressive in his foreign policy and did not hesitate to use
military means to achieve his political goals. Hitler came to power in Germany—a nation
that was highly disgruntled by the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The treaty was
not soft enough to mollify Germans, nor harsh enough to impede its rise (Kantowicz
1999, 149). Germans found it hard to accept that they had to demilitarize, never unite
with Austria, lose a number of German speaking territories, and importantly, they could
not accept the war-guilt clause which obliged the German people to pay war reparations.

During the German Revolution of 1918–1919, the German Empire was dissolved
and a democratic government, called the Weimar Republic, was founded. The democracy
had to face many internal problems and was unlikely to succeed. They were facing high
inflation because they had printed money excessively to cover up for the lack of
ingressions. The French had two main stipulations for Germany, reparations and control
of the coalmines. The French required German reparations to stabilize their economy
(Paxton 2011, 153). They also wanted German coal supplies for their coalmines had been
destroyed during the war. Moreover, the French asked for excessive coal to make sure
Germans would not be able to pay. They also wanted the German Rhineland
demilitarized. Germans found all these French demands excessive, unreasonable, and
highly onerous (Paxton 2011, 156).
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Germany was running late with its payments. As a response the French invaded
the Ruhr, the German coal region, in 1923. Naturally, the Germans were infuriated by the
French occupation. Many of them blamed the new founded republic for the humiliation.
Riding on the sentiment, Adolf Hitler attempted a revolution, better known as the Beer
Hall Putsch. He and his followers were infuriated by the fact that foreigners were
dictating Germans what to do. Germans could not resist because the Treaty of Versailles
had prohibited the Germans to possess combat ships, tanks, aircraft and heavy artillery
(Paxton 2011, 158).

Because Germans could not repay war reparations they resorted to printing
money, trillions of marks, which lead to hyperinflation. The Great Depression magnified
the difficulty of repaying the debt. The political and economic problems increased the
dissatisfaction of the German people with the Weimar Republic. Germans were enraged
with the victors of the war, who had pledged that Fourteen Points of the U.S. President
Wilson would dictate the nature of the postwar talks. But because Americans were not
able to convince its European allies to accept the 14 points, the nature of the talks did not
favor the Germans. Many Germans had assumed that their country capitulated only
because they were promised peace talks on the basis of the abovementioned principles.
Another segment of the of German population assumed that peace talks were conducted
by the government, which had assumed power through revolution, and it lacked
legitimacy (Paxton 2011, 165). Germany was deprived of all of its colonies and even
though they had won the war in the east, they had to give up their conquest.
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Italy, Germany’s ally that ultimately switched sides, had gained some territory
during the war; however, most of the promises made by Britain and France to secure
Italy’s support were not even discussed during the peace settlement. Italian nationalists
were left frustrated. Fascists led by Benito Mussolini came to power in 1925 and
immediately abolished representative democracy. They repressed all opposition forces –
liberals, socialists, and communists. Mussolini pursued an aggressive expansionist
foreign policy aimed at forging Italy as a world power, promising the creation of a "New
Roman Empire" (Shaw 2000, 56).

In Germany, the fledgling democracy was crushed by right-wing elements such as
the Freikorps and the Nazi party, who organized the Kapp Putsch and the Beer Hall
Putsch. The Great Depression in 1929, brought support for Nazism and Adolf Hitler. In
1933, he became the Chancellor of Germany. In the aftermath of the Reichstag fire,
Hitler created a totalitarian single-party state led by the Nazis (Bullock 1964, 28). It is
ironic that Adolf Hitler, who was not able to overthrow the German government in 1923,
eventually became the Chancellor of Germany in 1933 through political/democratic
means. Hitler immediately designed to turn the country into an authoritarian state.
Moreover, he planned to resuscitate the crippling economy, with huge unemployment,
through colossal military expenditure (Tooze 2008, 49). He abolished democracy,
espousing a radical, racially motivated revision of the world order, and soon began a
massive rearmament campaign (Brody 1999, 64).
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The Nazi party engaged in propaganda to encourage the rage of people against the
Weimar government and foreign powers. They spread the stab-in-the-back myth,
according to which the reason why the German fleet did not engage in war after the
mutiny of its sailors in 1917 was because it was full of traitor officers, who had betrayed
their country. They also promoted the ideology of uniting all German people under one
state, creating a living space for Germans through wars of conquest and subjugation of
inferior races. Italians and Japanese were practicing similar ideologies. Dissatisfied with
the post-WWI territorial arrangements, they had decided to lay claim on certain
territories. German allies, Italians, conquered Ethiopia in 1935, while the Japanese did the
same with Manchuria and parts of China.

Hitler’s first step was to increase the size of the German army and its weaponry.
In 1934 he began building ships, forming the air force and increasing the size of the
army. Simultaneously, Hitler accelerated his rearmament program and introduced
conscription (Zalampas 1989, 83). Germans now were obligated to serve in the army. The
French and British turned a blind eye at Hitler’s violation of the Treaty of Versailles.
Their graver concern was the spread of Communism from the east, and they hoped a
stronger Germany would serve as a deterrent against the expansion of the Soviets. France
desired Italy’s alliance and did not object to its politics in Ethiopia, which Italy wanted to
colonize. In early 1935, Hitler scrapped the Treaty of Versailles and the Saar Basin
became Germany’s once again.
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Hitler’s diplomacy largely consisted of extorting territorial concessions from
other powers. He made territorial demands and threatened with war if they were rejected
(Record 2007, 22). The strategy worked for some time as other powers preferred to
appease him than go to war with Germany. As part of his strategy he left the League of
Nations, started the re-militarization, created military alliances and invaded neighbor
states. Germans violated the Treaty of Versailles and moved their military to the
Rhineland. Hitler violated the Versailles and Locarno treaties and remilitarized the
Rhineland. He encountered little opposition from other European powers (Adamthwaite
1992, 43). Germany and Italy formed an alliance in 1936. Only a few weeks later
Germans and Japanese concluded their own agreement, which Italians joined in less than
a year. Both the French and British failed to act. The French were experiencing political
problems at home, while the British considering certain provisions of the Treaty of
Versailles unjust to Germans hesitated from involvement (Doerr 1988, 6).

The United Kingdom, France and Italy, alarmed by Germany, formed a front. In
June 1935, the United Kingdom decided to strike a naval deal with Germany, which gave
the Germans more freedom in their naval buildup. The Soviet Union was also alarmed,
especially by German encroachment on Eastern Europe and formed a partnership with the
French. The United States, concerned with events in Europe and Asia but opting not to
intervene, passed the Neutrality Act in August of the same year (Schmitz 2001, 121). In
1938 Germany annexed Austria and made Hitler’s dream of all German people living in
one state more realistic. The idea was widespread in both countries and was quite
popular. The British, French and Italians had pledged to support Austria’s independence,
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but after Italy allied with the Germans, Mussolini started supporting German aspirations.
The government of Austria was not happy about this fact. The results of the vote showed
that more than 99% of Austrians supported the unification, but the results of the vote
were fixed (Shaw 2000, 29). The Austrian government asked other powers for help.
Hitler promised this would be his last expansion and not wanting war the outside powers
condoned the political maneuver of Hitler.

Unfortunately, German, Italian and Japanese aggressions were met with feeble
resistance from other Great Powers and the League of Nations. Germany’s next goal was
taking the Sudetenland, part of Czechoslovakia comprising 3 million Germans. The Great
Powers allowed the annexation of Sudeten. This part of Germany was given to
Czechoslovakia according to the stipulations of the treaty of Versailles with the insistence
of the French. The territory was industrialized and the French wanted to weaken
Germany by separating the territory from them (Faber 2010, 101). Hitler insisted on the
annexation of the Sudetenland claiming that Germans under Czech were treated with
brutality. Germans required immediate intervention.

According to the Munich agreement of 1938 French, Britain and Italy recognized
Hitler’s demands and appeased him by allowing the incorporation of the Sudetenland.
The British Prime Minister and Hitler had three talks in 1938 to decide the fate of
Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain conceded that the Germans could incorporate the
Sudetenland as long as they abstained from invading Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain
hoped that he could satisfy Hitler by fulfilling his demands. He was following the policy

74

of appeasement. The reason why the British and French decided to stick to the policy was
because they realized the Treaty of Versailles was unjust to the Germans.

Hitler’s policies of rearmament and immediate expansion seemed reasonable. A
strong Germany could be a bulwark against the Soviets. Moreover, Hitler had argued that
the French-Soviet agreement made Germany vulnerable, as they felt encircled. He argued
that armament and expansion was essential to safeguard its security. Moreover, the
French would not be able to fight Germans without the British help and Britain was not
willing to go to war. Neville Chamberlain, who became the Prime Minister of Britain in
in 1937, firmly believed that Germans were treated unfairly after the WWI and giving in
to Hitler could rectify those issues. So Chamberlain adopted the policy of appeasement.

Germany still remained unsatisfied. Hitler could not hide his anger that the
British would not allow Germans to seize the whole of Czechoslovakia. In January 1939,
Hitler decided he would challenge the British naval leadership and started his own naval
build-up. In March, Hitler attacked the rest of Czechoslovakia, and appropriated part of
Lithuania. In less than a year German troops violated the Munich agreement and invaded
Prague. The policy of appeasement had failed. The French and British agreed that any
future aggression of Germany would be resisted. The Germans were not stopped by
ultimatum and set Poland as their next goal for expansion. Poland had access to the Baltic
Sea only because the Treaty of Versailles had given part of West Prussia to the Polish.
Danzig, the largest port of the area, was now a free city under Polish influence.
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At this stage, Great Britain and France were extremely worried. Hitler was
relentless and his next target was Danzig. Britain and France decided to interfere and they
supported Polish independence. Italy invaded Albania in April 1939, and the British and
French pledged support to Romania and Greece. Soon, as a response to Franco-British
pledge to Poland, Germany and Italy concluded the Pact of Steel (Dear and Foot 1995,
23). Moreover, Hitler abrogated the non-aggression agreements with Britain and Poland
claiming that they were trying to encircle Germany.

The Nazis had an intention of returning Danzig to Germany. In 1939 they offered
the Polish extra territory and a non-aggression pact in exchange for Danzig. The Polish
refused because they feared they would lose their access to the Baltic Sea. They did not
want to fall under German influence and succumb to future demands (Dear and Foot
1995, 25). The same year the Nazis decided to solve the Polish issue. In between two
world wars Poland’s official policy was that of neutrality between the Soviets and
Germans. In 1939 Germans demanded that the Polish join the anti-comintern and become
a satellite state of Germany (Lukacs 1976, 124). Poland refused and Hitler soon invaded
justifying his invasion as a necessary step towards “the extension of the living space in
the East” (Lukacs 1976, 124).

Britain and France had no intention of giving up Poland and they pledged to come
to their help should Germany invade them. Hitler continued to be bullish about Poland
and his actions provoked an international response. Britain and Poland became the
signatories of a defense pact. Britain and France hoped to persuade the Soviets to resist
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German aggression. Although its initial intentions were to come to the aid of Britain and
France, the Soviets were soon tempted by the opportunity of territorial aggrandizement
Germans offered them.

Germany did not want to be encircled by France, Britain, Poland and the Soviet
Union in case of a full-scale war. This is why in 1939 they signed a non-aggression pact
with the Soviets, which is known as Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The Germans and Soviets
did not seem to have rival intentions at the moment. In addition, the Soviets had lost
territory to Poland in 1920 and, as mentioned before, the Germans wanted back some of
the German territory conceded to Poland by the Treaty of Versailles. Germany and the
Soviet Union decided to split secretly the independent Baltic States into their spheres of
influence. They were waiting for the right moment to conquer these states. The Germans
and Soviets conquered all these states in the immediate future. According to the
agreement, Germans were left free to command western Poland and Lithuania, while
eastern Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Bessarabia were left at the disposal of the
Soviets. It was clear that Polish independence was seriously threatened (Dear and Foot
1995, 24). Hitler relished the agreement with the Soviets for it allowed Germans to avoid
a two-front war, as had happened during WWI.

On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland accusing them of sabotage
measures against Germans (Evans 2009, 48). On September 3, after Germans turned a
deaf ear to the British ultimatum to stop the warfare with the Poles, the British and
French declared war on Germany. France and Britain had failed in their attempts to
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prevent the takeover of Poland. But Hitler still did not expect that the British and the
French would start a war because of Poland and ignored their demands to withdraw the
German army from Polish soil. As a consequence, France and Britain declared war on
Germany in compliance with the defense treaties they had signed with Poland (Kochanski
2012, 39).

At the outset, British and French were hesitant to start full-scale operations, and
French sent small forces into the Saarland (Keegan 2009, 56). Importantly, Germany was
subjected to the maritime blockade aiming to hurt Germany’s economy and its military
capabilities. As a response, Germany ordered its submarines to sink the ships of the
Allied powers. Soon, Hitler offered a peace deal to the British and French, on the
conditions that the future of Poland would be determined by the Soviet Union and
Germany. The British government had little trust in Hitler’s pledges and they turned
down the deal. After hearing that the British government rejected the deal, Hitler ordered
an immediate offence on France.
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Impotence of the League of Nations

It is important to note that the League of Nations failed to keep peace among the
nations. It was founded as one of the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, with a goal to
uphold world peace. All states were supposed to be the members of the organization and
conflicts would be settled through peaceful bargaining rather than war. Should this fail
countries would impose trading sanctions on the violator and in case sanctions failed they
would go to war against that country. But the organization failed although it enjoyed
temporary success after WWI (Evans 2009, 25-28).

The end of the 1920s brought with it depression. The depression hit countries so
hard that some people resorted to violent means to solve their economic problems. For
instance, the Japanese army unilaterally invaded China, which was rich in lands and
natural resources. The Chinese government requested the help of the League of Nations.
Although, the Japanese were ordered to leave, they disobeyed and continued their
military raid (Keegan 2009, 32). Next step of the League was to order its member states
to stop trading with Japan, but because of the depression many countries feared to lose a
trading partner. Japan left the League but the plunder of China continued.

Italians violated the rules of the League by attacking Abyssinia in 1935.
Abyssinians asked for the League’s help. The League tried to impose sanctions but again
they would have no effect. The members of the League were not united in imposing
sanctions. The League of Nations failed mainly because not every state joined it (Evans
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2009, 32). The Americans, who initially promoted the institution, abstained from joining
it when Republicans changed Democrats at the helm of power in the states. Many other
countries were not allowed to become members, like Germany or Soviet Union, and
some others joined but soon left. Importantly, though, the punishment with trading
sanctions often did not work. Punished states still managed to trade with non-member
states. The League did not have its own standing army to enforce the rules of the
organization. And, it is important to note that the League was slow to intervene in
conflicts. It gathered only a few times per year and required unanimous approval of its
members (Evans 2009, 36).

Assault on the Soviet Union

Having conquered France, Hitler now laid his eyes on the Soviet Union. He
ordered the German troops to invade the Soviet Union in 1941. Hitler reasoned that he
could defeat the Soviets in a fast war, so-called blitzkrieg. Germans believed that they
would catch the Soviets by surprise. Hitler also believed that by defeating the Soviets he
would prevent any future attack from Stalin. Moreover, Germans reasoned that by
defeating the Soviets they would force the British to compromise and sign a peace treaty
(Dear and Foot 1995, 78).
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Japanese Involvement in WWII

On December 7th, 1941, Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, the U.S. naval base in the
Pacific Ocean. The Japanese air forces completely annihilated the harbor. Thousands of
soldiers were killed and wounded. The Japanese suffered only minor losses. On the
following day the US declared a war on Japan. Japan attacked the Philippines, first
organizing an air assault and then invading the country. Japan invaded a few other
countries in the neighborhood with an ultimate goal of taking control of the local oil
fields (Schmitz 2001, 67). Right after the Japanese attacked the US base, Germany
declared a war on the US. Hitler hoped that if he did so the Japanese would support him
and invade the Soviet Union. Unfortunately for Hitler his calculations proved wrong and
the Japanese did not assail the Soviets. Moreover, now Americans had a justification to
attack Germany itself. Because of his blunder, Hitler was now simultaneously fighting
the US, Britain and the Soviet Union (Zalampas 1989, 134).

The primary reason why the Japanese initiated their assault on Indochina and the
US is because they lacked resources. After defeating the Russians in 1905, the ultimate
goal of the Japanese was to expand in Asia. They aspired for economic self-sufficiency
and for this they needed to dominate East Asia (Hotta 2007, 87). Japan’s goal was to
become the most influential actor in China. In 1910 Japan annexed Korea.

In 1931 Japan was hit hard by the Great depression. Because the government was
too weak to solve outstanding problems, the Japanese army assumed the responsibility.
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The army saw Manchuria as a prized asset that would solve Japan’s problems. It was rich
in resources and had a lot of fertile land for overcrowded Japanese population. In 1937
Japan invaded Manchuria and China so as to remove Western powers and dominate the
region itself (Best 2002, 128). It was when the Japanese moved their troops to French
Indochina that Roosevelt’s administration stopped oil shipments to Japan (about 80% of
all its oil imports). Instead of withdrawing its troops from the occupied territories Japan
decided to conquer the oil fields in East Indies and become oil-independent (Sugihara
1997, 56).

The U.S. government and its European allies were in favor of an open door policy
in China. Hence, the Japanese expansionary ambitions were unacceptable to them.
Americans held close ties with the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-Shek and
considered the Japanese invasion in 1937 as a violation of its sovereign rights. In
response to the Japanese aggression, the US provided diplomatic, economic and military
help to China.

In 1940 the U.S. began limiting its trade with Japan. The U.S., Britain and the
Netherlands provided almost all Japanese oil imports (Conrad Black 2005, 647). In
response, the Japanese invaded French Indochina to prevent Chinese from importing fuel
and military supplies. Japan achieved its goal of stationing troops in Indochina, though it
would take place gradually. In 1941, after the Germans attacked the Soviets, the Japanese
not fearing them anymore continued with the occupation of the rest of Indochina. The
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U.S. imposed full trade embargo on Japan, trying to halt the Japanese aggression. Japan
responded with the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

World War II Ends

The war lasted 6 long years and ended with the German defeat in 1945. The
leaders of the victorious side gathered at the Potsdam Conference of July-August 1945.
Truman, Churchill and Stalin gathered to decide the fate of Japan and Germany. As a
result, Germany would be split into four zones controlled by the Soviet Union, Britain,
the United States and France. Because they needed Stalin’s cooperation in the war with
Japan, Churchill and Truman compromised with Stalin on the important question of
Eastern Europe. Truman was so desperate after two bloody battles, at Iwo Jima and
Okinawa, that he sanctioned the use of atomic bombs. The Japanese cities of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki were annihilated in early August 1945. Almost immediately, the Japanese
capitulated, accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and formally surrendered.

Post World War II

The U.S.A., the UK and France were on the winning side of WWII. During the
war, these allies, together with the Soviet Union, were united in their opposition to Nazi
Germany; however, immediately after defeating their enemy they discovered that they
had more differences than similarities in their visions of the post-war European and
global politics. The U.S.A. desired to reconstruct the post-war world order into one based
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on multilateralism and open-door politics. Britain, on the other hand, too weak to
compete economically with U.S.A., hang on to Imperial Preference system. France, just
like after WWI, wanted to prevent the rise of Germany, and in this objective, it differed
from the U.S.A. and the UK, which saw a strong Germany as a barrier against the spread
of Soviet communism on Western Europe. Thus, after the war the differences among
great powers might have proved insurmountable, if not for the common geostrategic
threats these states faced emanating from the Soviet Union.

American Interests

WWI and the Great Depression transformed the way Washington thought about
U.S. national security. Long-term American interests required a world more open to the
free flow of goods and capital. Quantitative restrictions, imperial preferences, exchange
controls, and autarkical economic arrangements restricted trade, had prolonged the Great
Depression, and bred jealousy and aggression (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 24).
Starting in the mid-1930s Democrats took control of the White House by storm and
firmly controlled the executive branch of the U.S. government for about two decades.
Among many of the Democrats and especially with the secretary of state Cordell Hull,
free trade was associated with peace. In Hull’s words, free trade policy was “an essential
requirement of a full and balanced economic recovery” and a powerful instrument of
economic appeasement and stability […] to strengthen the foundations of world peace”
(Eckes 1995, 148). Roosevelt appreciated the instrumental role commerce can play for
world peace when he claimed that “reciprocal trade is an indispensable part of the
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foundation of any stable and durable peace” (Eckes 1995, 153). Despite Hull’s retirement
in 1944 and Roosevelt’s premature death less than a year after, a prosperous world
without trade barriers continued to inspire American policy-makers for many years to
come (Eckes 1995, 157).

For Truman, who assumed the helm of the U.S. presidency in 1945, free trade was
an important element of foreign policy that was supposed to lighten the direct costs of
reconstruction in the war-ravished Europe. The Department of State, Department of
Commerce, and Economic Cooperation Administration all promoted foreign exports to
the dollar bloc. They wanted to reduce the US merchandise trade surplus in order to
relieve dollar shortages abroad (Eckes 1995, 158). By importing more it was argued that
more dollars would flow from the US to financial markets increasing global investment
dynamics, promoting foreign trade and economic reconstruction. The U.S. delegation
arrived to the Geneva conference on Trade and Unemployment eager to construct a
liberal economic order without high tariffs and exchange controls. Department planners
contemplated drastic and disproportional cuts in the US tariffs to stimulate imports and
assist foreign reconstruction and participation in an open trading community (Eckes
1995, 160).

Post-world war political developments and ensuing rivalry with the Soviet Union
made the logic of free trade with allies and neutrals even more appealing to the U.S.
Trade became an international issue with visible security implications to be settled within
a multilateral framework (Verdier 1994, 201). Senator Vandenberg expressed the
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common sentiment prevalent in Truman’s administration when he admonished the
isolationists against inaction, “if we do not lead, some other great and powerful nation
will capitalize on our failure and we shall pay the price of our default (Verdier 1994,
205).”

Coupled with the commendable principles of high morality and national security
there were some other parochial interests that motivated the silver-tongued partisans of
free trade. Great Britain happened to be the largest market for world imports in 1938
(18.5 percent); it was natural that the US should focus on negotiations with the United
Kingdom and its commonwealth. Americans wanted to “crack” the Imperial Preference
system, which largely limited the ability of the US producers to export their products into
the Commonwealth markets (Eckes 1995, 160).

After the war, the U.S. delegation wanted to offer other states up to 50% of tariff
cuts in exchange for their concessions. Americans aimed to persuade other nations to
open up to the principles of free trade and non-discrimination. The State Department
officials who began planning for the postwar world as early as 1940 considered an open
international system based on multilateral commercial and financial arrangements
indispensable to postwar security. The unrestricted flow of capital and goods would tend
to bind other nations to the United States and discourage trade alliances that could
endanger U.S. security (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 29).
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The U.S. had its own post-war strategy according to which none of its real or
potential enemies should take over Europe and Asia. Moreover, Americans envisioned a
global economy, which would not be hampered by colonialism, autarkic or
discriminatory practices of certain states. American strategy was a careful balance of
political and economic goals. The basics of the strategy envisioned Europe and Asia free
from any power inimical to U.S. interests, and world economic system open to the
movement of goods and capital (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 36). An important part of
this strategy was the affirmation of the sovereign right of states, economic cooperation,
open trade and cooperation to improve the well-being. Self-determination was an
important aspect of this, and Americans pushed for the world free of empires and
colonies.

Acheson, the U.S. Secretary of State, insisted that the global trade needed less
discrimination and more openness. He and his colleagues in the State department worked
hard to lay the foundations for the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Bank. Lower tariffs, US
loans, and stable exchange rates were deemed the prerequisites to peace and prosperity in
the postwar world as well as for safeguarding the security of the United States (Kennedy
and Hitchcock 2000, 46).

U.S. decision-makers were worried that economic distress in Germany and other
parts of Europe would lead to serious economic and political unrest. Assistant secretary
of War, John McCloy, traveled to Germany in April 1945 and reported to Stimson "there
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is a complete economic, social, and political collapse going on [...] in Europe" (Kennedy
and Hitchcock 2000, 54). Many Europeans were proposing price controls and heavy state
intervention to take care of the distress by sheltering local producers from global
competition. However, heavy state intervention, the U.S. feared, could lead to increased
Soviet influence and/or isolation of the European economies from the rest of the world.
Naturally, such arrangements conflicted with the open world order that US officials
deemed a requisite to American well-being and its national security (Kennedy and
Hitchcock 2000, 78).

The U.S. feared that the loss of Britain and France to communism could prove
lethal to U.S. security. Thus, it was vital to protect the allies. However, the security of
these nations was closely linked to political developments in Germany. According to the
opinion presented in 1947 by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff of the American Armed Forces:

The complete resurgence of German industry, particularly coal mining, is essential
for the economic recovery of France—whose security is inseparable from the
combined security of the US, Canada, and Great Britain. The economic revival of
Germany is therefore of primary importance from the viewpoint of US security
(Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 64).
George Kennan, the famous US historian and public official, clearly states the fears
of Washington. He affirmed that, "the only really dangerous thing […] is the
possibility that the technical skills of the Germans might be combined with the
physical resources of Russia" (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 67).
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Decision makers in Washington clearly understood that they could not isolate
themselves from European affairs. Economic isolation from Europe would be detrimental
to both Europeans and themselves. From their actions, it seems they realized that they
had to take a leading role in the reconstruction of the global economy. They also
understood that instead of punishing Germany, Italy, and Japan, they had to convert their
former enemies into friends. The lessons from WWI had showed that punishment could
ignite indignation and fury in people, leading to bloody conflicts and wars. U.S.
policymakers remembered very well how the Versailles Treaty had prevented any chance
of peace and how the ensuing fall of the Weimar Republic brought Hitler to power. They
also clearly understood that the presence of U.S. power in Europe was essential for the
infusion of confidence and the pursuit of moderation (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 75).

America was hoping to defeat unemployment at home and in Europe. They
wanted to rebuild the war-torn Europe first. Washington found the solution to the
problems in multilateralism for the reduction or elimination of trade barriers between the
U.S. and its allies. Washington offered a system of fixed exchange rates, which would
allow goods to flow freely among nations and nations would produce and sell goods they
produced best. Multilateralism, Washington believed, would prevent unemployment in
postwar America, rehabilitate war-torn areas in Europe and Asia, and raise living
standards in the developing world (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 84). Therefore,
multilateralism became the most important element of post-war reconstruction.
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An international trade system would be created which would be based on the
economic principle of competitive advantage. Countries would specialize in the
production of goods they produced cheaply and therefore could gain by trading those
goods on international markets. As mentioned above, reduction of trade barriers and
institution of fixed exchange rates was central to the goal. According to Americans, such
a system would benefit everybody by accelerating economic growth. It was the breaking
up of the British Sterling bloc that they recognized as the key to the realization of a
multilateral system (Heroki 2015, 42).

In the two years following the war, the Western Allies agreed to unprecedented
45,000 tariff concessions affecting $10 billion of trade, they signed the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT—predecessor of World Trade Organization),
drew up the framework for the foundation of ITO, and generally standardized trading
rules for countries which accounted for 70% of total world trade.

British Interests

The British government, decided to close off its economy during the war. It
created the so-called Sterling Bloc during wartime. Though, they understood very well
that they could not close themselves from others completely and forever. Their economic
well-being depended on massive American help. British economist and one of the active
participants of post-war reconstruction, John Keynes, supported multilateralism but he
wanted to create an order, which would safeguard British position in the world. Keynes
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did not want to live to see a global economic system in which Americans would dominate
global markets and drive out their competitors. He wanted to have a system in which
Americans would help their wartime partners to reconstruct their economies, to be able to
keep their production and be competitive on global markets. Keynes wanted to form an
International Clearing Union. The role of this institution would be to monitor which
countries ran surpluses and deficits in their trade and if certain countries ran surplus, they
would fine them and redistribute the surplus to debtors. The purpose of this plan was to
impose on the US, the biggest creditor with huge trade surpluses, the duty to furnish
international liquidity institutionally (Heroki 2015, 48).

After the U.S., Great Britain was the greatest non-communist trading nation in the
world. At this stage, it was still operating inside its imperial trading system. Because
Britain was so important, Americans needed their support to spread their idea of
multilateralism on a global scale. At the Ottawa Conference in 1932, the British imperial
trading bloc concluded an agreement according to which members of the bloc would
receive preferential treatment from the members of the bloc. Material losses of the WWII
forced British government to consolidate the bloc and to accelerate the trend toward
governmental control of international finance and foreign commerce (Kennedy and
Hitchcock 2000, 104). The government limited imports from outside the bloc and limited
the ability of domestic businesses to import from foreign countries. American
policymakers did not approve of British actions, because these actions contradicted
America’s goals to make multilateralism the primary reference of post-war global
economic system (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 108).
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As the war ended, the gold and dollar resources of Great Britain had fallen
drastically, because Britain had spent most of them on acquiring weaponry and other warrelated goods. Moreover, Britain had accumulated almost a $14 billion debt. The British
could not afford opening their borders to free trade, because this would exhaust their
resources. First, they had to take important economic measures, resuscitate their war-torn
economy and only then engage in the multilateral free trade system Americans had on
their mind. Such an eventuality would mean not only the collapse of the internal
economy but a British strategic withdrawal from Europe and Middle East (Kennedy and
Hitchcock 2000, 125).

Naturally, the British were very concerned with the post-war developments. The
UK was not as potent as it used to be. The U.S. had risen as a hegemon and the Soviets
were the global power threatening the whole of Europe. The UK had also lost its
economic and financial prowess to the U.S. Moreover, American’s were particularly
insistent with the British on the matter of India. American anti-imperialism, in particular
regarding India, was an old cause of British bitterness. Roosevelt's prodding had led
Churchill - much to the anger of the Right-wing of his own Party - to commit Britain in
the Atlantic charter to the right of all peoples to national sovereignty and self-government
(Goodman 1996, 42).

Americans continued their demands and drew particularly bitter British responses.
At one point Churchill responded to Americans that he had not become 'the King's First
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Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire (Goodman 1996,
48). The intense U.S. pressure on the matters regarding Imperial preferences preoccupied
Leo Amery, Lord Beaverbrook and several other ministers in Churchill’s party. Amery
called lunatic the American advocacy of free trade. Most British politicians shared a view
that Americans were using arguments in favor of free trade as a tool to strip the British of
their markets and dominate them instead (Goodman 1996, 54). Nor did the British fall for
the American initiatives on post-war system of fixed-exchange rates by a dollardominated IMF.

Great Britain was the historical home of liberal economic tradition. In the seventy
years between the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and the beginning of the First World
War in 1914 the United Kingdom had put no obstacles in the way of the free importation
of goods from foreign markets (Gardner 1980, 26). Because the United Kingdom was a
densely populated island with very limited resources, it could be self-sufficient only at a
tremendous cost. It also had an indirect stake in the development of free and prosperous
international commerce, being at once a leading financier, carrier, and insurer of the trade
of nations (Gardner 1980, 26). In the words of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir
Kingsley Wood, pronounced soon after World War II: “No nation’s interest in the
maximum growth and freedom of commerce will be as great as ours. We shall want to
secure as large a volume of international commerce under conditions as free from
restrictions as possible” (Gardner 1980, 28).
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Free trade and multilateralism were the desired long-term goals of Britain.
However, many in the empire doubted the ability and economic strength of a wardevastated country to handle the pressures from free trade and global competition in the
short-run. Exactly for this reason, the United Kingdom had a strong stake in
strengthening Commonwealth political and economic unity in an uncertain and insecure
world (Gardner 1980, 36). British government could not support any American program,
which seemed to be aimed indiscriminately at weakening Commonwealth ties (Gardner
1980, 36).

Employment and social welfare was another of British major concerns. It was
generally agreed that any future projects for the revival of multilateral trade would need
to have expansionist bias, with safeguards to protect the United Kingdom from
fluctuations originating abroad (Gardner 1980, 37). British were particularly afraid that
open trade and international interdependence resulting from it meant that a crisis
originating in one country might eventually spread to the other. British opinion was
gravely concerned with the danger of post-war depression in the United States.
Anticipating global economic repercussions of the U.S. slump, the British aimed to
insulate themselves from the crisis and resulting mass unemployment. Last but not least,
of Britain’s major concerns was the frightening balance of payments dynamic. Britain
imported heavily from abroad, but postwar British exports were falling to a fraction of
their pre-war level and its productive capacity was being reduced by depreciation and
aerial construction (Gardner 1980, 37).

94

For Britain it was clear that free trade could only be restored gradually. During
the transition period Britain needed to have some means of making payments for imports
while repairing its war damage and rebuilding its export trade. In short, they needed
substantial assistance from the United States without which they could not participate in a
system of multilateral trade. As quoted by Gardner, the British Prime Minister put it:

The essential problem is to reconcile the aims of expansion of international trade
and equilibrium in the balance of payments. For this purpose what is chiefly needed
is that those countries [namely, the U.S.] which are otherwise likely to have an
unduly favorable balance of payments should be willing to do most to reduce import
duties and to remove other impediments to imports (Gardner 1980, 355).

The British apparently meant that they could not resort to multilateralism and
should not be expected to open up their markets before their economy was back on its feet
and before their businesses could export more to alleviate the balance-of-payment burden.
British representatives insisted that,

Greater reductions in preferences might have been possible in more normal
circumstances, but having regard to Britain’s balance of payment difficulties, this
is about the worst moment for surrendering safeguards of any kind, and particularly
those that derive from Imperial Preference (Gardner 1980, 357).
In the immediate future, as put by the Economist (29 Aprill, 1944, 564), “there
was no chance that the British would consent to the abolition of the system of Imperial
Preference save possibly as part of a very large reconstruction of international trade
involving concessions of other countries far larger than any that are yet in prospect”
(Gardner 1980, 357).
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British and American Disagreement:

In the private meeting between British and American representatives at the
Geneva conference, Will Clayton, representing the Department of State, frankly admitted
to the British representative that he ‘was disappointed in the British offers as compared
with the US offers’ (FRUS 74, 45). And disappointed he should have been. The
concessions the U.S. side offered to the United Kingdom affected 95% of U.K. imports
into the US in 1939; the U.S. concessions on dutiable items affected 70% of U.K. imports
into the U.S. and the U.S. concessions in the form of free list bindings covered 75% of
U.K. imports into the U.S. Mr. Clayton pointed out to his British colleague that the
reductions in dutiable items covered by the U.S. concessions, on 92% reductions of 3650% were offered, on 17% reductions of 25-35% were offered and on 11% reductions of
less than 25% were offered (FRUS 74, 46). With respect to duty concessions offered by
the U.K., about 48% of total dutiable imports on which concessions were offered, were
effected by reductions of less than 25%, about 41% by reductions of 25-35% and only
1% reductions of 50%. According to Mr. Clayton the U.K. offer covered only 34% of the
total U.S imports into the U.K (FRUS 74, 47).

The British were anything but persuaded with the arguments of the U.S.
delegation; in fact they thought Americans were pursuing two contradictory objectives:
(1) to obtain a world in which there will be a minimum of trade restrictions and
impediment to private enterprise; and (2) to obtain for every concession they make on
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tariffs an equivalent concession in tariff and preference from other countries (FRUS 74,
30). In the British view, equal concessions in the tariff bargaining would not help to turn
over the US favorable export balance. As a result Britain and other war-ravaged countries
importing the US products would run into balance-of-payment problems. According to
the British, if the Americans wanted to advance towards a regime of more liberal trade by
the path of tariff bargaining, they would need to make unequal trades in this field and
offer concessions which would really lead to greater international specialization through
the shifting of some productive resources and capacity in the U.S. in favor of imports
(FRUS 74, 30). The British critically joked that “gold medals should be distributed to the
teams making the worst bargains, as this would most quickly bring to an end the
overriding dollar exchange shortage problem which is plaguing the world” (FRUS 74,
34).

The US delegates objected that the British could impose quantitative restrictions
when they face balance-of-payment problems and by doing so decrease imports,
accumulate dollars and eventually switch back to trade without restrictions. The British
representative responded that an equal bargain on tariffs and preferences would prolong
the period during which the U.K would have to take advantage of balance-of-payment
quantitative restrictions. This would be due to the fact that equal tariff bargains would not
reduce the US imports relative to exports. The U.K. did not like this solution because as
long as the U.K. took advantage of quantitative restrictions many other countries would
feel they also had to do so, and the U.K objected to the system of balance-of-payment
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quantitative restrictions applied generally as contrary to her own export interests (FRUS
74, 30).

British representatives argued that although ‘on a statistical basis the offers made
by the U.K to the U.S. were inconsequential, if the U.K offers were reasonably
considered from the point of view of greater economic strength of the U.S., and the
tremendous increase in the volume of the foreign trade of the U.S. due to the war, the
offers made by the U.K to the U.S. compare favorably to those made by the U.S. to the
U.K (FRUS 74, 58). Moreover, the U.K delegation suggested that Americans were
welcome to withdraw some of their concessions if they thought they were offering too
much to the U.K in return for nothing.

Conclusion of the Geneva Negotiations:

Although many in the American delegation believed that the real obstacle to a
mutually advantageous agreement lay in the political resistance to multilateralism within
the U.K, the sterling convertibility crisis which unraveled during the negotiations played
its due role to persuade Americans to continue the negotiations in the face of continued
unwillingness of the British to compromise. Disgruntled as they were that the British
were violating the Mutual Aid Agreement of 1942 and the spirit of the “Proposals” of
1945, they nevertheless saw the outcome of the conference rather satisfactory. The
British had their own interpretation of those documents, which radically contrasted with
the American interpretation.
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Though the Imperial Preference system stood unscathed at the end of the
conference, according to Americans “in the overall picture of success, the comparative
failure on preference negotiations will not loom too large” (FRUS 74, 89). The proposed
agreement was the result of fifteen negotiations between the U.S. and other countries and
more than ninety negotiations between other pairs of countries. It covered the countries
that handled around 75% of the world’s trade before the war and represented the most
extensive action undertaken to reduce barriers to trade (FRUS 74, 107). As part and
parcel of the Geneva negotiations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
was signed as a preliminary step to the creation of the International Trade Organizations
(ITO). GATT contained important provisions on most-favored-nation treatment, customs
matter, quantitative restrictions and state trading that would bind nation-states from
January 1, 1948, provided the participant countries ratified the agreement on that date.
The agreement would be made definitively effective after the charter of ITO had been
approved during the Havana Conference. The GATT provisions had no mention of
cartels, commodities, employment, economic development or the establishment of ITO.

But GATT provisions committed its signatories to essential commercial policy
provisions of the ITO charter. The articles on quantitative restrictions proved to be one of
the most contentious undertakings. On the one hand, they paid tribute to the principle of
non-discrimination. On the other hand, they allowed wide scope for discrimination during
the transition period – with no assurance that transition period would ever end (Gardner
1980, 364). Quantitative restrictions were allowed by countries if they were running
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balance-of-payment deficits and only after the “finality of Monetary Fund determination
as to balance-of-payments position of countries seeking to use import quotas to correct
balance of payment” (FRUS 1974, 109).

At the Geneva conference, the under-developed countries advanced a number of
specific exceptions to the commercial policy rules to safeguard their national plans for
economic development. One of the main exceptions was the principle of treatment of
private investment. The under-developed countries filled the Geneva Draft article on
foreign investment with broad exceptions asserting the right to place all kinds of
restrictions on foreign investment, even the right to expropriate particular investments
without paying compensation for the full value of the investments (Gardner 1980, 366).
They successfully sought to include in the Geneva Draft a special authorization for
regional preferences to promote economic development, subject to the approval of twothirds of the members of the ITO. Moreover, under-developed countries were allowed to
employ quantitative restrictions to promote economic development “as long as such
restrictions were unlikely to be more restrictive of trade than any other reasonable and
practical alternatives and were suited to the economic needs of the industry and the
member concerned” (Gardner 1980, 367).

French Interests

America’s grand strategy was unacceptable to the British and the French. The
U.S. had decided to pump significant funds to rebuild Germany and Japan. The French
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were opposed to American and British measures designed to raise industrial production in
Germany. Neither did they approve of America’s decision to merge the German zones
and allow for self-government. The French were fearful that Germans would pose a threat
to France in the future, either unilaterally or in alliance with the Soviets. Washington's
most influential diplomat in Europe, Lewis Douglas, informed Marshall that "if the
French were assured of long-term U.S. defensive cooperation against German aggression,
in other words, we would fight on the Rhine, in such an eventuality, the French would
relax in their attitude regarding German industry and reconstruction" (Kennedy and
Hitchcock 2000, 134).

The U.S. troops would remain on the territory of Germany and France would
partake in the management of Ruhr coal. Moreover, the U.S. would provide military
assistance and work diligently towards creating a transatlantic security organization. In
1949 British and French representatives arrived in Washington to sign the North Atlantic
Treaty. Without the North Atlantic Treaty, Acheson confided to President Truman, "I
doubt that we could have come to a successful conclusion of these agreements at this
time (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 125).

After the war, De Gaulle had tried to maximize French security as much as he
could. However, his style of diplomacy was inflexible. If he failed to achieve his goals,
he would rather obstruct others than try to find common ground. According to Hitchcock,
such a diplomatic choice was a disaster for the Fourth Republic of France. The French
prioritized forcing Germany to pay reparations and isolating a few important coal and
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steel mines from the rest of Germany. Even after de Gaulle's departure as president, his
confrontational diplomatic style persisted until 1948 in the person of foreign minister
Georges Bidault (Esposito 2000, 18). Bidault continued his demands for reparations and
coal/steel mines. Nevertheless, Americans and British were deaf to France’s demands.
Very soon they united their occupation zones, leaving the French isolated and sending
them a signal that Germany would be united even against French wishes (Esposito 2000,
19).

The French continued with their obstructionist stance for a while. Bidault hoped
that he could play as an intermediary between the West and the Soviets. However, the
confrontation between the West and the Soviets was reaching its peak. Soon Bidault
realized that by isolating France from the West, he was not just distancing the country
from its wartime allies, but also, and perhaps more importantly, letting the country be
threatened by the communists, both inside and outside the country. In that context,
German reconstruction became ever more important for the West: a weak Germany in the
heart of Europe could only benefit the Soviet cause (Esposito 2000, 20).

Right after the war, the French were fearful that Germany would rise again.
Naturally, they wanted to weaken Germany by punishing it with reparations and control
of its resources. The French did not take to heart the Marshall Plan, because it would
make Germany stronger. The French would only agree to German unification if it were in
their interest. The threat of communism was that important catalyst, which pushed the
French towards European integration. Also, "by embracing European integration, France

102

sought to establish itself as the de facto arbiter of European economic reconstruction, and
thus offset the crippling disadvantages that economic dependence and military weakness
had placed on French diplomacy" (Willis 1999, 45).

Soviet Threat and Transatlantic Alliance

With the Marshall Plan, Americans aimed to achieve monetary stabilization in the
West. Americans wanted to gradually achieve currency convertibility among nations. The
U.S. Treasury, IMF and other intergovernmental institutions were in charge of policies. If
the first postwar settlement had experimented with an international “associationalism,”
the post-1945 settlement rested on an American-sponsored intergovernmentalism
(Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 145).

It is evident that post-WWII cooperation between the US and the Western
European powers proved more solid than the one after WWI. An important factor was the
cooperation among the governments of Great Britain, France, and the United States. The
heavy involvement of governments was crucial to the success. However, this
involvement was largely conditioned and motivated by the serious Soviet threat. Had
communism appeared more of a menace to Western Europe in the 1920s, perhaps the
United States and Britain would have adopted a more resolute policy (Kennedy and
Hitchcock 2000, 146). The latter is only a counterfactual that only help us put into
perspective the significance of the geostrategic threat posed by the Soviet Union
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immediately after the end of the Second World War and the reconstruction of the postwar international order, particularly in the European theater.

The British and Americans were equally fearful of threats emanating from the
Soviet Union. They wanted to get along with the Soviets, but they were also firm in their
conviction and geostrategic interest that Europe and Asia had to be protected from Soviet
encroachments and the expansion of communism. It was a direct affront to the way of life
in liberal democracies and a direct threat to the stability of the post-world liberal order. In
1945, an important study by the Brookings Institution was released in the field of
International Relations, which clearly summarized the attitude of the Western allies. The
study stressed that,

Soviet Russia is a power whose good intentions must be assumed until there is
incontrovertible evidence to the contrary, but its intentions are sufficiently unclear
so that the US must in no case place sole reliance for its security on Soviet good
intentions. In all the world only Soviet Russia and the ex-enemy powers are capable
of forming nuclei around which an anti-American coalition could form to threaten
the security of the US (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 148).

In May 1944, Admiral William Leahy, briefly summarized the point of view the
U.S. government held of the Soviets:

[T]he outstanding fact to be noted is the recent phenomenal development of
heretofore latent Russian military and economic strength—a development which
seems certain to prove epochal in its bearing on future politico-military
international relationships, and which has yet to reach the full scope attainable with
Russian resources (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 151).
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While it is true that right after the war Americans might not have wanted to depict
the Soviets as their enemies, they were confident that the Soviet Union’s influence should
not be allowed to spread further. Hence, the US decisions to intervene in South Korea, to
control Japan, and to take measures to prevent further Soviet expansion around the globe.
The preparations for negotiations at Potsdam revealed the determination of almost all US
military and civilian officials to block Soviet inroads into Western Europe and the Middle
East (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 163). The US government and its allies took an
important decision to exclude the Soviets from any decisions regarding Germany’s coal
and steel mines. Quoting the U.S. Strategic Committee, Paul M. Kennedy and William I.
Hitchcock put it in a nutshell:

Russia had already been left as the sole great power on the Continent—a position
unique in modern history. Under present circumstances, the extension of Soviet
power and influence into the heart of Western Europe, through the device of
trusteeship, would manifestly be open to grave doubt" (Kennedy and Hitchcock
2000, 162).

The U.S. government wanted to see Europe and Asia free from Communist
control. They were concerned that Germany and other European nations had been
devastated by the war. The Marshall Plan would help Europe rise to stand on its feet and
help create a multilateral order, which the Soviets would be unable to undermine alone.
The strategy was to link economies together and make sure that Western countries would
never fall under the influence of the Soviets. The U.S. was particularly worried that the
Kremlin could lure the Western Europeans with economic incentives or promises of
territorial aggrandizement. According to Marshall, the worst of all scenarios would be

105

seeing "a Germany controlled by the Soviet Union with German military potential
utilized in alliance with the Soviet Union (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 183).

Conclusion:

This chapter tested hypothesis No. 2: Absence of compatibility of national
interests, coupled with the looming or actual presence of an external security threat, leads
to multilateral military cooperation. It also explained why former allied Great powers
during the war, including prominently the Soviet Union, failed to engage in military
cooperation right after the Second World War. Incompatibility of their national interests
was a primary obstacle to their cooperation right after the war and the disbanding of the
military coalition that defeated the Axis Powers in 1945. This incompatibility almost also
led to the disintegration of the Western Alliance. However, the looming Soviet threat
grew exponentially in a couple of years from 1945 to 1947, forcing the USA, the United
Kingdom, and France to set aside their differences. The existence of an immediate
external threat as early as 1947, in contrast to the post-WWI environment in 1919, turned
out to be the catalyst that induced the Western allies to stay together and reconstruct
another military alliance with a different geostrategic enemy in sight: The Soviet Union.

The aftermath of the First World War and the Great Depression of 1929-1939
unquestionably transformed the way decision makers in Washington thought about U.S.
national security. Long-term American grand strategic interests required a world more
open to the free flow of goods and capital. Quantitative restrictions, imperial preferences,
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exchange controls, and autarkical economic arrangements restricted trade, had prolonged
the Great Depression, and bred jealousy and aggression (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000,
24). Post-world war political developments and ensuing rivalry with the Soviet Union
made the logic of free trade with allies and neutrals even more appealing to the U.S.
Trade became an international issue with visible security implications to be settled within
a multilateral framework (Verdier 1994, 201). The unrestricted flow of capital and goods
would tend to bind other nations to the United States and discourage trade alliances that
could endanger U.S. security (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 29).

Beginning in 1947, American grand strategy was a careful balance of political and
economic goals. An important part of this strategy was the affirmation of the sovereign
rights of states, economic cooperation, open trade and cooperation to improve the wellbeing of peoples throughout the world, particularly those in the North Atlantic
community. Self-determination was an important aspect of this strategy, and Americans
pushed for the world free of empires and colonies. Importantly, though, the U.S. feared
that the loss of Britain and France to communism could prove lethal to the U.S. security.
Thus, it was vital to protect the Western allies. The security of these nation-states was
closely linked to political developments in Germany.

The British government, unlike the US government, decided to close off its
economy during the war and continued the policy for a brief period thereafter. It created
the so-called Sterling Bloc. As the war ended, Great Britain’s gold and dollar resources
had fallen drastically, because Britain had spent most of them on acquiring weaponry and
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other war-related goods. Moreover, Britain had accumulated almost $14 billion in debt.
The British could not afford opening their borders to free trade, because this would
exhaust their national reserves and resources. Naturally, the British were very concerned
with the post-war developments. The UK was not as potent as it used to be. The US had
risen as a hegemon and the Soviets were the global power threatening Europe and
counterbalancing U.S. leadership and power.

The UK had also lost its economic and financial prowess and leadership to the
US. Many in the empire doubted the ability and economic strength of a war-devastated
country to handle the pressures from free trade and global competition in the short-run.
Exactly for this reason, the United Kingdom had a strong stake in strengthening the
Commonwealth political and economic unity in an uncertain and insecure world (Gardner
1980, 36). Employment and social welfare was another of British major concerns. British
were particularly afraid that open trade and international interdependence resulting from
it meant that a crisis originating in one country might eventually spread to the other.
British opinion was gravely concerned with the danger of post-war depression in the
United States. Anticipating global economic repercussions of the US slump, the British
aimed to insulate themselves from the crisis and resulting mass unemployment. Last but
not least, of Britain’s major concerns was the frightening balance of payments dynamic.
Britain imported heavily from abroad, but postwar British exports were falling to a
fraction of their pre-war level and its productive capacity was being reduced by
depreciation and aerial construction (Gardner 1980, 37).
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America’s grand strategy was unacceptable not only for British but for the French
too. The U.S. had decided to pump significant funds to rebuild Germany and Japan. The
French were opposed to American and British measures designed to raise industrial
production in Germany. Neither did they approve of America’s decision to merge
German zones and allow for self-government. French were fearful that Germans would
pose a threat to France, alone or in alliance with the Soviets. The French prioritized
forcing Germany to pay reparations and isolating a number of important coal and steel
mines from the rest of Germany. Bidault continued his demands for reparations and
coal/steel mines. For some time, the French continued with their obstructionist stance.
Bidault hoped they could play an intermediary between the West and the Soviets.
However, the confrontation between the West and the Soviets was reaching its peak.
Soon Bidault realized that by isolating France from the West, he was not just distancing
the country from its wartime allies, but, more importantly, letting the country be
threatened by the communists, both inside and outside the country. In that context,
German reconstruction became ever more important for the West: a weak Germany in the
heart of Europe could only benefit the Soviet cause (Esposito 2000, 20).

National differences of the Western Great Powers, right after WWII, loosened the
bond tying the Western Alliance. Consumed by their own national interests they were on
the brink of discontinuing military cooperation. However, the rise of the Soviet Union to
the status of global power and regional hegemon in Eurasia made the Western Allies
reconsider their differences and prioritize at the top of their national interest the looming
expansionistic Soviet threat to their individual and collective national security. Thus, both
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immediately after WWI and WWII, the absence of major external threats were a
sufficient condition in affecting the extension and endurance of the Triple Entente and the
Allied Powers alliances respectively. Subsequent to the end of the Cold War in 1991,
however, the threats disappeared; yet, the alliance continued and deepened over the next
twenty-five years. In the next two chapters, accordingly, I demonstrate why sufficient
conditions such as the presence or absence of external threat ceased to be decisive in
affecting the probability of extending and strengthening multilateral military cooperation
after the end of the Cold War. The compatibility of ideational national interests could
explain why NATO member states decided against either rearranging or altogether
dissolving the alliance in the absence of clear and direct external threat. In the presence of
the continuation and deepening of multilateral, military cooperation for twenty-five years,
however, it does not fare well as a satisfactory explanatory variable. Subsequently, I will
introduce several understudied and overlooked variables in the literature of military
alliance dynamics and politics that I expect will help to explain part of such paradoxical
and complex developments since 1991.
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CHAPTER V

MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND ALLIANCE POLITICS

In the previous two chapters on the Triple Entente alliance of the First World War
and the Allied Powers alliance of the Second World War, it was demonstrated that
military alliances which are successful during times of crisis and war dissolve or
regenerate as a result of two different but interrelated international dynamics. First,
immediately following the disappearance of the external geostrategic threat, even in the
presence of compatible national interests among former alliance members, military
cooperation ceases to operate; and, second, when in the presence of an immediately new
external geostrategic security threat, even in the absence of compatible national interests
among former alliance members, a renewed military cooperation and coalition
regenerates. The aim of the present and subsequent chapters is to explain the paradox of
NATO’s endurance for well over two decades beyond the absolute disappearance of its
former external geostrategic threat and in the absence of a renewed external threat as was
the case immediately after 1991. On the basis of extant military alliance literature and
history in International Relations, it is truly puzzling to make sense of how some former
allied great powers during the Cold War continued and deepened considerably their
military cooperation in the absence of a former or new geostrategic external threat to their
national security in the aftermath of the Cold War. Accordingly, I will test the following
third major hypothesis: Cooperation in the military production of states with compatible
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national interests is positively related to economies of scale, scope and learning by doing,
both in the absence or presence of an external geostrategic threat. I will analyze the postCold War developments to confirm or disconfirm the validity and usefulness of this
hypothesis.

Prior to engaging in my evaluation and analysis of the post-Cold War alliance
dynamics and politics, a caveat is necessary and in order. It is exceedingly critical to
clarify that I am not oblivious to the possibility that other important contributing causes
or socio-political, ideological/ideational, geostrategic factors may be crucial contributing
elements or sufficient conditions explaining the endurance of NATO beyond the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991. Nonetheless, my analytical objective is to offer and assess
an important, new argument that has been largely overlooked or neglected up to now by
military alliance dynamic theory. The goal here is not to argue that the political economic
argument of alliance dynamics advanced in this dissertation is the single most important
explanation of NATO’s endurance since 1991. But rather my position is that a politicaleconomic dimension is missing and it needs to be incorporated into the explanatory
equation in order to advance a richer, more rounded, and more rigorous explanation of
this puzzling historical development among current great powers.

Traditional trade theory in political economy has viewed economic cooperation
among nation-states as a function of economic endowments. I will argue in these two
chapters that market imperfections and rapidly increasing costs of military production
and research and development (R & D) make traditional political economic explanations
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of economic relations superfluous. Members of NATO do not simply trade in military
goods among each other to cut down military costs, as the classical trade theory would
predict, but, more tellingly, they cooperate in R & D and production of many weapon
systems.

Before exploring how market imperfections might affect military alliances and
specifically, the endurance of NATO, however, I will first explain classical trade theory
and its assumptions regarding trade and economic cooperation of states in order to frame
my argument in main corpus of this literature; next, I will attempt to explain market
imperfections and review the work advanced by several authors who have analyzed such
imperfections in military materiel production. I will close this chapter by analyzing
specific military industries in which NATO members cooperate. In this vein, I will search
for economies of scale and other market imperfections in these industries as these
conditions may save huge quantities to enduring NATO members.

Classical Trade Theory

According to Adam Smith, the main reason why states trade with each other is
because they possess an absolute advantage to provide higher quantity of goods or more
service employing the same inputs. In other words, states are more efficient. For Adam
Smith the production function was rather simple and consisted only of the labor input.
Thus, by comparing the labor productiveness of two units, countries, factories, or
productive sectors one could see which has an absolute advantage (Marrewijk 2007, 13).
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It is not uncommon to see different sides without absolute advantage at all. In this case
trade makes no sense and, hence, it does not take place (Marrewijk 2007, 18). I will
compare the principle of absolute advantage to the Ricardian comparative advantage
model, which explains international trade as a factor of opportunity costs of producing a
certain good in a nation-state.

Adam Smith coined the term absolute advantage in his book An Inquiry into the
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. As a supporter of free trade, his main goal
was to demonstrate that mercantilist ideas on free trade were erroneous (Marrewijk 2007,
25). Smith showed that it was counterproductive for nations to set direct and indirect
barriers to free trade if they wanted to prosper. Free trade, according to him, was the only
way for all nations to gain. All nation-states would gain if they specialized in the
production of goods and services in which they had absolute advantage. His logic was
that prosperity of populace depended on commodities and services they enjoyed.

Adam Smith’s reasoning was the following: If the foreign producer can furnish a
certain good or a service at a cheaper price than local producer, the population is better
off if they buy foreign products in exchange for goods and services that are produced
cheaper locally. Such an exchange is mutually beneficial. Both produce more goods in
total and in case of the exchange they will end up with higher utility. The capital in each
country is employed in the production of goods and services at which the producer is
efficient (Smith 1937, 85).
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Although absolute advantage can bring gains from international trade, still, it does
not completely explain why international trade is mutually beneficial. The principle of
comparative advantage fills this gap. Comparative advantage explains the benefits of
trade to individual agents, companies and countries because of their labor and capital
factors and/or technological progress (Maneschi 1998, 1). According to the concept, an
actor has a comparative advantage over another if it can provide a service or manufacture
a good at a lower opportunity cost. The main idea here is not to compare the input costs,
as in the case of Smith’s concept of absolute advantage, but to compare the opportunity
costs of manufacturing different commodities. According to the logic of comparative
advantage, when countries engage in free trade they will produce more of goods in which
they have comparative advantage to produce and export (Dixit 1980, 2).

David Ricardo, the author of the theory of comparative advantage, wanted to
show why it makes sense for countries to engage in trade even when they are more
efficient in the production of all goods than other countries. This is because countries that
engage in trade will increase their utility by consuming more goods through export of
goods they are more efficient at producing and importing more of goods their trading
partners enjoy comparative advantage at. Here, it is crucial that relative efficiency in
producing goods be different in trading countries. Countries that produce goods relatively
cheaper than their partners will export those goods, and import goods their partners are
relatively more efficient at producing. Like in Adam Smith’s theory of absolute
advantage, it is important that exporting countries have different labor productivity in the
production of goods they exchange (Baumol and Binder 1979, 50).
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David Ricardo’s theory has important implications for international trade, as it
suggests the theory of comparative advantage rather than Smith’s theory based on
absolute advantage (Krugman 1996, 12). Ricardo advanced his theory in his book On the
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Like Smith, he was against artificial
barriers to international trade. Ricardo adds an important premise that with perfect
competition and markets countries would prefer to trade and export goods they are better
at producing. The classical theory of international trade continued its development in the
twentieth century. In 1919 Heckscher and Ohlin offered their factors proportions
development model to explain international trade.

Similar to Ricardo’s theory, they start with an assumption that trade depends on
the proportion of factor endowments among trading countries. According to their trade
theory, countries will export goods they are better at producing or have more and cheaper
resources to produce and in turn will import goods which are too expensive to produce at
home (Blaug 1992, 190). According to this model, a country’s land, labor and capital
endowments create its comparative advantage. The logic posits that countries enjoy
advantages when they have profuse resources domestically. Profuse resources translate to
cheap inputs and production costs which translate into low prices (Blaug 1992, 286).

Countries endowed with a large labor force but lacking capital will enjoy
comparative advantage in goods that require labor-intensive production. The abundance
of labor keeps a downward pressure on its costs. Capital-intensive commodities would be
relatively expensive because of the scarcity of capital inputs. In this case it would make
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more sense for a country to concentrate on the production and export of labor-intensive
goods and importation of capital-intensive commodities.

David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage bases its explanation of
international trade on differences in labor productivity among nations. It is crucial to note
that, according to Ricardo, such difference in labor productivity stems from the use of
different technologies. Heckscher and Ohlin’s model of international trade does not base
its explanation of trade among nations on technological differences. It makes a theoretical
assumption that such technologies are similar everywhere. Ricardo had only labor as a
factor of production and to explain comparative advantage and trade he focused on
technological differences among nations. Heckscher-Ohlin argued that countries differed
in capital inputs rather than technological availability. In their model capital is privately
owned and it is used to create infrastructure and invest in technology. Thus, private
owners make decisions in which technologies and intermediate goods to make their
investment.

Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade assumed that countries had different
proportions of labor and capital. Developed countries had proportionally more capital to
labor. This means that developed countries had an abundance of capital compared to
developing countries, while developing countries enjoyed an overabundance of labor. But
just like in the classical models of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, Heckscher and Ohlin
reached the conclusion that trade increased the utility of the parties engaged in
international trade. Trade increased the quantity of consumed goods, simultaneously
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making them cheaper. Subsequently, I will discuss the criticism of beneficial effects from
trade by several economists.

Criticism of the Classical Model of Trade

The notion that states should specialize in the production of goods in which they
enjoy comparative advantage has been criticized on theoretical and empirical grounds.
Keynesianism, Infant-industry argument, and Singer-Prebisch theorem criticize certain
assumptions and conclusions of the comparative advantage theory. According to
advocates of the Infant-industry argument countries that are disadvantaged in a certain
industry can protect such industries from foreign competition while they become
competitive enough to succeed in free markets. New economic theories, like the new
growth theory, the new economic geography and the new trade theory, charge that
comparative advantage is not a dynamic theory and does not account for the fact that
advantage might change in time. In other words, the theory does not take the long-term
perspective. It does not account for the possibility of advantage changing through
investment or economic development, and, thus, it does not provide guidance for longterm economic development (Krugman 1987, 135).

It has been shown by new economic theorists that in strategic scenarios, subsidies
for local producers and import limitations on foreign ones can help domestic producers
compete with foreign producers and increase consumer welfare and utility (Krugman
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1987, 137). Despite the fact that classical assumptions regarding international trade are
shared by a majority of economists, nevertheless, it is clear that under certain conditions
they do not hold necessarily. For example, international trade theory based on the
comparative advantage assumption cannot explain the success of Japan and SouthEastern Asian states (Krugman 1987, 141).

John K. Galbraith suggests that a constant return to scale that is assumed in the
theory of comparative advantage is simply fallacious. According to the constant returns
assumption to scale, doubling an input would cause the doubling of output. But Galbraith
argues that for many goods, economies of scale, scope, learning-by-doing, and other
market imperfections set in to decrease the marginal and consequently the average cost of
production (Galbraith 2008, 69).

More often than not, production is characterized by diminishing returns. Very
often the land, resources and nature in general, constrain the ability of countries to
produce. Tropical countries that export banana, coffee and other natural commodities are
more likely to remain poor. Galbraith argues that demand for such products is inelastic –
increase in supply and decrease in prices harms domestic producers and economy.
Importantly, diversification allows states to fall back upon other goods when some of the
goods they export fall in demand and prices. It is very important for countries to rely on
multiple sources of export to withstand temporary or permanent fall in demand for some
of their goods (Galbraith 2008, 69).
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Market Imperfections:

Classical trade theory has been criticized because it assumes that markets are
perfect. But it has been shown that in certain scenarios allocation of goods and services in
perfect markets might be inefficient. Market failures are situations when the actions of
agents to increase their utility might not lead to the optimal outcome (Krugman and
Robin 2006, 25). During market failures there are possible outcomes in which the utility
of market participants can be improved without harming anybody else. Market failures
can be eliminated through various means; one of them is through the intervention of
government institutions. Although many economists approve of such interventions,
public policies can actually harm market efficiency, leading to so-called government
failure (Weimer and Vining 1992, 28). For this reason, there is no consensus on the
necessity and benefits of government intervention. Although, it should be noted that
mainstream/Neoclassical economists agree that governments should interfere to alleviate
the effects of market failure and increase the public good. Market failure is a direct
consequence of market imperfections—that is, factors, which impede trade in the market.
Imperfections affect market costs and consequently the decisions that rational actors
would make when they trade in the open market.

There are many reasons why market failures might arise. One of the most
important has to do with the nature of the markets. In certain markets participants can
possess market power and preclude other beneficial transactions from taking place.
Inefficiencies can arise due to limited competition, for example, in markets where actors
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are monopolies or monopsonies (DeMartino 2000, 70). In monopolistic markets an agent
will provide goods or services below the optimal level of utility for customers to keep
profit high. Monopolies arise and persevere when barriers to entry in the market are high,
meaning when it is impossible for a new entrant in the market to compete with a present
member. Importantly, first entrants might have advantage like diminishing costs as the
quantity of their output increases.

It is argued that multinational corporations (MNCs) exist because of market
imperfections. According to Hymer and Kindleberger there are many reasons why
structural market imperfections arise (Pitelis and Sugden 1991, 74). Among the most
important are patents, scarcity and limited ownership of inputs, and economies of scale. If
not for the above-mentioned factors, markets would work efficiently (Pitelis and Sugden
1991, 75). Other political economists, like McManus, Casson, and Hennart, have argued
that market imperfections are normal market developments and MNCs are specifically
useful to overcome such imperfections. According to them, imperfections exist because
neoclassical economic assumptions of perfect information and knowledge are often
missing and unrealistic (Pitelis and Sugden 1991, 74).

Economies of Scale:

Among other market imperfections, economies of scale occupy one of the most
prominent roles. Economies of scale are the effect on the cost of production of such
factors as quantity, size, and volume of production. The idea is that with economies of

121

scale constant return to scale assumed in classical economics is discarded. With increased
volume of production high average cost, due to high fixed costs, is spread out. Among
other effects on the cost of production, it is important to mention the positive effect that
increased volume of production might have on variable costs.

Economies of scale were responsible for many corporate mergers in the 20 th
century. They were relevant in the previous century and they continue to be relevant
nowadays. Economies of scale are one of two kinds: internal and external. With internal
economies of scale, companies have cost savings independent of industries they operate
in. With external economies of scale, a company enjoys certain economic benefits
because of the way it is organized. Internal economies of scale are very often influenced
by R & D costs (Chandler 1977, 92). For instance, large companies find it easier to invest
large amounts in research and experimentation. The amount of money needed for the
research is enormous and the costs are only increasing. In recent years a few important
mergers between large companies have been driven by the fact that research costs are
getting progressively higher. Economies of scale have a downside too. Very often as
companies increase in size to become more profitable from increased quantity of
production and sales, they become more difficult and complex to manage. Increased
management costs may at some point exceed benefits from increased production. Thus, it
is important to coordinate the costs related to production and management.

Economies of scale can bring benefits at various organizational and
manufacturing levels and units, though. It is expected that ceteris paribus a larger factory
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would enjoy lower costs per unit of production than a smaller factory. Also, companies
that possess many branches might have cost advantages over their smaller competitors.
The concept itself was coined by Adam Smith and was applied to the division of labor as
a source of generating larger and more efficient production. In the majority of cases,
though, economies of scale are constrained by factors that cause costs per marginal unit
of production to increase beyond certain point. Among such factors can be the exhaustion
or overusing of local mineral resources used as inputs in production, the size of local
markets, smaller local markets obliging companies to sell abroad increasing their
transportation costs, and the inefficient use of energy beyond certain quantity of
production. (Chandler 1977, 92).

The use of economies of scale is only possible for large-scale producers, but there
is a downside in that such producers might find it hard to change the good they are
producing. As a result they avoid specializing, leaving it to smaller producers to
specialize in production. Production of specialized goods by smaller producers is
widespread in steel, paper and many other industries. As already mentioned, economies
of scale implies the change in efficiency of production given the changes in production
capacity, volume, and quantity (Chandler 1977, 92). Very often economies of scale
originate because of the costs related to fixed capital, which decrease per unit of
production as the volume of production increases. In some businesses, increasing the
speed of conducted work decreases fixed costs. Economies of scale can originate for
multiple reasons, for example, establishing long-term contracts might decrease the
purchasing costs, allowing managers to specialize might increase the speed and quality of
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their work, borrowing in large quantities from banks might decrease the interest on loans,
advertising large quantity of goods instead of just one, employing technology which is
more efficient. In the long run in each of these scenarios the average cost of production
decreases.

Scale economies explain practical phenomena such as the nature or markets and
number of companies that populate it. Scale economies tell us why in certain markets
companies grow in size. Some national markets are too small because of the presence of
such economies and companies could be making more profits in larger international
markets. For instance, it would not make sense for a small country like Monaco to
produce planes if it could not sell them on international markets. Production of planes
implies high fixed costs and if the local producer produced only for local markets they
might not be able to produce enough to make them cheap and affordable. If the producers
in Monaco could sell on international markets they would increase the volume of
production, cut down the long run average cost of production and make planes cheaper
and highly affordable. Economies of scale exist in the service sector; meaning, a
company can potentially speed up its service from the moment it receives an order to the
moment it gratifies the customer.

It is important to distinguish economies of scale from returns to scale. When
economists talk about economies of scale they refer to the relationship between costs and
volume/quantity of production/service. Returns to scale relate inputs to outputs. That is,
what effect the change in quantity/volume of inputs has on the quantity/volume of
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outputs. For example, constant returns to scale implies that if quantity/volume of inputs
increases by some number, the quantity/volume of output will always increase by certain
number. Decreasing returns to scale mean that increasing the quantity/volume of inputs
by one increase the quantity/volume of outputs by less than one. Lastly, increasing
returns to scale mean that increasing the quantity/volume of inputs by one increase the
quantity/volume of output by more than one.

If markets for all company’s production inputs are perfect, meaning that the
company cannot influence the price of inputs by how much of these inputs it buys, it
implies that a company will have economies of scale if it has increasing returns to scale
and vice versa. Also, it will have no economies of scale at constant return to scale (Frisch
1965, 52). This implies that in the long-run companies will be exhausting their economies
of scale and producing at the lowest long-run average cost. On the other hand, if there is
no perfect competition in the markets, the outcome will be different. In case of increasing
returns to scale, when the company is big enough to effect input prices; they will have
decreasing economies of scale if they increase the quantity of production. Importantly,
though, if a company can buy cheaper, its inputs depending on the increased quantity of
purchase, it will have economies of scale.

Significance of Learning:

The most important element of economies of scale is process learning. While
fixed costs need to be spread over large quantities to make profits possible, scaling is
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only possible through the process of learning. Getting to the production stage involves a
process of learning that might turn decisive for a company’s survival (Ribbonfarm 2012).
Amortization of fixed costs is the final stage; it is unknown costs of learning that will
prove detrimental more frequently. This is the reason why many innovators almost never
succeed in or dominate their markets (Ribbonfarm 2012). Very often, nonetheless,
learning how to scale the idea is much more important than coming up with the
innovative idea in itself. According to the online study by Venkatesh Rao3, there are
multiple reasons why learning is involved in scaling:

1. The law of large numbers: Producing in large quantities implies that a company
is subjected to the risk of failure more often than smaller companies. This means
that if they want to survive or cut down their costs they have to learn ways to cope
with failures.
2. Staircase effect: Economies of scale implies that production capacity increases
fast, while market demand takes time to change. As such producers will take time
to learn the optimal quantity of production to satisfy market demand and cut down
costs.
3. Loss windups: With small businesses time and cost of discovering a problem and
fixing it will not be so significant. When economies of scale are involved when
the volume and speed of production is large even an insignificant problem can
cause huge operational loss.
For more detailed analysis see Venkatesh Rao,“Economies of Scale, Economies of Scope,” Ribbonfarm,
last modified October 15, 2012, http://www.ribbonfarm.com/2012/10/15/economies-of-scale-economiesof-scope/
3
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4. Accounting issues: Scaling implies innovating accounting tools and expertise,
which might take quite some time. Meanwhile, poor financial accounting might
lead to losses, through justifiable mistakes or employees taking advantage of the
situation.
5. Process design: Economies of scale consists of large amounts of repeating
processes, which very often entail defects and risks. Discovering such conditions
and addressing them should be adequately timed. Process adaptation that takes
long or is too costly might exacerbate the problem.
6. HR effects: During economies of scale it is important to acquaint the workforce
with the intricacies of the production process. Imparting such knowledge on the
workforce might simply turn too expensive and contribute to the demise of
business.
7. Gravitational effects: Scaling means increasing the company in size; this very
often leads to markets that are monopolistic or oligopolistic. Increasing in size
might lead to legal problems. As a company increases in size, it becomes more
likely that somebody is going to sue it.
8. Lucy effects: As the speed of production increases companies might have to
reinvent certain aspects of production entirely. At small sizes, certain tools of
production might satisfy the needs, but increased velocity of production might
lead to the need to overhaul certain components of production, which might turn
out to be hard and costly.
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Economies of scale do not simply imply spreading large fixed costs over certain
volumes of production. Companies have to go through an important learning process, on
the way to producing a successful product, a process which can prove to be very costly
(Ribbonfarm 2012).

Minimum Efficient Scale

Competition in the markets depends on the minimum efficient scale. This is the
lowest possible scale/quantity of production to achieve efficiency and be competitive on
the market. No economies of scale can be achieved beyond specific quantity. Minimum
efficient scale has important implications for the nature of the market. Namely, it
determines how many companies can survive in the market. The lower the scale, the
larger is the number of firms that can operate in the market. However, if minimum
efficient scale requires large output, then the number of firms in the market will be small.
This is the case with natural monopolies, such as water, gas, and electricity suppliers. The
most important factor, which determines the economies of scale, is the type of product
manufactured. In many industries, the economies of scale are minimal and such industries
are very competitive, with many small firms operating in the market. Economies of scale
are more of anomaly than regularity, and for many industries, they might be out of
question. However, when they occur they do only to a certain level of output until
diseconomies, or decreased economies of scale set in (Frisch 1965, 56).
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Fixed Costs and Economies of Scale

More often than not, economies of scale exist due to large fixed capital costs,
which are lowered per unit as the volume of production increases. The basic
characteristic of fixed costs is that they do not change at all or experience minimal
change independent of how much they are used. Fixed costs are expenses that companies
have to spend their resources on even if nothing is produced at all. Building factories,
warehouses, investing in equipment, and several other similar production factors are all
examples of fixed costs. Of course, there are current costs associated with these assets,
and some of them will likely vary, at least in part, according to the level of output, such
as maintenance and security (Frisch 1965, 78). However, such costs are minimal
compared to fixed costs incurred by companies.

Large economies of scale are characteristic of industries with large fixed costs.
Industries, which are capital intensive, are normally the ones with high fixed costs.
Examples of such industries are railroads, aircraft production, semiconductors, and
information technology to name a few. In these industries, only if the quantity of
production is large enough will unit costs reach the minimum level possible. To attain
such levels of output, it is necessary to have massive investments in production facilities,
measured in billions of dollars (Frisch 1965, 85).
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Other Causes of Decreasing Costs

An additional unit of production can decrease costs for various other reasons. One
of those is the often-mentioned concept defined as technical economies. This is when a
firm saves money, as it grows larger, because it starts employing more sophisticated
equipment or simply equipment used for large-scale production. Technical economies of
scale are normally found in motor vehicles production, because it employs mass
production technology. Economies of scale can occur for typical industry-specific
reasons. In steelmaking, larger blast furnaces retain heat better and thus are more
economical. In chemical industry, because of the characteristics of chemical processes,
large-scale production is equally economical (Frisch 1965, 88).

Physical and Engineering Basis

One of the important reasons for economies of scale is the square-cube law
(David H. 2013). According to the law, if the surface of a container increases by the
square of dimensions, its volume will increase by the cube. This law has a direct effect on
the capital cost of buildings, factories, pipelines, ships and airplanes (Ferguson 2008,
123). Normally, the capacity of a vehicle to carry cargo decreases less than proportionally
with the increase of the quantity of cargo. Consequently, larger vehicles consume less
fuel at a given speed. Heat losses from industrial processes vary per unit of volume for
pipes, tanks and other vessels in a relationship somewhat similar to the square-cube law
(Ferguson 2008, 124).
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Capital and Operating Costs

It is a common fact that capital costs are subject to economies of scale. Normally
changing the size of equipment changes its cost by the 0.6 power of the capacity ratio
(the point six-power rule) (Ferguson 2008, 145). When it comes to airplanes, ships and
other types of transportation increase in size or volume does not require proportional
increase in the number of operators (Rosenberg 1982, 28). Factories, warehouses and
other facilities very often have labor requirements that are not influenced by changes in
size (Rosenberg 1982, 29). This is because much of the labor work has to do with the
nature of tasks rather than the volume of production.

It is important to note that the crew size of planes, trains and many other
transportation vehicles does not change proportionally to the increase in size (Rosenberg
1982, 40). For example, the crew will still consist of one pilot/driver and the same
number of assistants. Many planes and other transportation vehicles have been increased
in capacity to increase profitability (Rosenberg 1982, 41). Many industries like chemical,
gasoline, and pulp to name a few do not require any or significant change in labor as the
size of the plants is increased. This stems from the fact that most of the production
process is automated and does not require adding extra labor force to handle the increased
load of work – with standard operating procedures, amount of work and equipment does
not change.

131

Very often the number and professional expertise of managers and other
specialists determine the quantity of production. If a company produces little, it is not
able to make profits and afford high quality specialists who could actually save them
operating costs. Companies could have significant administrative, accounting and other
types of savings if they can have their management work across different factories,
sectors and divisions of the same company. For instance, MNCs can have their
accountants perform their functions in different subdivisions of the company, saving it
the costs of hiring more accountants.

Purchasing economies is another way of saving. In this type of economies, large
firms receive discounts as they purchase goods in large quantities. Supermarkets are the
ones that take advantage of such discounts. Often, the cost of inputs decreases for a
company as they purchase more of it from their suppliers. Freight rates are subject to
economies of scale as well—rates decrease as the volume of cargo shipment increases.
Moreover, a larger firm might be able to obtain financing at lower interest rates than a
smaller firm, also contributing to its lower costs (Rosenberg 1982, 65). Large firms can
be monopsonistic in nature. Monopsony gives firms huge bargaining powers to reduce
the cost of inputs, because they are the only buyers on the market.

It is important to note that large companies have significant borrowing advantages
over smaller companies. This is explained by the fact that they have more valuable assets
that can be declared as collateral. Also, they are considered to be less risky compared to
smaller and newer businesses. Many new businesses go bankrupt very soon after they
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launch production. Also, large companies might be more resistant to risks/failures. If a
line of production of a large company fails, unlike a small company, it might find enough
resources to switch to producing something else (Rosenberg 1982, 83). Large production
runs might contribute to using inputs sparingly and avoiding a lot of waste (Rosenberg
1982, 87). For example chemical industries are largely dependent on turning their
chemical waste into products they can sell. In paper production process wood parts are
burned to recover some used chemical for further use (Rosenberg 1982, 87).

Economies of Scope:

Under economies of scale the efficiency of production is a direct consequence of
the volume of production. Under economies of scope, on the other hand, efficiencies stem
from the variety of production. In other words, diversification of production is supposed
to achieve certain economic benefits by cutting down the average costs of production by
producing more types of goods. But diversification of product base is only possible if the
producer makes frequent use of some knowledge/expertise or even a particular asset
(Teece 1980, 225). A good example of economies of scope is when a company promotes
a few different products; more people can be reached with the same amount of money
spent compared to the scenario when different companies specialize in the production of
particular goods. Economies of scope allow the company to cut down the costs of
advertising/branding goods. It should be taken into consideration that the company will
get to the point when extra expenses on advertising will be of no effect.
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Whereas with economies of scale a company might reach the optimal quantity of
production, which is relatively easy to detect because of falling costs, with economies of
scope, on the other hand, one may not reach such a point at all. To put it in different
terms, one may never reach a point at which the business can be certain it has reached the
optimal quantity or diversity of production (Ribbonfarm 2012). This makes businesses
hard to manage; however, success in the modern market requires that firms never stop
attempts to diversify their production.

Economies of scope have many advantages for companies. Among many other
advantages, companies can react swiftly to fluctuating or shifting market demands. Also,
economies of scope entail less wasted costs, more accuracy, better training. Importantly,
it involves fewer risks. If a business sells different products, in different countries, the
company benefits from the economies of scope. For example, if some of its merchandise
becomes less attractive to the public, the company can always switch to other production
line and/or rely on other markets before it does so. Normally, economies of scope are
possible when companies start to share separate functions, for example, finance and
advertising. It also happens when a company sells one of its products next to another and
can use certain outputs as inputs for another finished product.

It should be noted that the agreement on economies of scope is not unanimous
among economists. According to some, this phenomenon is rare and applies to a handful
of businesses. While some might doubt the significance of the economies of scope for
businesses, it is a documented fact that economies of scope played an important role
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behind the mergers and formations of huge MNCs in the 1970s and 1980s. Many
companies like Hanson and BTR (can you spell out the name of this company and its
specialization?) enjoyed the benefits of economies of scope by employing their financial
expertise in diverse businesses. In the following decades companies employed the same
people to advertise, market, and sell different products (Panzar and Willig 1977, 483).

When marketing some merchandise, it is more efficient to sell a few products
rather than just one, especially if this involves a lot of travel. Very often it is more
lucrative for companies to offer a bundle of products rather than a single one. Economies
of scope occur through distributional effects as well. For instance, it is much cheaper and
efficient in terms of transportation costs to sell a range of products over long distance
than sell just a single product. Economies of scope can originate because of byproducts.
For example, heating produced during the production of energy can be used to create
necessary climate for agricultural products (Panzar and Willig 1977, 488).

Learning in Economies of Scope:

An important element of economies of scope is transaction-cost learning. It
originates with the ability of companies to produce their goods and to purchase their
inputs in bulk. Companies should determine the size, volume of production and
diversification of a company relative to its economic capabilities. It is important to realize
that scoping has to do with the allocation of resources towards various activities in a
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company, the activities which will lead to decisions related to the quantity of production
(Ribbonfarm 2012).

Scaling vs. Scoping:

Scaling and scoping are related. In an environment with little or no competition
companies are free to scale, and they will start scoping after significant competition
emerges. In markets where competition is a fact, companies have to scope first, which is
a tool for a company to establish itself in the market. Once a company has managed to
create a niche for itself in the market, it can start to find ways to employ economies of
scale. It is vital to start scaling and grow the company in size before the competitors
begin to take measures. It is of primary importance to break in the existing market and
once this is achieved the speed becomes essential. The company should grow in sufficient
size and gain enough knowledge to remain a successful player in the market, particularly
once the initial phase of success has passed (Ribbonfarm 2012). It is important to grow
big enough to be able to influence the surrounding environment. The more a company
grows, the more it will shape the environment and the less other actors will be able to
influence it. One has to grow sufficiently big in order to become a dominant player in the
market and not just be one of the small market actors.
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Computer-integration and Economies of Scope:

Among multiple advantages of economies of scope, it offers critical flexibility,
responsiveness, and faster reaction to changes in customer tastes and demands. Managers
play a crucial role for they should appreciate the benefit of economies of scope and
implement them at the expense of other more familiar modes of production. A common
assumption among companies is that manufacturing systems/process is important; but
despite this acknowledgement, decisions regarding this have not been considered as
central and critical. At the managerial level the bias towards economies of scale has been
so strong that scope economies have had little consideration at all (Goldhar and Jelinek
1983, 142).

The bias towards economies of scale comes from the assumption that
manufacturing “know how” is an attribute of a machine. So, if managers decide to
purchase certain equipment, they are making a decision to increase efficiency in
producing a certain good; however, this would come at a price, the production process
becomes rigid and diversification of production is too costly. But the role of computers in
manufacturing has challenged the above-mentioned type of thinking (Goldhar and Jelinek
1983, 143). Moreover, as global competition has become more mature, product
customization has become a motto in markets. Standardized manufacturing, inventory
and processes related to traditional manufacturing are becoming increasingly obsolete.
Advances in technology have impacted how companies view the process of production
and decisions managers take regarding it.
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The new technologies cut down the production costs as well as diversify
production, but they require a large expenditure. Very often, though, such technologies
are much more expensive than traditional equipment; the company is gambling its future
when deciding to invest in such technologies. However, the company should realize that
the new technology offers a broad range of opportunities. They should not try to improve
simply the efficiency of present production but, more importantly, take strategic
decisions to diversify which the new technology offers. This is critical in case they fail. If
this is the case, competitors might take advantage of the window opportunity in market
competition (Henderson and Cockburn 1996, 25).

The use of computer technology has impacted the production process
significantly. Following elements are the qualities that cyber technology has introduced
into the market in the recent past: 1) Flexibility in production, which makes it possible for
companies to have a huge variety of designs; 2) the ability to respond quickly to changes
in market demands, tastes, production rates, scheduling problems; 3) better product
quality because of the greater control involved in the production process; 4) more control
of the waste produced, which allows companies to cut down significantly the waste of
basic resources; 5) greater predictability in the process of manufacturing, due to the
greater amount of data that can be collected at any stage of manufacturing; 6) less use of
inventory; 7) fewer problems with machines—new sensory machines allow for faster
speeds and information processing (Goldhar and Jelinek 1983, 144).
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All these developments in production capabilities have direct implications for the
cost of production. The assumption in economies of scale is that larger quantity of
production decreases the costs per unit. The idea is that large quantities in production
permit companies to invest in costly specialized equipment. With economies of scope,
modern technologies introduce efficiencies of variety. Computerized technology,
controls, memory make it possible to have smaller production runs (Goldhar and Jelinek
1983, 145). This has implications for the market structure. Small companies can gain
from advances in technology and successfully share the markets with giant producers.
Steel production is a good example, where economies of scope have been successfully
introduced. It is not the only one, though. Increasingly companies are switching to
smarter ways of production made possible by developments in technology. Small
manufacturers, who produce a limited quantity of a given product, but can switch the
variety is becoming increasingly a central tenet in the production function of companies.

Variety in Production:

The logic of economies of scope allows the manufacture of a variety of products
to product at lower cost than it would cost to produce them separately. Computer
equipment allows companies to diversify products and produce them in different
sequences. Costs and time necessary to switch the mode of production is negligible,
because it is programmed in the computer, and can be adjusted by pushing a button. With
given technology, engineering data can be adjusted easily, and changes in style and
design become simpler; if a machine can polish, paint and perform multiple functions,
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and if these functions can be alternated, the same machine can be used to produce
multiple products and their variations (Fraquelli and Piacenzo 2004, 48).

The impact of technology goes further than improvements in velocity or
precision. Several years ago manufacturing was possible because of skills and abilities of
individuals—it was in the hands of an individual. Workers were the ones who controlled
the information and possessed experience. With mechanization or automatization,
knowledge was built into machines. Such machines became faster, more accurate, and
better than producers who used human labor. Unfortunately, such machinery was also
very expensive. Importantly, companies utilized expensive hardware as a means of
production. Nowadays, more and more companies emphasize the use of software.
Machines can be programmed to produce even in small quantities, without any sunk
costs. Such flexibility allows companies to become more competitive in multiple
markets, attract more customers, and open new venues for success (Fraquelli and
Piacenzo 2004, 50).

The given method of production would be of particular value only if the company
entrepreneurs and managers learn how to market its diversified product base. The
company will have to invest in research to be able to modify its products and turn them
competitive. They need to be able to come up with product and design changes.
Consequently, the companies will have to “learn” to compete not only in terms of
efficiency but also in terms of their ability to satisfy simultaneously diverse demands to
provide diverse markets. For example, plastic manufacturers have already absorbed the

140

knowledge; apart from their traditional product base, they specialize in the production of
diaper pail and tubs. Computer technology has cut down the time needed to manufacture
Tornado fighter jets from two year and a half to one year and a half. (Substantiate this
with a footnote) This investment reduction of only 50 million dollars decreased hardware
and personnel by almost half, area of production by almost third, and costs by about 10%
(Goldhar and Jelinek 1983, 146).

Computers and programming of production devices will oblige managers to
consider the importance of production decisions on their strategic options. For instance,
Boeing’s decision to adopt computer based manufacturing enables it to work on over
billion parts, oversee clerks and workspace, which would be impossible without
computerization. The same systems have made it possible for the company to produce a
few aircrafts at the same time. With the developments in technology, the company’s
production and marketing strategies had to change. Examples of how computerized
technology has aided the production process are multiple: NC, one of the leaders in the
rubber industry, produces fender molds with the help of technology without first having
to produce wooden parts. In perfume production, computers are used to control the
volume of perfume poured, which has increased the efficiency over seven times (Goldhar
and Jelinek 1983, 146).

Electronics production depends heavily on computerized systems. In such
production, circuits are tested through computer simulation and calculations are made
before they are approved for production. The role of manufacturing is already impacting
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company’s strategic decisions and will continue to do so increasingly. Without computer
technology, no manufacture in electronics would be able to handle the complexity and
errors of production, and the costs associated with them. For example, in Intel’s highdensity memories, computer input is very heavy. Actually, the possibility of breakdown
has been lowered by over 80% (Goldhar and Jelinek 1983, 147).

Developed computerized systems handle the production from design to
manufacturing. Technologies such as adaptive controls and sensors help to gather and
store information. With increased information it will be much easier to collect relevant
data and draw important conclusions. Lockheed, for example, has been a pioneer in this
direction. It has installed a system, which will gather data on the performance of engines,
vibration, and temperature, which will be used later to increase the quality of production
and, importantly, prevent failures. Moreover, if it takes more time to handle certain tasks,
data provided from the computerized tools will help discover the difficulties. The
sophistication of computerized technology has become so staggering that machines can
specify the most optimal sequence and timing of operations. Thus, the increase is not just
in quality and efficiency of producing in a certain way; the technology can point the most
efficient way of production too. New methods of production can now satisfy traditional
needs with increased efficiency (Goldhar and Jelinek 1983, 147).

With traditional production there is little flexibility to diversify. Products become
standardized until the cheapest mode is discovered, and it becomes one standard mode of
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production. With new technology it is possible to make markets more diversified and
satisfy specific needs of customers. Thus, ultimately customers will have products that
are both more inexpensive, better, and cater amply to consumers’ tastes. If before
computerization catering to specific needs of customers was prohibitively expensive and
depended on the capabilities of workers, now it has become less expensive and more
accessible as the result of computer programming.

When companies invest in equipment they take a huge bargain. Their products
will move through their life cycle, competitors will produce something better. In such
situations smart technology becomes especially important. Computerization allows
companies to reprogram their technology to produce new products, so hardware might
not become obsolete at all and may only need the update of software. Ultimately,
economies of scope allow companies to diversify their production, increase innovation,
obviate the need for inventories, eliminate production and other kind of errors, and in
general, increase product variety and customer satisfaction, as well as cutting down
response time to changes in customer tastes.

Learning-by-doing:

Learning-by-doing implies increasing efficiency by means of practice and
perfection. Companies might “learn” to use their equipment better without a need to buy
more equipment or train their workers. The process of learning implies that companies
“think,” realize their problems, and, then, take measures to solve them. Dynamic
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programming and strategic planning are fields where learning-by-doing is of primary
importance. In learning-by-doing the workforce increases its efficiency by doing the
same process repeatedly over time. Kenneth Arrow promoted the idea when he coined his
endogenous growth theory incorporating innovations and technical change into classical
explanation of economic growth. Arrow used the notion of learning-by-doing to denote
learning inside the company. He was basing his studies on previous conclusions by
Solow and Abramowitz, who argued that technological change had important
implications for long-run development. First of all it implied that economic growth was
susceptible to policy manipulations (Greiner and Hanusch 1994, 28).

There are increasing returns associated with human capital. And learning is
extremely important for building human capital. As a result countries tend to specialize,
increasing efficiency in production and cutting down costs (Bretschger 1994, 85). Yang
and Borland demonstrate that learning-by-doing can be an important source of
comparative advantage.4 Many studies have documented the increase in efficiency
through learning-by-doing. Lundberg studied Horndal iron factory in Sweden. He
observed that productivity of the factory increased by 2% every year although it had no
new investments.5 Wright and Middleton show that in aircraft industry the labor
productivity and output have increased with time independent of scale effects. 6
For more detailed account, see Yang, Xiaokai and Jeff Borland, “A Microeconomic Mechanism for
Economic Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 19, no.11 (1991), 460-82, doi: 10.1007/s00787-0100130-8.
4

5

For more details see Erik Lundberg, Produktivitet och Räntabilitet (Stockholm: Norstedt & Söner, 1961),
126-28.
6

For more details see Alexander Middleton Theodore Wright, “Wartime Productivity Changes in the
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Learning-by-doing is supported by literature in engineering and management,
which clearly demonstrates the fact that increases in aggregate output have a dampening
effect on unit costs. Wright was one of the first scholars who mentioned the phenomenon
in his analysis of aircraft manufacturing—although the effects were quite well known in
the industry itself. They were so established that when in the 1950s the US government
was purchasing boats and planes from shipbuilders and aircraft manufacturers, they were
already incorporated in the budget (Bretschger 1994, 122).

Market Imperfections in Military Production:

Several authors have written about scale economies, economies of scope,
learning-by-doing, and other economic imperfections related to military production.
Harold Asher, in his paper, “Cost-Quantity Relationships in the Airframe Industry,”
published in 1956, noted that the ‘"learning curve"’ tended to apply to airframe
production […] with unit costs declining in a fairly predictable pattern as production
expanded.” Malcolm W. Hoag, in his 1967 paper, “Increasing Returns in Military
Production Functions,” alludes to this reasoning when he suggests that prominent
production economies of scale do apply with special frequency in military applications.
He argues this is the reason why instead of many factories and producers, there are just

Airframe Industry,” Monthly Labor Review 61, no.2: 215-225, doi: 20.1347/g23456-010-0177-8, also Paul
Wright, “Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes,” Journal of Aeronautical Sciences 3, no.4: 122-128, doi:
23.4456/d3456-015-6627-2.
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few that produce in large quantities. He illustrates the point with the example of F-iii
(TFX), which was designed to be the advanced tactical fighter-bomber for both the
United States Navy and the Air Force. Hoag concludes that the same logic applies to the
space programs.

Scale economies per se may have had only a modest influence on defense
industry structure in the past, though the evidence for learning economies and their
impact was more convincing (Sandler and Hartley 1995, 22). However, since the 1990s,
scale economies have had a large impact as well. Governments now appear more
sensitive to the extra cost incurred by small national production runs (and the high
technology nature of some manufacture) and more receptive to the argument that
“economies of scale need to be met through international collaboration and industrial
restructuring” (Dunne 1995, 28).

A huge wave of U.S. merger and acquisition in the 1990s has been partly
attributed to a search for scale and scope economies at a time of shrinking demand
(Markusen 2000, 46). The degree of cross-sector diversification among the largest
defense firms suggests that they perceive and value such economies (Markowski 2010,
125). According to Dunne, a major driver of economic restructuring is the growing transAtlantic nature of the industry, in terms of both the European companies’ aspirations to
become major players in the U.S. market and the U.S.’s acceptance that “interoperability
requirements, the benefits of cooperative defense programs, and an increasingly global
industrial infrastructure require that the U.S. Department of Defense be prepared to
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accept the benefits offered by access to the most innovative, efficient, and competitive
suppliers worldwide.” (Dunne 1995, 35).

Market imperfections (e.g., economic of scale, economies of scope, and learningby-doing) are important in the military production of many states. And their importance
has only grown in the last quarter of the century. Unfortunately, International Relations
literature has not reflected the growing significance of political economic variables in the
military production of states. Such a gap should be filled in as the political economic
variables can explain developments, such as continuing and deepening military
cooperation of NATO Great Powers after the Cold War.

The various perspectives summarized above point to one key development: there
are clear indications that since the end of the Cold War cutting military costs has become
one of the major concerns for NATO members. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO
members have not faced comparable external threats and, thus, have not required high
scale production. Some firms could not keep up with reduced demand and exited the
weapons system market. Others, in order to stay in business, consolidated their operations
and expanded their markets internationally. Importantly, though, NATO members
collaborated with each other and produced common orders, which, I will argue, allowed
them to use scale, scope, and other economies to cut down production and overhead
costs. All this has taken place while maintaining a vibrant and robust military research,
development, and production processes in the face of decreased threat and to replenish
normal tear and wear of the national armed forces. Furthermore, due to this I argue that
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by cooperating beyond immediate needs, these NATO countries gained by saving from
specialization in research, development, and production costs of defense. Cooperation
among NATO allies has been in terms of NATO projects, and projects outside it too.

Analysis of NATO Common Projects:

Both military and civil aerospace costs are tremendous and the costs are
continually rising. The costs are actually growing at an exponential rate (Augustine 1987,
18). The historical cost trend arises from technical progress in each generation, with
governments striving to purchase the latest products in order to have a competitive edge.
I maintain that continuing rising costs in defense products provide a sobering context for
nation-states to engage in continuous military collaboration. The cost incentives to
collaborate result from the large fixed costs in military technology, rendering some
countries unable to afford the necessary defense or military equipment to provide
unilaterally for their own national security.

Augustine forecasted that the costs of military production would increase to the
extent that all resources in the defense budget would be channeled to acquire just one
aircraft. Both Navy and Air Force would have to share this single aircraft 3.5 days each
week because they could not afford more. According to Augustine, the British military
would reach the same point somewhat earlier than the US, and countries with smaller
defense budgets would take even less time. The main reason why this is happening,
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according to Augustine, is because the costs of producing military equipment is rising
fast, while military budgets are falling rapidly to keep up with rising costs (Augustine
1987, 19).

The Augustine prediction concerns rising costs in high-tech equipment. He shows
that the costs of aircrafts have jumped by fourfold every ten years. Similar trends can be
observed with helicopters, ships, tanks as well as commercial aircraft. For ships and
tanks, the cost growth has been lower at a factor of two every ten years (Augustine 1987,
38). The rise in the cost trend is conditioned by technical progress in military equipment.
Nations are striving to have the latest high-tech equipment in order to be more secured.
These trends have led to suggestions of an eventual single ship navy, a single tank army
and Starship Enterprise for the air force! (Kirkpatrick and Pugh 1985, 83).

Rising Costs and Incentives for Collaboration:

Expensive military technology and rising costs create an important rationale for
states to engage in military cooperation; namely, collaborative projects. Collaboration is
particularly important because large fixed costs and small national orders make it too
costly for states to have national production. Large international orders would allow the
average cost of production to fall over larger volumes of output and make new
technology affordable to collaborating nations. Rising costs make it impossible for any
single nation in Europe to produce a future generation of planes unilaterally. Production
of a new model will necessitate colossal resources, which could only be allocated to the
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development of future generation combat jets through collaborative projects. Even
advanced technology unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) will be costly (Hartley 1999, 13).
Europeans will have to make a choice between increased collaboration and importation
from other nations, which can afford large batches of production, such as for example,
the US.

Collaboration gains can be assessed following the square root rule. The rule
implies that the costs of common projects compared to single-nation production are
increased by the square root of the number of participants. With four nations, the costs of
developing a project would be twice as much as doing it alone. With two nations, the
costs can amount to 1.4. However, these additional costs are shared between the partners
so that each nation has lower development costs compared with a national venture
(Hartley 1999, 23). Although, the aggregate costs increase due to cooperation, costs per
nation decrease, which allows them to partake in the development of technology they
would not afford on their own.

Collaboration increases development costs as the number of nations rise (Pugh
2007, 30). With two nations aggregate development costs are about 1.5, with three
nations they are about 1.8 and with four nations they are about 1.95 of the single-nation
projects. It is important to take into consideration the fact that along with the drop of
development costs per nation, increase in output affects the costs negatively. In general,
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the doubling of output is expected to result in a reduction in unit production costs of up to
10% when developed and manufactured jointly (Hartley 1999, 29).

R & D and Unit Production Costs:

Decreased economic costs provide significant incentives for states to cooperate.
Such costs are incurred during research and development (R & D) and production
processes. Collaborating nations can share in R & D costs and they can achieve
economies of scale and learning through increased production. For example, if two
nations were intending to develop similar high-tech weapons, which would cost them
billions of dollars in research, they would be duplicating their resources if they invested
in R & D separately and independently. Additionally, they would fail to take advantage
of economies of scale, which comes with larger batches of production. Common projects
would allow nations to save considerable resources. Ceteris paribus two-nation
collaboration, with equal sharing, will save half of the development costs for each nation
in the example, plus savings in unit production costs from a larger output (Hartley and
Sandler 1995, 28).

It is estimated that doubling of output in aircraft production from 300 to 600 units
might lead to savings in unit production costs of about 5%. If a single aircraft costs about
50 million per unit, savings are 2.5 million per unit. A two-nation collaboration would
avoid the duplication of resources and save little over 5 billion for each nation (Hartley
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2006, 56). Below, I will present NATO’s common projects and benefits brought to
member-states of the alliance.

Typhoon combat plane: One of the top common projects in NATO is the
Typhoon plane. The cost of development of the plane is over 54 billion Euros. Moreover,
the Typhoon project has created about hundred thousand jobs in over four hundred
European companies. Britain had 40,000 of these jobs, with Spain having 25,000, and
Italy and Germany about 20,000 each. Large part of these jobs is in high skilled crafts,
creating important externalities for the rest of the national economies. Skills from the
Typhoon’s production can be used in many other industries as well. This is clearly a
positive spillover effect. The Typhoon project scores more highly on gains from scale and
learning through combining production (Hartley 2010, 43).

Aircraft production is characterized by large economies of scale. Gains from
production are increased as the quantity of production is increased. Increased production
is important to spread R & D costs and reduce average production costs. Typhoon
production benefits from learning with an average 85% learning curve and typically a
90% learning curve for combined labor and other operations (Hartley 2010, 46). On the
Typhoon project, learning was substantial over the first 60 units. Both Typhoon and
Airbus have significantly improved learning scale compared to previous generations.
This suggests that the European aircraft production is characterized by constant
improvement in learning scale, which is reflected in productivity improvement and
downward shift in average cost of production.
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The Typhoon production has often been called inefficient. However, in reply to
such criticism, it is argued here and in accordance with Hartley’s conclusion, that the
main principle in production is single source for major units and sub-systems (Hartley
2010, 48). Most of the production, about 95%, is single-source and is able to achieve
economies of scale and learning. Only the final assembly lines, 4 of them are not singlesource, and consequently fail to benefit from larger economies of scale and learning. Data
from the US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) production confirms that the benefits of final
production line are minimal. It is estimated that JSF final assembly and check-out cost is
about 2% of the fleet unit recurring flyaway costs: other airframe work totals 35% of
costs, propulsion totals 19% and other non-airframe items total 44% of costs (Hartley
2010, 49).

The main reason for inefficiency in Europe is due to having many final assembly
lines. Each one of them costs Europeans over 130 million Euros. However, four assembly
lines compensate the losses with the important benefits they bring. They transfer
important technology to member states and support the aircraft in service. Thus, the
penalty of four assembly lines is small when taking into consideration the societal
spillover effects and in addition there are offsetting benefits for life-cycle support
(Hartley 2010, 57).

Industrial benefits: The Typhoon project brings important industrial benefits. It
allows the European aircraft industry to remain competitive, but also, allows Europeans
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to remain independent and feel secure in case of conflicts with outside powers. (Hartley
2012, 13). Some critics claim that the Typhoon project still remains more expensive
compared to other aircrafts. Data confirms the criticism. (Show source for this
conclusion) The Typhoon is about 20-60% more expensive than those other national
aircraft projects in Europe –for example French Rafale. On a unit total cost basis, the
French Rafale is some 10% cheaper than the Typhoon whilst the Swedish Saab Gripen is
some 50% less expensive than the Typhoon (Hartley 2012, 14).

But in response, it should be noted that comparing only prices confuses rather
than clarifies. Prices say nothing about operational efficiency of the aircraft. The
Typhoon is a superior aircraft to French Rafale, although it is more expensive (See Table
1). R & D costs for the Typhoon is $23.5 billion and for Rafale is about $21.9 billion.
The Typhoon is more expensive, but it should be remembered that R & D costs for the
Typhoon are shared by four nations, while only France incurs the Rafale costs. The
Gripen costs about 6-8 billion Euros. But it is smaller and simpler with many combat
disadvantages. The Typhoon has important combat advantages over Rafale and Gripen
(Hartley 2012, 16).
Table 1
Comparison of Relative Combat Effectiveness
F-22

Typhoon

F-15F

Rafale

F-18E/F Super Hornet

F-16C

F-18 Hornet

0.91

0.82

0.6

0.5

0.25

0.21

0.21
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Note: Combat effectiveness rating of 1.0 means that the aircraft will always win a combat engagement, a
0.5 means that it has an even chance, and less than 0.5 means that it will usually lose.

The price and battle effectiveness data in Table 1, clearly demonstrate that the
Typhoon is the best combat plane among European produced planes. Had the nations,
which are producing now three different combat planes, joined their resources to produce
only the Typhoon planes, important implications would ensue, particularly a better
aircraft and superb cost-cutting savings. The aggregate volume of production would have
topped 900 units and through economies of scale they would save more than 20% of
production costs. Importantly, more than 20 billion Euros would have been saved in R &
D costs (Hartley 2012, 20).

Other examples of collaborative projects in Europe confirm that common
production brings considerable benefits. Collaborative development compared with
national alternatives can be about 140% for two nations (e.g. the Merlin helicopter), 161–
179% for three nations (e.g. the Tornado airplane) and almost twice as high for four
nations (e.g. the Eurofighter). Despite higher aggregate development costs of
collaboration, each partner only bears its share of these costs. As a consequence, costs
savings accrue to the nations involved in collaborative development work (Hartley 2012,
24).
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Collaboration in other Projects:

The US and its allies are cooperating in over 20 military programs. Below I will
list a few programs, with each spending over $1.5 billion:
•

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter NATO Medium Extended Air Defense System

Design and Development Production and Logistics, NATO Helicopter Design and
Development Production and Logistics.
•

The United Kingdom and the United States are also key partners in terms of

defense industry cooperation and defense sales. The two countries are engaged in more
than 20 joint equipment programs. Moreover, France and Great Britain have multiple
military cooperation programs. They are already building a "Future Combat Air
System," due in 2030.

Western Europeans are also cooperating in the production of missiles through a
company called MBDA. The collaboration has actually become so successful that MBDA
now is a primary competitor of the major global missile company, Raytheon, from the
US. The English and French have cooperated in the Storm Shadow missile project.
Similarly, the Meteor air-to-air missile is showing promise with the UK acting as the lead
on a six nation international program also involving France, Germany, Italy, Spain and
Sweden (Hartley 2012, 40).

Logistical support can also bring important economic benefits. The UK,
Netherlands, Belgium and France have been cooperating in the logistical support of Spey,
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Olympus and Tyne marine engines. According to rough estimates, such cooperation has
saved participating nations about 30 per cent in maintenance services. The UK and US
benefit considerably from their cooperation in Multi-Launch Rocket System and the
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile. They have benefited from the economies of scale
through joint purchasing of spares and shared maintenance facilities (Ministry of Defense
2001).

Western Europeans have successfully cooperated in other helicopter and missile
programs. Among them, the 1967 Anglo-French helicopter agreement and the NH90
helicopter need to be singled out. The NH90 helicopter is a four-nation collaboration to
develop and build a medium-sized multi-role military helicopter (Hartley 2006, 28). The
manufacturers of the helicopter are NHIndustries (France and Germany), AgustaWestland and Fokker Aerostructures. NATO Helicopter Management Agency
(NAHEMA) manages the program for participating NATO members. There are six
assembly lines: in France, Germany, Italy, Finland, Spain and Australia. Five hundred
and seventy three helicopters have been sold by 2011. More generally, European
collaboration in helicopters has created two industrial groups which are now competitive
with the US helicopter industry (Hartley 2006, 30).

The UK Department of Defense estimates that collaboration with partners in
research brings benefits almost five times the original investment. Collaboration with
partners provides access to important technology, saves from duplicated costs, and, in
general, allows managing more efficiently the limited budget. The UK Department of
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Defense spends little over 40 million pounds on collaborative programs with other
nations, less than 10% of its defense budget. However, according to their estimate they
obtain technology worth approximately £200 million– a 5:1 return on its investment
(Ministry of Defense 2001).

Conclusion:

This chapter tested hypothesis 3 according to which states are more likely to have
military cooperation in the presence of market imperfections, even in the presence of
minimal external threat. It is undisputable that an ideological, political, and cultural
affinity among the great powers making up NATO’s leadership is an a priori,
fundamental, and necessary condition for other facilitating factors influencing the
cooperation of NATO members beyond the end of the Cold War. Yet, this chapter
revealed that the presence of market imperfections in the military production is an
important incentive for NATO’s Great Powers to continue cooperation even after the
disappearance of their rival, the Soviet Union.

I demonstrated that military production is characterized by significant market
imperfections, such as economies of scale, scope and learning-by-doing. Such
imperfections have a dampening effect on the costs of production up to a certain
quantity/size/volume produced. Because military production is extremely expensive and
is characterized by market imperfections, some NATO members find it imperative to
collaborate in the production of military technology to save costs but still have access to
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it. The cases analyzed demonstrate that by collaborating, member states can produce
better, more efficient and secure war material and save lots of money. NATO states have
benefited from common projects, and by taking advantage of market imperfections they
preserved and even increased their power capabilities since the end of the Cold War.

In the following chapter, I will show that since the early to mid-1990s only a few
military companies have remained. Disappearance of the external threat obviated the
need for states to have Cold War level expenditures. Military companies consolidated and
only a few big companies remained. Because of their size and other specific qualities,
these companies could now take advantage of economies of scale and other market
imperfections.
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CHAPTER VI

CONSOLIDATION OF INDUSTRIES AND ESCALATING PRICES

In the previous chapter, I showed that there are important political economic
conditions, which made it meaningful for NATO members to cooperate in military
production after the end of the Cold War. In this chapter, though, I will analyze how
those conditions came about, evolved, and strengthened the enduring capacity of NATO
beyond the disappearance of the Soviet Union in 1991. I claim that those conditions were
facilitated by the end of the Cold War, which allowed the consolidations of military
industries seeking to cut down escalating military costs in the face of decreased
government demands for weapon systems. I will analyze hypothesis No. 4 to confirm or
disconfirm whether international cooperation in military matters and production, of states
with compatible national interests, is positively related to escalating costs in military
production, both in the absence or presence of external threat. In short, if exponentially
increasing costs of defense prevail, then multilateral military cooperation or an alliance
will endure beyond the disappearance of the immediate external, geostrategic threat. I
will analyze the post-Cold War military cooperative developments to confirm or
disconfirm the validity of this hypothesis. My assumption is that escalating costs are
partly responsible for the degree of cooperation, common military projects/spending
among NATO members, military firm mergers and consolidations.
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A brief explanation is in order to expose more directly the above-hypothesized
causal relation. Since the 1990s the concentration/size of military companies globally has
increased steadily (see Table 2 below). What explains the development? One plausible
argument is that the disappearance of the external, geostrategic threat to NATO members
obviated the need for these states to maintain military expenditures at the same levels as
those prevailing during the Cold War. Accordingly, some companies had to merge to
survive the reduction in military expenditure by NATO-members. Based on their size and
other specific qualities, some of these companies could take advantage of economies of
scale and other specific market imperfections.

Table 2
Concentration of the Arms Industry, 1990–2003
Figures are percentage shares of the sales of the SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing companies.
Share of total arms sales

Share of total sales

1990

1995

2000

2003

1990

1995

2000

2003

Top 5

22

28

41

44

33

34

43

45

Top 10

37

42

57

61

51

52

61

61

Top 15

48

53

65

69

61

64

71

72

Top 20

57

61

70

74

69

72

79

80

Source: SIPRI Arms Industry Database.

Economies of scale per se may have had only a modest influence on defense
industry structure in the distant past, though the evidence for learning-by-doing and its
impact was more convincing. However, since the 1990s economies of scale have had
large impact as well (Sandler and Hartley 1995, 84). Nonetheless, since the late 1990s to
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2015, one is able to discern that governments appear significantly more sensitive than in
previous periods in history, to the extra cost that may be incurred by small national
production runs and the highly sophisticated technological nature of some defense
equipment manufacturing. Further, governments appear to be quite receptive to the
argument that increasing “economies of scale need to be met through international
collaboration and industrial restructuring” (Dunne 1995, 415).

A huge wave of US merger and acquisition in the 1990s has been partly attributed
to a search for scale and scope economies at a time of shrinking demand for weapon
systems (Markusen 2000, 127). Also, the degree of cross-sector diversification among the
largest defense firms suggests that they perceive and value such economies (Markowski,
Hall and Wylie 2010, 36). A major impetus of economic restructuring is the increasing
trans-Atlantic drive of the military companies in terms of both the European companies’
aspirations to become major players in the US market and the acceptance by the United
States, as argued by Dunne and Smith, that “interoperability requirements, the benefits of
cooperative defense programs, and an increasingly global industrial infrastructure require
that the [USDOD] to be prepared to accept the benefits offered by access to the most
innovative, efficient, and competitive suppliers worldwide” (Dunne and Smith 2001, 17).

However, as the chapter will explain it was not only market imperfections and
decreased demand that pushed NATO great powers to continue and deepen their
cooperation after the Cold War. Escalating R & D costs made it prohibitively expensive
for NATO members to develop a new generation of military technology on their own. As
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a result, NATO members found it imperative to cooperate in military production even in
the absence of the serious threat to their security. The cooperation allowed excess to the
modern military technology at a cheaper cost and allowed states to remain competitive.

Military Production during the Cold War:

The defense industry had unique characteristics during the Cold War.
Governments spent generously on the procurement of new and sophisticated weaponry,
which attracted quite a few corporations. The high R & D costs influenced the structure
of the market and companies. The high expenditure on R & D also influenced
significantly the trend in costs, making them higher than the cost on civil projects, and
the nature of production—with short production runs, technologically advanced and
concerned with performance rather than cost minimization—limited the potential for
economies of scale and learning (Dunne 1995, 25). Civil and military production were
very different from each other as was the nature of capital equipment, with labor skills
and the organization of production becoming increasingly specific to the sector (Dunne
1995, 30).

During the Cold War, governments prioritized the performance of technology
rather than price. In this sense governments were ready to finance expensive research,
investment heavily, and bear the risks (Dunne 1995, 32). Moreover, during the Cold War,
the military always pushed to innovate in order to be able to cope with the worst possible
scenarios. Governments, military and producers developed close ties, leading to a
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“revolving door” through which military and civil servants moved to defense contractors
with whom they had previous dealings and defense contractors’ personnel moving into
the national bureaucracy (Gordon 1981, 236). This became known as the “military–
industrial complex.” This complex relationship influenced governmental policies and
pushed for financing projects even when these was no apparent need (Dunne 1995, 45).
With the help of a close relationship between military and civilian personnel, these
defense firms became very efficient in obtaining lucrative government contracts to
develop and manufacture expensive weapon systems. Moreover, the close relationship of
firms with governments was the primary reason why markets were stable, with no firms
entering or exiting the market. In addition, the manufacturing industry remained national
in its composition, with a few or no actors from other countries. Smaller countries, which
could not afford the large fixed costs, resorted to import major weapon systems (Dunne
1995, 46).

Immediately after the Cold War, the world’s military expenditure declined
considerably for a brief period. However, in 1998 spending in the military sector started
to increase until in 2005 it exceeded the peak expenditure of the Cold War. The US
influenced decisively this trend, as it is the largest spender on military equipment in the
world spending almost as much as the rest of the world (Markowski, Hall and Wylie
2010, 13). In the mid-2000s, the US spent about half of the world’s outlays on military
equipment. To put this amount into perspective, one must realize that the combined
expenditure on the military of the next five largest spenders—the UK, France, Japan,
China and Germany—is less than half that of that by the U.S.A. NATO members alone
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spent more than 70% of the world’s military expenditures in 2005 (Markowski, Hall and
Wylie 2010, 12).

Two main processes have characterized the evolution of the defense industry
since the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR. First, markets in the
USA and Europe have consolidated and become oligopolistic. Second, the US and
Western Europe are unparalleled in the production and export of advanced weapon
systems (Mantin and Tishler 2004, 238). Just like during the Cold War, in the post-Cold
War world the arm’s industry and trade are a function of government decisions.
Governments are the main purchasers and regulators of export and import policies.
However, there have been some changes. Because of the reduced demand, outside the
USA, many companies have become national champions, in many cases monopolies or
close to it, with a consequent need for cross-border restructuring (Dunne and Surry 2005,
32).

Defense-Related Industrial Consolidation in the USA:

In 1993 the US Secretary of Defense initiated the industrial consolidation process
of the defense market in the USA. According to the Secretary, the existing market was
too small for so many companies and reduction of the number of players would actually
decrease the US defense costs (Markusen 2000, 32). A mergers wave was stimulated by
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, when he addressed a dinner attended
by defense industry executives and openly encouraged consolidation—this became
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known as the “last supper” (Tirpak 1998, 22). The department of Defense facilitated the
process of consolidation by financing the costs of defense industrial restructuring (Dunne
1995, 602).

The Clinton administration changed the course of previous governments who
scorned the idea of mergers and consolidations. Between 1990 and 1998, four giant
companies were formed (Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon).
Aerospace and electronics firms in the USA and Europe were centrally involved in much
of the industrial restructuring of the 1990s (Hartley and Sandler 2003, 372). In fact, the
process of consolidation was advocated by the US Department of Defense as necessary to
achieve economies of scale (Flamm 2000, 28). The government heavily subsidized the
firms so they could produce enough to achieve economies of scale. For example, over the
period 1993 to 1997, the U.S. Department of Defense approved restructuring costs of
$765 million for seven major mergers based on forecast cost savings in weapons
acquisitions exceeding $4 billion over five years (Kovacic 1999, 12).

Post-cold war consolidations have affected the structure of the defense industry.
During the Cold War, the industry was not concentrated, as the top five companies sold
about 20% of global arms supply. By 2003 this had changed significantly, with the top
five firms accounting for 44% of total arms sales in the world. This large increase in the
share of the top companies continued further for the top ten, fifteen and twenty
companies in the world (Kurtz 2008).
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The U.S. companies have been particularly successful in the global defenserelated markets. This is significant when compared to European NATO partners. For
example, BAE Systems is the only European company that ranks among the top five
defense-related manufacturing firms in the world (Dunne 1993, 99). Three other
European companies are in the top ten: Thales, EADS and Finmeccanica. The largest
number of mergers and acquisitions in the defense industry took place in the five-year
period between 1993 and 1998. While the process is still in progress, it is proceeding at a
much slower rate. The “last supper” event had important implications for arms
manufacturers. As a direct result of this, defense-related firms limited their product range
and increased their specialization in producing specific products. This was reinforced by
Wall Street transactions, which encouraged companies to concentrate on what the players
in the stock market called “pure play” and “core competences” (Dunne 1993, 102).

Defense-Related Industrial Consolidation in Europe:

The emergence of four giant American defense firms appears to be the catalyst for
a similar consolidation process in Europe and across the Atlantic (Becker 2000, 25).
Industrial size, so it seems, had become a significant factor in the defense industry
(Dunne 1993, 104). However, European consolidation was necessarily a more
complicated process than the American. In Europe the process among NATO members
involved cross-border consolidations, which created serious political problems (Ripley
2005, 28). It is important to underscore here that the ownership type in Europe was quite
different than in America. In comparison with the US, European arms production was
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characterized by a high degree of state control. National borders made the process of
consolidation difficult. However, the driving forces in Europe were similar to those that
affected the US defense-related manufacturing sector and ultimately led to a marked
increase in industrial concentration.

Further, one should point out here that industrial consolidation in Western
Europe’s defense market was a gradual process. These were centered around EADS
(European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company -a European international merger in
2000 involving aerospace companies in France, Germany and Spain); BAE Systems; and
Thales, which is a French company based on the following firms: Thomson-CSF,
Thomson Marconi Sonar and Shorts Missiles Systems (2000). Further, European mergers
resulted in the creation of Agusta-Westland that involved a number of defense-related
systems production lines among different international partnerships, for example, the
helicopters production partnership between Italy and the UK; MBDA missiles, which was
the result of a merger between Matra BAe Dynamics from France, the UK, and Alenia
Marconi Systems from Italy (Hartley and Sandler 2003, 367).

In 1999, two gigantic mergers took place. First it was the merger of BAE systems
and EADS, and the second was the purchase of British Racal Electronics by the French
Thales Company. These two mergers increased dramatically the concentration in
defense-related markets. On average, the sales of each of the largest 100 defense firms
declined from $2.2 billion to $1.5 billion (1995 prices) between 1990 and 1998, while
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each of the five largest defense firms increased their defense sales from $9.5 billion to
$11.7 billion (Dunne et al. 2003, 25).

France was a major protagonist in the European moves towards independent
defense production and it was an active force behind the restructuring of this sector after
the Cold War. Surprisingly, though, France does not collaborate as much with other
European nation-states. Much of the French armament and naval industry is in the hands
of the government. France has also encouraged more competition in their defense
markets. British Aerospace is very active in Britain’s domestic market and to
counterbalance this dominance and to create a second "national" defense electronics
supplier competing with BAe Systems, the UK Ministry of Defense accepted the takeover of Racal by France’s Thales.7

Germans have integrated their aerospace production into the European
Aeronautics, Defense and Space Company (EADS), which originally included German
DASA, French Aérospatiale Matra, and the Spanish CASA. EADS increased even more
in the early to mid-2000s by acquiring other defense-related manufacturing companies.
For example, EADS incorporated the Spanish company, CASA, and accepted the General
Dynamic’s offer for Santa Barbara, the Spanish defense contractor. The Italian company
Finmeccanica is also participating in a few joint European projects (Hartley and Sandler
7

For more detailed review see Hartley, Keith, and Todd Sandler. 1995. Handbook of defense economics.
Amsterdam: Elsevier. Hartley, Keith, and Todd Sandler. "The Future of the Defense Firm." Kyklos 56, no.
3 (2003): 361-80.
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2003, 370). Similarly and compounding the merger trend, several trans-Atlantic deals
were struck in the period from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. During this period BAE
purchased Lockheed Martin and American companies bought a number of European
defense-related companies. For example, US companies bought MOWAG of
Switzerland; Santa Barbara of Spain; and Bofors of Sweden (Hartley and Sandler 2003,
372).

Arms Sales and Company Consolidations during the 2000s

In the 2000s arms sales continued to rise in the world. U.S. companies accounted
for the large majority of military equipment sales. The year 2005 was significant for the
analysis due to the number of important company consolidations that took place in the
world. The sector is already extensively consolidated as compared to previous decades in
the midst of the Cold War. While the pace of consolidation slowed down in the 2000s,
significant activity is still taking place. Consolidation among European companies
continues and is likely to be reinforced by the increased political commitment in the
European Union (EU) to harmonize rules for arms procurement and by the adoption of
the 2005 Code of Conduct on Defense Procurement, which accepts competition in arms
procurement among member states (Dunne and Surry 2005, 256).

The top 100 weapons manufacturing companies sold about $270 billion worth of
merchandise. American and Europeans sold the overwhelming majority of these sales
(Kurtz 2008). US defense companies are particularly prominent in this trend. To buttress
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this point, one should keep in mind that about 65% of total world sales in defense-related
material is sold by 40 American companies and another 30% of these sales are by 35
European companies (Holmqvist, C. 2005). The sales of top 100 defense companies
increased in 2004, which was an increase of about 15% over the previous five years. The
sale increases in the 2000s suggest that the decline in arms sales by the largest armsproducing companies that occurred during the 1990s ended by this time (Dunne and
Surry 2005, 28). Specifically, the year 2005 is significant for my analysis and I
designated accordingly due to the five large acquisitions that took place for over $10
billion in total. By comparison, in 2004, there was only one similar acquisition in terms
of size and amount. In 2005 BAE Systems (UK) purchased United Defense (USA) for
$4.2 billion (Dunne and Surry 2005, 29). This deal was historic. It represented the biggest
foreign purchase ever of an American defense company. An extraordinary result from
this purchase is that a British company has become the sixth-largest military contractor
selling to the US Department of Defense (DOD). The above-mentioned purchase may
prove a catalyst for the European market and push it to consolidate further (Chutter and
Ratnam 2005, 122).

The Information Technology (IT) sector was also an important venue for
acquisitions in 2005. Titan Corporation was acquired by L-3 Communications for over
$2.5 billion. The company General Dynamics was purchased by Anteon International for
about $2.2 billion; DRS Technologies paid a little bit less than $2 billion to acquire
Engineered Support Systems. All these purchases constituted American companies
purchasing other American companies. In the same year the Swedish EQT purchased a
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subdivision of German DaimlerChrysler. This transaction, which had been a source of
considerable controversy and political debate in Germany, also included the OffHighway Division of Detroit Diesel (USA) and was valued at approximately $1.9 billion
(Aguera 2005, 156).

As mentioned above, the British BAE Systems purchased American United
Defense in order to gain access to US markets. But this is not a discrete case at all. British
QinetiQ purchased 4 U.S. aerospace firms in 2004-5. VT Group (UK) also purchased an
American company and openly stated its goal of doubling its business in the United
States. Among non-US companies, which have announced publicly their intentions to
increase their presence in the US, Thales of France and Finmeccanica from Italy are the
biggest company currently doing business with the US Department of Defense. Efforts by
non-US companies to access a greater part of the large US procurement budget in this
way have been characterized as an “uphill battle” as a direct consequence of the ongoing
political debates about the procurement of foreign military equipment by the US and how
this may compromise national autonomy and security (Dune and Surry 2005, 245).

Cooperation has always been relatively common between American and western
European aerospace and defense companies. They can use collaboration, joint ventures
and strategic alliances to cut production costs—by sharing high R & D and other
overhead costs-cutting strategies, and pooling orders together to increase production
runs—without losing independence (Dunne 1993, 110). Joint ventures are partnerships or
conglomerates, often formed to share risk or expertise, where two or more businesses
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agree to share profit, loss and control in a specific enterprise. They are seen as a safe way
for companies to combine resources without having to merge. However, joint ventures
can be difficult to manage and companies generally prefer direct control, when they can
get it. One of the success stories in military aerospace is the longstanding link between
the partly state owned French aero-engine company Snecma and General Electric of the
USA (Dunne 1993, 112).

Strategic alliances are arrangements between companies that pool, exchange or
integrate selected business resources for mutual benefit, while remaining separate
entities. Strategic alliances are less complicated than joint ventures. They take many
forms and have become more sophisticated and flexible over the past few years.
Companies may choose an alliance that involves simple market exchanges or crosslicensing agreements, or they may form a more complicated partnership that includes
cooperative manufacturing arrangements or joint-equity ventures.

Defense-related manufacturing companies have adopted all of these variants over
the past two decades. While the companies rely significantly on domestic support through
procurement and support for exports, and so are not truly “transnational,” they have
internationalized considerably the manufacturing operations. Governments are
increasingly willing to recognize that the costs of high-technology defense R&D and
smaller national production runs mean that economies of scale need to be met through
international collaboration and industrial restructuring (Dunne and Surry 2005, 226). This
is very different from a few decades ago, when governments aimed to maintain a
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comprehensive national defense industrial base. Major non-US defense companies are
also buying defense contractors in the U.S.A. as a means of entering the U.S. market.
While Europe has been heading in the same direction, they still have some way to go in
terms of restructuring and increasing concentration.

It is, thus, sufficiently clear that the defense market has changed considerably in
terms of shape. The number of companies has decreased, while they have also increased
in size. The attempt by European firms to move into the U.S. market has been significant,
with seven transatlantic acquisitions of U.S. companies in 2005 (Dunne and Surry 2005,
227). The evidence shows that concentration among giant companies stopped in the states
around the end of 1990s. However, at the time of this writing, the process of
consolidation is still continuing at the level of smaller firms. Europe is closely following
the US in its efforts to restructure the industry and gain a competitive edge (Slijper 2005,
28). Europeans are becoming more open to privatization, foreign companies, and nondomestic procurement.

At this stage, 19 of the 20 largest defense producers belong to one or a
combination of the NATO great powers. NATO members have a considerable advantage
over other states in military production. The combined share of the USA and Western
Europe (mainly UK, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain) in the
world’s exports of weapon systems has been about 85% since 1992 (Hartley and Sandler
1995, 45) . The top 10 arms producers in the world have increased exponentially their
presence on the market since the 1990s. The biggest corporation in the top ten of largest
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defense producers supplied in 2015 about 20% of the total arms sales of the top ten
companies as compared to the previous 14% in 2005. Moreover, the same number
increased from 37% to 55% for the top 3 firms in arms sales in the same time period.
These figures are indicative of the trend towards increased concentration resulting from
mergers leading to a smaller number of larger defense firms (Hartley and Sandler 1995,
46).

Movement towards more concentration is shown by the fact that throughout the
1990s the largest firm experienced a 50% increase, while the mean increase of the top 5
firms was over 20%. After the Cold war the relative size of American and European firms
changed considerably. If in the 1990s European firms earned about 95% of the revenue of
American ones, in the 2000s this number decreased to 88% (Hartley and Sandler 1995,
47). A similar relative position occurred between the largest U.S. firm and its European
equivalent: in 1990, British Aerospace was 83% of the size of the US based McDonnell
Douglas but in 2000, BAE Systems was 77% of the size of Lockheed Martin (Hartley and
Sandler 1995, 47). The data above shows unequivocally that since the end of the Cold
War the size of the companies in the defense industry has grown in the U.S.A. and
Western Europe. The decreased demand by governments and escalating production costs
in the first decade after the Cold War forced defense companies to consolidate/merge
with other companies, exit the industry or switch to civil production. Importantly, NATO
great powers increased the number of common projects to save costs in the face of
escalating prices and tightening budget constraints.
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Escalating Prices in Military Production

Increasing production costs and consequent concentration in defense industry
should bring a few benefits to NATO powers. They should actually decrease net costs in
these countries. As a result, industry consolidation is likely to continue and more
transatlantic mergers are to be expected in the near future. Americans and Europeans are
likely to continue their colossal investments in military R & D to crowd out the rest of the
world from the market for modern weapon systems and to maintain a credible deterrent
capacity against potentially rising geostrategic and national threats (Mantin and Tishler
2004, 162). NATO countries are going to benefit with the decrease of the number of
firms globally. This way they will be able to produce more and reduce their production
costs. Thus, the consolidation process of the defense industry in the USA and in Western
Europe is, at least in part, the outcome of economic considerations, along with political
and security processes. Except for a major systemic disruption in world politics, this
trend is likely to continue in the immediate future (Mantin and Tishler 2004, 165).

Although, Europeans and Americans will be increasing the concentration of their
production by increasing the size of their companies and other forms of multinational
cooperation, prices will still increase. This is because the NATO Great Powers will be
investing heavily in R & D in their attempts to improve their national and multilateral
security. They will not be manufacturing more of the old technology, but will try to go
ahead in the technological battle. Better technology will necessarily mean rising costs and
create increasing pressure for more military expenditure. Statistical evidence shows that
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production costs of military aircrafts in the UK and the US have risen by almost 10%
annually, which is equivalent to a factor of 2.5 per decade (Kirkpatrick 1995, 265). Pugh
demonstrates that a similar logic applies to other military technologies. He calculates that
production costs will double every 7 years for a unit of output produced (Pugh 1993,
180).

The main reason for increasing production costs is the expensive nature of the
new technologies. New generations of arms are more lethal than previous ones, but they
also have higher development and production costs. This implies that fewer units will be
produced because of the expensive nature of production and limited and shrinking
national military budgets. What currently is enough to develop and produce 200 units is
unlikely to be sufficient to complete the development of its successor (Pugh 1993, 185).

Some neoliberal economic experts and observes will probably argue that
producers can become more effective by increasing efficiency and productivity, thus,
alleviating the cost escalation. However, I think such prognosis is unrealistic. With cost
escalations of about 10% per year, becoming more efficient and productive only solves
the problem for a short time. The rate of increase in costs, particularly of R&D and
innovation, is so huge that it easily offsets any improvements in efficiency and
productivity. As a result, unit cost escalation is a major determinant of both military and
industrial capabilities and their structures (Pugh 1993, 186). Such unit cost escalation
influences the nature of military competition more than inefficiencies in procurement.
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Crises and budgetary constraints and escalating costs will make great powers
postpone or outright reject the development of costly military hardware and technology
independently. For example, in 2000s, the U.S. Department of Defense had ordered the
production of about 700 F-22 fighter jets, but the final budget cap was reached with the
production of less than 180 units. Europeans have also cut their orders for the Typhoon
jets. It seems Germans, British, Italians and Spanish cannot afford the jets. It is predicted
that the order for F-35 advanced fighter jets will experience sharp fall in demand too.
Constraint on military budgets is severe. In 2010, the U.S. started cutting jobs for over 40
of its generals and admirals, diminished funding for contractors and implemented other
money saving measures. After almost a decade of increased spending in the war on
terrorism, resources have been cut to fight the budget deficit (Kirkpatrick 2010, 123). The
Europeans started the process of cutting military spending a bit earlier than the
Americans. Germany’s defense is working to decrease its army by about 30% and save
over 10 billion dollars annually. Britain is working on cut down its military spending by
about 20%. Spain and Italy have cut about 10% and are working on more budget saving
measures (Kirkpatrick 2010, 267).

NATO’s goal of having its members contribute a minimum of 2% of their GDP
never has looked so bleak. Public demands for more and deeper cuts and the
governments’ willingness to heed them make diminished military expenditure almost a
certainty. It might be argued that by implementing the expending cutting measures, the
West is acknowledging its decline and accepting a less hegemonic position in the world.
Some observers, like Krepinevhich, director of a think-tank in Washington, suggests that
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America is now experiencing what Britain experienced at the end of the 20th century. He
reminds readers that in just after the First Great War, Britain had to deal with rapidly
growing States, aggressive Russia, Germany and Japan. Britain had to play wisely and
strategically to make sure it remained in the dominant position. It compromised with the
United States, allied with Japan against Russia, and befriended the French to resist
German inroads for European and global supremacy. Krepinevich suggests that wise
strategy can help solve the problems created by decreased economic might. Like Britain
the declining U.S. can sustain its dominance, at least for a while, if it plays its cards right
(Markowski, Hall and Wylie 2010, 58). This is a view shared by this study.

In light of its constrained military budget, the U.S. must find new resources and
devise alternative policies like manufacturing. Although the U.S. military budget is over
700 billion dollars, equaling the military budget of the rest of the world, price escalation
of military equipment and rising wages pose a great problem for the superpower and its
allies (Mantin and Tishler 2004, 165). The annual budget rises by approximately 2%,
while the US military costs by about 3% (Mantin and Tishler 2004, 166).

The fixed costs of the remuneration of military forces are quite expensive. The
U.S. also pays considerable amount for health-care services of its combatants and
families. And it is next to impossible to cut down such services to soldiers. One of the
tried solutions to save on military costs is to invest in technology. But unfortunately,
there is ample evidence to show that technology does not solve the problem, primarily
because it is expensive and is becoming even more so at a staggering speed. The price of
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technology has overshadowed the general inflation in the economy. The price of combat
jets has been rising faster than inflation. Combat ships are going through the same
process. Augustine in 1983, in his book, suggested that the unit cost of combat jets will
increase exponentially. He reached a staggering conclusion that, on the basis of current
rates, by the year 2054 the US would possess only one fighter jet system, which would be
shared by the Air Force and the Navy. Over three decades after his forecast, Augustine’s
projection remains absolutely on target. The Raptors system costs over 150 million and
350 per unit if developmental costs are included. Compared to previous generations, this
is a mind-bogging inflation. For example, the F-16 cost about 50 millions. Because of
increasing prices, the air and marine forces of the states have decreased, although defense
spending has risen (Mantin and Tishler 2004, 170).

The value of modern military equipment is in computers. And logically, it should
follow Moore’s law, which forecasts rapid fall in the costs of computer technology.
Strangely, though, the military technology has followed Augustine’s law, which
predicted sharp rise in costs. There are a few reasons for such development. First of all,
military equipment very often is not produced in large quantities and its expenses are
usually inflationary, which does not allow the drop in the unit costs (the effect of
economies of scale). Second, the security requires that military software always be
programmed from scratch, instead of being upgraded periodically. Importantly,
governments rarely negotiate fixed-price deals. There is a lot of risk involved in
developing expensive military technology and software and companies would not assume
the risk without government guarantees, which cost government an enormous amount.
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Even the giants in the combat aircraft industry, such as for example Boeing, would
abstain from developing military jets on their own, if they had no government guarantees
(Pugh 2007, 29).

Military technology has been rising in cost at tremendous speed. Pugh in his study
of the costs of constructing war ships suggests that industrial revolution exacerbated the
problem even further. Since owing to groundbreaking technologies and the pace of their
development, great powers have been competing in building better ships for their fleet.
Countries normally face two choices when the costs of production start to escalate – they
either can cut down on producing advanced weapons, or invest in new and sophisticated
technology. According to Pugh, the rivalry to build better ships is the most pronounced
during times of peace, but usually falls when the war starts. At such times, the author
argues that countries prioritize quantity over anything else. Moreover, the Cold War
induced countries to prefer quality to quantity because it never actually turned into a real
war. During the Cold War, quality was given precedence over other factors (Pugh 2007,
30).

Another one of Agustine’s laws is that achieving the final 10% of performance is
responsible for over 30% of the costs and 60% of problems. Very often the so-called
conspiracy of optimism manifests itself, when governments and producers purposefully
or unintentionally miscalculate the cost of weapons. Add to this the fact that military
projects are almost never cancelled until consummated; the result is frightening for
budgetary policies. There are many reasons for rising costs: technological problems cause
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delays; governments delay work to avoid annual budgetary overspending which increase
costs in the long run. As time passes, technology becomes obsolete, and new
requirements have to be satisfied. All this ends up with governments downsizing their
projects, purchasing less than they had initially planned for, due to increasing per unit
costs. For example, the US government was planning to buy over 130 B-2 bombers but
ultimately bought less than twenty-five at an approximate cost of 2 billion per plane.
Despite measures to increase efficiency and decrease production costs, spending on the
biggest military programs in the United States has increased by over 25% (Pugh 2007,
35).

The problems in Europe are just as acute as in the US. Tight budgetary constraints
have left France with one aircraft carrier, while Britain has two of medium size. The
British have two more coming out of the production line in the near future, but since the
moment they ordered their construction, the project had to be delayed because of
pecuniary constraints. This way the British would save about half a billion in the next few
years but spend over 1 billion more than initially planned in the long run. European
countries are less efficient with their funds than Americans. While together they have
more troops, they are actually less potent in terms of their fighting capabilities. Their
limited resources are divided among many more units and industries. As a result they find
themselves in a difficult situation. If the United States is deciding on how many weapons
to make, very often the Europeans are breaking their heads deciding whether to make
those weapons at all because they are too expensive. So when the U.S. might be
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contemplating if it needs its 11 aircraft carriers, in France and Britain the question is
whether they need and/or can afford those carriers.

It is evident from the European example that it needs to take advantage of market
imperfections and most of all, economies of scale. One European army seems very
difficult to imagine at this stage. As argued above, more transatlantic cooperation would
make matters affordable to the European members of NATO. An example with the F-35
fighter jet shows that despite the rising costs, it still seems affordable, provided the costs
of development and manufacturing are shared by NATO members. The F-35 borrows
some of its avionic technology from previous models and currently the U.S. uses it in all
its army divisions. At the moment, a few European countries have joined the U.S. In this
manner these countries can save more money if they avoid custom-made technology and
invest in small projects that upgrade existing technology, rather than invest colossal
amount in developing new one (Ripley 2005, 8). The rising price is not a problem at all.
This is the case because the price is well compensated by the efficiency/quality of the
weapon system. While this is true, this logic only works against a single/concentrated
enemy. When there are multiple enemies or the enemy is dispersed, fighting in multiple
locations and tactical scenarios is inevitable and complex. In such cases the
efficiency/quality of weaponry would be of little help if it is not omnipresent. In such
cases quantity rather than sophistication and quality become very important (Ripley 2005,
12).

183

The findings above demonstrate unequivocally that costs in military production
are escalating at a tremendous rate. And the trend will only exacerbate. Given the
colossal R & D costs of producing competitive military equipment NATO great powers,
and especially its Western European members, find it necessary to continue and increase
their cooperation, even in the absence of immediate external threats. The inflationary
effect of military production is the bond that tightens the military cooperation among
NATO members.

Future Trends: Creation of European Market

Escalating costs and limited budgetary resources are forcing nations to consider
alternatives to autonomous national development and production of military technology
and, thus, choosing to engage in more and greater cooperation (Hartley and Sandler 1995,
328). Autonomous production is costly for European nations because of the small scale
of production. In this sense, high costs are forcing NATO members to cooperate in the
development, production, and adoption of weapons projects and systems. But Western
European members of NATO are even under greater pressure than the U.S. because of
the small size of their markets. Faced with escalating costs, they can opt to cooperate
with each other to take advantage of economic imperfections and shared costs or buy
from foreign producers.

Europe is an inefficient defense market. A preference for national independence is
costly and the future organization of European defense markets is likely to change
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radically as nations seek to achieve the economic benefits of collective action (Sandler
and Hartley 1995, 330). The creation of a Single EU Market for defense equipment will
allow companies there to achieve large scale of output. Estimates show that the creation
of a Single EU Market for defense equipment would yield cost savings of approximately
10% to 17% annually (Hartley and Sandler 1995, 331).

A NATO Free Trade Area?

Two factors can lead to the creation of a NATO-based trade area: First, the
escalation of R & D costs for high-tech military technology, and, second, the increased
concentration in the market. These two factors are already affecting the nature of military
production. As a result, the preference for a competitive procurement policy will favor
the creation of a NATO-based free trade area for defense equipment (Hartley and Sandler
1995, 333). In this vein, a NATO market would allow companies to cooperate on
transatlantic basis. One of the successful instances of such multinational cooperation is
the US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The UK and several other states are actively
cooperating with the US in this project. The JSF industrial arrangement provides a model
for future international collaboration in the defense industry and it can be potentially an
important determinant of continued multilateral security collaboration within the confines
of the NATO alliance system.
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Conclusion:

This chapter attempted to demonstrate the extent of military or defense-related
company mergers and consolidations. As I showed in the previous chapter, economies of
scale and other market imperfections are responsible for many military projects among
NATO members, leading them to cooperate closely within the same organizational
umbrella. In this chapter my goal has been to show how those conditions came about and
evolved over time. The evidence presented above reveals that after the Cold War military
companies have actively pursued consolidation through mergers. According to the
argument advanced in this study, this condition allowed them to cut down costs in the
face of decreased government spending in the military sector. NATO member states
allowed for such consolidation because it permitted them to save considerable resources
while remaining strategically and politically secured under the umbrella of the NATO
alliance.

In closing, it is important to underscore that this chapter tested the effect of
increasing prices on the cooperation among NATO Great Powers. The effect has proved
to be positive. Escalating military prices made it even more meaningful for states to
cooperate. New technology is becoming increasingly expensive and many NATO
members will be able to afford it only under a multinational cooperation within the
auspices of the alliance. As a direct result, cooperation in military production remains the
only possible option to keep up with technological pace. In the next chapter, I will show
how the incorporation of the political economic aspect enriches and complements the
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international relations theory on military alliances, as well as provides an important
reason to explain why NATO member states continued their multilateral military
cooperation well beyond the end of the Cold War in 1991.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

This study set out to explore the characteristic of military power heretofore
unaccounted in the international relations literature – its exponential capacity. Moreover,
it set out to investigate how this unique characteristic can potentially impact military
alliances among states. The case of post-Cold War NATO alliance was selected to test
the validity of the theoretical assumption, that, the exponential capacity of power impacts
endurance and more importantly, deepening of military cooperation, even in the absence
of external threats, in the conditions of compatible national interests. The study explored
why NATO’s most powerful members, (i.e., France, Germany, Great Britain, Canada,
and the United States) continued and deepened their military cooperation when their main
geostrategic rival collapsed and disappeared over a quarter-of-a-century ago. This study
made a theoretical contribution to the literature on military alliance dynamics. It showed
that the political economy of military production, generally omitted when explaining
military alliance strategies and dynamics, might be a crucial causal factor in determining
the alliance choices of states and the endurance of military coalitions beyond the absence
and/or disappearance of an external threat. This is a dimension that, as far I have been
able to establish in my perusal of the germane literature on military alliance dynamics,
has not been discussed and has not been theorized into the alliance behavior literature. At
no time has the intention of my work been to debunk other alternative explanations of the
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extension and endurance of NATO. Rather, the purpose of this study has been to offer a
new complementary explanation.

In the case of NATO, British, French and Germans, contrary to what Waltzian
defensive neorealism would predict, are not trying to balance the relatively larger military
capabilities of the U.S. within the coalition. Clearly, the U.S. is overwhelmingly more
powerful than any other state on its own. Nonetheless, Europeans in alliance with
Russians, Chinese, or these two combined could actually achieve enough military power
to counterbalance the U.S. The Europeans, however, opted against this option. Instead,
they chose to ally, or in other terms, bandwagon with a much stronger partner—the U.S.
This decision has been explained according to multilateral cultural, political, and
ideological affinities among members of the North-Atlantic military coalition. Others
have emphasized the United States’ geopolitical and global leadership objectives and the
proximity of a potentially threatening Russia. This does not provide, however, a strong
explanation as to why the Europeans deepened their military cooperation or in other
words bandwagoned with the U.S., even more importantly and perplexing, in times of
peace, consequently remaining in the NATO alliance. In addition to Russia, China was an
alliance partner option for the Europeans in a pure power politics context, yet these states
resolved to bandwagon with the U.S. and remain linked to and deepened their
cooperation with the U.S. in NATO.

It should be emphasized that the term bandwagoning used in this work is
modified from Schweller’s original understanding. Schweller uses the term to denote why
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countries with compatible interests would cooperate with each other in the military realm
in times of conflict with other powers. In this work, bandwagoning assumes an additional
meaning. It signifies that countries can first increase/deepen their cooperation and,
second, do so in times of peace. This is an important point of the study, because it shows
that countries do not require conflicts and outside threats in general to expand, increase,
and deepen military cooperation. According to the study, one of the reasons why
countries would do so is to afford sophisticated and advanced military equipment.

It should also be noted that the state represented as a unitary actor is a choice of
convenience. Such a choice should not impact the conclusion of the study – that power
has exponential capacity, which affects the cooperation in military alliances. It is clear to
the author that state is not a black box, but a playing ground for competing actors vying
for political power. Among them, corporations and financial sector having interest in
military production and generally in military matters are very important. However, this
study does not go deep to dissect what these sectors are and how they impact state
agenda. This is a critical important aspect that should be examined in greater detail in a
study with a different scope. The axiomatic assumption on my side is that whoever the
agents who formally or informally dominate states’ agenda, they can cut down the costs
of military production by cooperating with each other, whether the ultimate goal is to
augment profits, increase state power, satisfy certain group interests, or promote certain
ideology worldwide. And as the study shows, change in the mode of military production
(deepened cooperation among states) has significantly cut down the production costs both
in Europe and the US, although due to inflationary costs in military production and for
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other possible reasons unexplored within the scope of the study, it has not necessarily
decreased the states’ expenditure.

The study completely discounts the role of certain external threats, for example,
Islamic terrorism, or threat language like concern with peripheral instability that justify
the cooperation among NATO great powers after the Cold War. The threat language was
actively used by the U.S. to justify NATO cooperation and expansion after the Cold War.
Moreover, the U.S. global military spending means protection of markets for a wide
range of firms, U.S. and European, so there is a larger constituency in favor of global
militarization, both in terms of consolidated profit-making opportunities within the
defense sector and opening up of markets—especially in the oil and natural gas sector,
where NATO global expansion was justified as early as the 1990s with the idea to protect
foreign oil markets from external "threats." But readers should be reminded that the goal
of the study was not to explore why NATO powers cooperate and justify their
cooperation in terms of actual or perceived external, geostrategic “threats.” Rather, this
study aimed at demonstrating that significant savings accrued to NATO partners from the
joint production and consumption of highly advanced and sophisticated military materiel.
While the final bill to governments remains relatively expensive, the accrued prize is the
acquisition of highly sophisticated military equipment that would otherwise be too
expensive and possibly beyond the procurement potentials of any single major NATO
power except, perhaps, the U.S. The latter is a critically important motivation for the
endurance, expansion, and deepening of the NATO alliance beyond 1991. This is a new
complementary interpretation that remained neglected until the completion of this work.
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Another key aspect that remains for future study and analysis is the absence of a
clear explanation on what the cost-sharing burden is among great powers. That is, how
much each NATO great power pays in the production of military goods. The study does
not emphasize the role of the U.S. military spending and its corporations in the common
military projects among NATO’s great powers. It should be noted that the U.S. and its
corporations play a significant role in almost all NATO projects. However, the European
Great powers are not idle or innocent bystanders either. France and Great Britain have
multiple military cooperation programs. They are already building a "Future Combat Air
System," due in 2030. Western Europeans are also cooperating in the production of
missiles through a company called MBDA. The collaboration has actually become so
successful that MBDA is now a primary competitor of the major global missile company,
Raytheon, from the U.S. The English and French have cooperated in the Storm Shadow
missile project. Similarly, the Meteor air-to-air missile is showing promise with the UK
acting as the lead on a six nation international program also involving France, Germany,
Italy, Spain and Sweden (Hartley 2012, 40).

Although, the U.S. and its corporations gain most from the hegemonic-induced
cooperation, as this study shows, other NATO great powers, as well as their national
corporations, gain considerably. In this regard, the study follows Morrow’s logic to
explain the endurance of NATO. James D. Morrow, in his article “Alliances and
Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” suggests
that symmetric alliances –that is, alliances of states with roughly equal strength–will not
last long because there is an inherent problem of distributing the costs and benefits
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(Morrow 1991, 908). In a symmetric alliance, a change in either ally's capabilities forces
a reallocation of the benefits of the alliance, making the alliance less likely to persist.
Conversely, asymmetric alliances are easier to negotiate and last longer. In such alliances
the small state gains the support of the strong state but loses autonomy and the strong
state provides this support and gains the compliance of the weaker one. Likewise,
corporate actors in European states might be getting less of the table compared to their
American partners in their asymmetric relationship, but, still, they are getting more than
they would if they were only oriented domestically or to Europe.

To summarize, internal or intra-alliance balancing dynamics are very important
for the endurance of military alliances. The internal security depends on the bargaining
between states and on the benefits they gain from bargaining. In an alliance among equal
powers, bargaining might destabilize its endurance. However, in asymmetric alliances,
endurance is much more readily available. Thus, the enduring success of NATO could be
attributed partially to the fact that it is an alliance between a major power and weaker
members. And by the same token, it is quite plausible that corporate actors within the
state influence the endurance and deepening of the alliance because of pecuniary
considerations. This aspect remains for further study in another work with a different
analytical scope.

Having analyzed external threat conditions, compatibility of state interests after
WWI and WWII and, also, military markets and imperfections in military production in
the post-Cold War era, I should have an answer about whether the political economy of
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military production is an important variable in the alliance politics among states. My
findings should elucidate why states may continue to ally and collaborate in the absence
of external threats and countervailing military power. And by the same token, the study
shows that Schweller’s balance-of-interests theory, generally valid in explaining alliance
choices of states during conflicts, by taking into consideration certain economic
variables, also explains military cooperation of great powers in times of peace. Schweller
provided a clue as to why powers could ally even if the threat to their security is
nonexistent.

In Schweller’s “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back
In,” he argues that states sometimes join an alliance hoping to gain something rather than
to defend from a real threat. Schweller suggests that some states—the so-called
revisionist states—are not satisfied with their position and care to increase their power
rather than just maintain security (Schweller 1994, 74). According to Schweller the
Europeans and the US would align to counter external threat, which challenges the status
quo. However, Schweller does not attempt to explain why alliances would hold in
peacetime. I have argued that at the moment, Europeans and Americans gain from
remaining involved in the alliance and cooperating with each other. The central argument
of this study was that political economic developments in the defense industry influenced
NATO’s endurance by affecting the policies and calculations of the alliance partners.

This study demonstrated that market imperfections—economies of scale,
economies of scope—and sharing escalating research/development costs in military
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production can significantly cut down military costs of the allies, without jeopardizing
their individual capabilities, autonomy, and relative power. Consequently, it makes sense
for states to cooperate with each other to cut down such costs, provided their national
interests are compatible. Scale, scope and learning economies and escalating research
costs do appear to influence defense industry costs, thereby prompting the restructuring
of the industry nationally and globally. Governments are more open to international
collaborations, because they realize they have a lot to gain from their continued military
cooperation. Cooperation allows large-scale production and gives companies
opportunities to merge to take advantage of size and other factors that affect the
production.

The central question of this study was: Why NATO endured through 1991-2014
in the absence of an external or extra-alliance threat. My answer to this question hinges
on pecuniary considerations leading to significant savings in the research, development,
and production functions of military materiel and operations. In the absence of an
external threat and countervailing power, NATO members did not need to spend much on
expensive weapons and on keeping large operational infrastructures, and specialized
personnel. Regarding research, development, and production, NATO countries let
military industries to consolidate, engage in trans-border, friendly mergers or economic
cooperation, and use economies of scale, scope and share research costs in order to cut
down costs.
To answer the question of how economic considerations in military production
might influence the endurance of alliances, given threat conditions and compatibility of
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interests, I tested two different sets of hypotheses. The first two hypotheses confirmed the
importance of the compatibility of national interests and the existence of external threats
to promote multinational military cooperation among several states. Hypotheses Nos. 3
and 4 showed that, even in the absence of external threats, states might choose to
cooperate given their interests are compatible.

Hypothesis No. 1: If there is no external threat and no compatibility of interests among
great powers, cooperation is weak or non-existent. I have analyzed the post WWI
developments to confirm the validity of this hypothesis.

Hypothesis No. 2: Incompatibility of interests, coupled with external threats, leads to
cooperation among great powers. I have analyzed the post WWII developments to
confirm the validity of this hypothesis.

Hypothesis No. 3: Cooperation in states’ military production, given their national
interests are compatible, is positively related to economies of scale, economies of scope,
and learning by doing, both in the absence or presence of external threat. I have analyzed
the post-Cold War developments to confirm the validity of this hypothesis.

Hypothesis No. 4: Cooperation in military the production of states, with compatible
interests, provided there are favorable market conditions, is positively related to
escalating costs in military production, both in the absence or presence of external threat.
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I have analyzed the post-Cold War developments to confirm the validity of this
hypothesis.

Detailed Explanation of Findings:

Hypothesis No. 1: If there is no external threat and no compatibility of interests
among great powers, cooperation is weak or non-existent.

Political developments after WWI confirmed hypothesis No. 1. Great powers
failed to engage in military cooperation after the war. The disappearance of the external
threat loosened the bond holding the Triple Entente powers together. Consumed by their
own national interests, the USA, the United Kingdom, and France reverted back to
traditional, balance of power approach to foreign affairs. Among this limited coterie,
there were clashing interests and an unequal power balance. France, who had suffered the
most, held the biggest grudge against Germans and worked hard to weaken them
permanently. The British goal was to safeguard its economic interests, to manage the
European balance of power, and protect its empire. The objectives of the United States
were to create a stable world of democratic governments, limited armaments, and open
markets (Horne 2010, 129)

The U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson, was shocked by the savagery of the war.
Although, he developed the idea of the League of Nations, American contribution to it
was kept minimal during its work. Wilson was a firm believer that Germany had to be
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punished; however, the punishment should not have been harsh, to make sure that
Germans would reconcile with the rest of Europe. During the conference, Americans
were disappointed that their wartime allies shared little enthusiasm for the Fourteen
Points plan advanced by President Wilson (Hickman 2015, 2). The main reasons for the
lack of understanding among powers were reparations and imperial competition.

British concern was to preserve the British Empire. They sought to settle
territorial disputes; keep France protected, and make sure that the German fleet never
became potent enough to challenge the British Navy. While the British favored the
formation of the League of Nations, they discouraged Wilson's call for self-determination
as it could adversely affect Britain's colonies possessions (Hickman 2015, 4). French
Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau wanted to make sure that Germans never attempted
to restore territorial holdings or seek any kind of revenge. The destruction brought upon
French territory was to be indemnified by the reparations negotiated at Versailles
(Hickman 2015, 10). The French wanted to make sure that Germans paid war reparations,
and they even occupied Rurh region in 1923 in order to force Germany to pay. Georges
Clemenceau, the French statesman, believed that Germany had to be weakened so that it
would never be able to start a war. The three victorious nations were far from united on
how Germany should be treated and had conflicting views about how best to reorganize
the post-war political and economic systems. As a result, they failed to continue military
cooperation after the war.
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Hypothesis No. 2: Incompatibility of interests, coupled with external threats,
leads to cooperation among great powers.

I have analyzed the post WWII developments to confirm the validity of this
hypothesis. Hypothesis No. 2 is confirmed by the political and strategic developments
after WWII. The Allies—the U.S.A., Great Britain, and France—did not continue
military cooperation immediately after the end of the Second World War. Just like after
the Cold War, when the Soviet Union capitulated and disappeared as a geostrategic
threat, the main rival of the coalition during WWII—Nazi Germany—was defeated and
ceased to be a threat. The explanation lies in the fact that the national interests of great
powers—the U.S., Great Britain, and France—were incompatible. However, these three
great powers united as soon as they realized that the Soviet Union was a major
geostrategic threat to their national security.

The U.S., the UK, France, and the Soviet Union were on the winning side of
WWII. During the war these allies were united in their opposition to and quest to defeat
Nazi Germany; however, immediately after defeating their common enemy, they
discovered that they had more differences than similarities in their visions of the post-war
European and global orders. The U.S. desired to reconstruct the post-war world into one
based on multilateralism and open-door politics. Britain, on the other hand, too weak to
compete economically with the U.S. hanged on to its Imperial Preference system. France,
just like after WWI, wanted to prevent the rise of Germany, and in this regard it differed
deeply from the US and the UK, which saw a strong Germany as a barrier against the
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spread of Soviet communism in Europe. Thus, after the war the differences among great
powers might have proved insurmountable, if it had not been for the common threat
posed by the Soviet Union, which they all faced at this juncture.

WWI transformed the way Washington’s decision makers thought about U.S.
national security. Long-term American interests required a world more open to the free
flow of goods and capital. Quantitative restrictions, imperial preferences, exchange
controls, and autarkical economic arrangements had restricted trade, prolonged the Great
Depression, and bred jealousy and aggression (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 24). The
US State Department officials who began planning for the postwar world as early as 1940
considered an open international system based on multilateral commercial and financial
arrangements indispensable to postwar security. The unrestricted flow of capital and
goods would tend to bind other nations to the United States and discourage trade alliances
that could endanger U.S. security (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 104).

On the other side, the British government, especially the Exchequer and the Board
of Trade, strengthened the Sterling Bloc during wartime. Material losses during WWII,
nevertheless, forced the British government to consolidate the bloc and to accelerate the
trend toward governmental control of international finance and foreign commerce
(Kennedy and Hitchcock). The government limited imports from outside the Sterling
Bloc and limited the ability of domestic businesses to import from foreign countries.
American policymakers did not approve of British actions, because these actions
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contradicted America’s goals to make multilateralism the primary reference of post-war
global economic system (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 108).

The French were opposed to American and British measures designed to raise
industrial production in Germany. In addition, they did not like that the Americans had
decided to merge German zones and allow for self-government. The French were fearful
that Germans would pose a threat to France, alone or in alliance with Soviets.
Washington's most influential diplomat in Europe, Lewis Douglas, informed Marshall
that "if the French were assured of long-term US defensive cooperation against German
aggression, in other words, we would fight on the Rhine in such an eventuality, the
French would relax in their attitude regarding German industry and reconstruction"
(Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 124).

Soviet Threat and Transatlantic Alliance

It is evident that the post-WWII cooperation between the US and the Western
European powers proved to be on more solid than the one after the WWI. The critically
important factor was the cooperation among the governments of Great Britain, France,
and the United states. The heavy involvement of governments was crucial to the success
of cooperation. However, this involvement was largely conditioned by the Soviet threat.
Had communism appeared more of a menace to Western Europe in the 1920s, perhaps
the United States and Britain would have adopted a more resolute public policy in the
1920s (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 128).
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The Marshall Plan would help Europe to stand on its feet and create a multilateral
order, which the Soviets would not be able to undermine through their policies. The idea
was to link economies together and make sure that the Western countries would never fall
under the influence of the Soviets. The U.S. was particularly worried that the Kremlin
could lure the Western Europeans with economic incentives or promises of territorial
aggrandizement. According to Marshall, the worst of all scenarios would be seeing "a
Germany controlled by the Soviet Union with German military potential utilized in
alliance with the Soviet” (Kennedy and Hitchcock 2000, 129). Incompatibility of Great
power interests was the primary obstacle to their cooperation right after the war. The
incompatibility of interests among the allied powers led to the disintegration of the
Western Alliance after the end of WWII. However, very soon the Soviet threat made the
U.S., United Kingdom and France put aside their differences in order to counterbalance
the existence of immediate external threats. This was very different from the aftermath of
the post WWI environment and it turned out to be the facilitating factor that held the
allies together immediately after the post-WWII environment.

Hypothesis No. 3: Cooperation in states’ military production, given the fact that
their national interests are compatible, is positively related to economies of scale,
economies of scope, and learning by doing, both in the absence or presence of external
threat.

The collapse and disappearance of the Soviet Union removed the geostrategic
external threat and military power balancing that NATO members confronted since 1949
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until 1991. The absence of the threat obviated the need for NATO members to maintain
the military alliance, according to traditional military alliance theory, and/or to sustain
their individual and collective Cold War level of military expenditure. In this new
geostrategic context some firms could not keep up with reduced sovereign demand for
defense-related equipment and, thus, many companies exited this market. Others, in order
to stay in business, consolidated their operations and expanded their markets
internationally. Because of their size and other specific qualities, these companies could
take advantage of economies of scale and other market imperfections.

Sandler and Hartley suggest that scale economies per se may have had only a
modest influence on defense industry structure in the past, though the evidence for
learning-by-doing and their impact was more convincing recently (Sandler and Hartley,
1995, 28). However, since the 1990s scale economies have had a major impact as well.
Dunne suggests that governments now appear more sensitive to the extra cost incurred by
small national production runs (and the high technology nature of some manufacture) and
more receptive to the argument that “economies of scale need to be met through
international collaboration and industrial restructuring” (Dunne 1995, 595).

The end of the Cold War transformed the defense industry in two important ways:
First, defense firms in the NATO countries grew to become giants through the
consolidation process and, second, NATO Great Powers have established themselves as
the only dominant players in the development, production, and export of advanced
weapon systems (Mantin and Tishler 2004, 38). Mergers in the US reduced the number of
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defense and aerospace firms from 15 major companies in 1990 to four by 1998, namely,
Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon (Hartley and Sandler 1995,
30). Post-Cold War consolidations have affected the structure of the industry. During the
Cold War the industry was not concentrated, as the top five companies sold about 20 per
cent of global arms. By 2003 this had changed significantly, with the top five firms
accounting for 44 per cent of total arms sales. This large increase in the share of the top
companies has continued further for the top 10, 15, and 20 manufacturers of defenserelated equipment (Mantin and Tishler 2004, 55).

European consolidation: The emergence of four giant American defense firms
stimulated the process of consolidation in Europe too (Becker 2000, 25). Size, so it
seems, had become a significant factor in the defense industry (Dunne 1993, 104).
However, the European industrial consolidation was necessarily a more complicated
matter. Here the process involved cross-border consolidations, which created political
problems (Ripley 2005, 28). The consolidation of Western Europe’s defense market was
a more gradual process than that in the US. These were centered around EADS (a
European international merger in 2000 involving aerospace companies in France,
Germany and Spain); BAE Systems; and Thales (electronics) which is a French company
based on Thomson-CSF which acquired the UK defense companies and divisions of
Racal, Thomson Marconi Sonar and Shorts Missiles Systems (2000). Further European
mergers resulted in the creation of Agusta-Westland (helicopters: Italy and the UK: 2000
and MBDA (missiles) which was a merger of Matra BAe Dynamics (France and the UK)
and Alenia Marconi Systems (Italy) (Hartley and Sandler 2003, 367).
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Governments are increasingly willing to recognize that the high costs of
sophisticated technology, defense R & D and smaller national production runs mean that
economies of scale need to be met through international collaboration and industrial
restructuring (Dunne and Surry 2005, 226). The trend was different a few decades ago,
when governments aimed to maintain a comprehensive national defense industrial base.
Major non-US defense companies are also buying defense contractors in the US as a
means of entering the US defense market. While there has been some activity in Europe,
there is still some way to go in terms of restructuring and increasing concentration.

Thus, on the bases of the factors outlined above, the findings of this study confirm
hypothesis 3. That is, market imperfections positively influence cooperation in military
production among great powers. Consolidations, mergers, and collaborative projects
which have become the new golden rule of the game in military production after the Cold
War have created fertile conditions for great power cooperation.

Hypothesis No. 4: Cooperation in military production of states with compatible interests,
provided that there are favorable market conditions, is positively related to escalating
costs in military production, both in the absence or presence of external threat.

Both military and civil aerospace costs are tremendous and the costs are rising.
The costs are actually growing at an exponential rate (Augustine 1987, 18). The historical
cost trend arises from technical progress in each generation, with governments striving to
purchase the latest products so as to have a competitive edge. Continuing rising costs

205

provide a context for nations to engage in collaboration. The cost incentives to
collaborate result from large fixed costs with nations unable to afford the equipment.
Countries seek to acquire the latest high technology in defense equipment to maintain
their superiority in the technical arms race. New technology creates new capabilities. The
continued trend of rising unit costs of combat aircraft, for instance, renders the point
about independent development nonsensical since if there is to be another future
generation of manned combat aircraft, it will be too costly after some time for any single
nation to develop and produce independently. European Great Powers have already
reached this limit.

Examples from collaborative projects in Europe confirm that common production
brings serious benefits to collaborating partners. Collaborative development costs
compared with national alternatives can be some 140% as high for two nations (e.g.
Merlin helicopter), 161–179% for three nations (e.g. Tornado) and almost twice as high
for four nations (e.g. Eurofighter). Despite higher aggregate development costs on
collaboration, each partner only bears its share of these costs so that there are costs
savings to the countries involved in collaborative development work (Hartley 1999, 47).

Collaboration in Other Spheres:

Western Europeans are also cooperating in the production of missiles through a
company called MBDA. The collaboration has actually become so successful that MBDA
now is a primary competitor of the major global missile company based in the U.S.,
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Raytheon. The British and French have cooperated on the Storm Shadow missile project.
Similarly, the Meteor air-to-air missile is showing promise with the UK acting as the lead
on a six-nation international collaborative program also involving France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, and Sweden (Hartley 2010, 111).

Logistical support can also bring important gain. Important economic benefits can
accrue from logistical support. The UK, Netherlands, Belgium, and France have been
cooperating in the logistical support of Spey, Olympus and Tyne marine engines.
According to rough estimates, such cooperation has saved participating countries about
30 per cent in maintenance services. The UK and US benefit considerably from their
cooperation in the Multi-Launch Rocket System and the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile.
They have benefited from the economies of scale through joint purchasing schemes of
spares and shared maintenance facilities (Ministry of Defense 2001).

Western Europeans have successfully cooperated in other helicopter and missile
programs. Among them, the 1967 Anglo-French helicopter agreement and the NH90
helicopter need to be singled out in relation to this international collaborative aspect in
the defense industry. The NH90 helicopter is a four-nation collaboration project to
develop and build a medium-sized, multi-role military helicopter (Hartley 2010, 112).
The manufacturers of the helicopter are NH Industries (France and Germany),
AgustaWestland and Fokker Aerostructures. NATO Helicopter Management Agency
(NAHEMA) manages the program for participating NATO members. There are six
assembly lines: in France, Germany, Italy, Finland, Spain and Australia. 573 helicopters
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have been sold by 2011. More generally, European collaboration in helicopters has
created two industrial groups which are now competitive with the US helicopter industry
(Hartley 2010, 113).

The British Ministry of Defense estimates that collaboration with partners in
research brings considerable benefits—almost five times the original investment.
Collaboration with partners provides access to important technology, prevents countries
from duplicating costs, and in general allows for more efficiently manage the limited and
shrinking national defense budgets. The UK Ministry of Defense spends a little over 40
million pounds on collaborative programs with other nations, less than 10% of its defense
budget. However, according to their estimate, they obtain technology worth
approximately £200 million– a 5:1 return ratio on its original investment (Ministry of
Defense 2001).

Theoretical Contribution of the Study:

My findings suggest that the political economy of military production is an
important variable in the alliance politics among great powers. The findings of this study
elucidate why states continue to ally in the absence of external threats and military
power-balancing needs. The findings of this study also reveal that Schweller’s logic in his
balance-of-interests theory is generally valid. Finally, this study shows that by taking into
consideration economic variables, one can also explain military cooperation and
coalitions between great powers in times of peace. On the larger scale, the study
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demonstrates that the incorporation of political economic variables enriches and
complements the international relations theory of military alliances. Classical realist and
neorealist theories have been largely silent on how the political economy of security
conditions the possibility of alliance endurance among member states. I tried to show that
the notion of social power entails a political economic dimension that remained neglected
and unincorporated into alliance dynamics theories by realist scholars and generally by
international security theorists.

I introduced above the notion of intra-alliance dynamics as an important influence
on the endurance of alliances. Among the various important factors conditioning internal
dynamics, state interests stand out as one of the most prominent assumptions. Similar to
Schweller’s argument about the compatibility of interests among states, my explanation
takes the level of analysis explaining the endurance of alliances from the systemic to the
state level. According to this perspective, alliances are not solely influenced by systemic
factors but also, and perhaps very importantly, by how nation-states view their interests
within the system. This is more a refinement of neo-classical realism.

Schweller only explains why states dissatisfied with the status quo, such as
wolves and jackals would ally to change the odds. And “lions” that are content with the
status quo create alliances to oppose change. Schweller does not explain, nevertheless,
why lions would continue their alliance after the threat to their status disappeared, as is in
the case of NATO. Even more importantly, though, he does not explain why states would
deepen their military cooperation in the absence of external or extra-alliance challenges
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and power-balancing dynamics. I explain such development by introducing the politicaleconomic arguments and their influence on the defense industry and alliance dynamics.

Economies of scale, scope, learning-by-doing and research and development costs
provide the political economic rationale for such outcome. Classical realists and
neorealists consider political-economic elements mainly under the rubric of intra-alliance
balancing. According to them, states balance internally when they augment their own
capabilities by increasing economic growth and increasing military spending.
Accordingly, the economic potential of a country is determined by its natural resource
endowment, its demographic, economic, military and technological capacity. Logically
speaking, the military power of a state is shaped by the state’s own economic potential in
military production. However, with economies of scale, economies of scope, and shared
research and development costs a different logic operates. In cooperation with each other,
nation-states may be able to achieve more power using the same resources or the same
level of power by using fewer resources.

The findings of this study suggest that military power has a unique quality. It has
a capacity to increase exponentially in ratio to inputs. This is important because states
might decide to cooperate in the creation of this power by pulling their resources
together. In this manner they would be generating more power than they could on their
own, using the same resources. Moreover, cooperation would make sense even if states
would want to generate the same amount of power, which they could on their own,
simply because it would cost states less.
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Based on the outlined explanations, the findings of the study suggest that the logic
of Schweller's balance-of-interest works in times of peace as well. Status quo powers will
cooperate among each other and they do not need external threats and power-balancing
compulsion to do so. As long as their national interests are compatible, pecuniary
considerations will be the bond that holds these powers together under the NATO
umbrella even in the absence of formidable rivals like the former Soviet Union, Nazi
Germany, or Imperial Japan.
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